Equitable Guarantee And Trust Company v. Donahoe

• Decision Date: 16 May 1901
• Citation: 19 Del. 191,49 A. 372
• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Parties: THE EQUITABLE GUARANTEE AND TRUST COMPANY v. JOHN P. DONAHOE, Collector of Taxes for the Northern District of the City of Wilmington

49 A. 372

19 Del. 191

THE EQUITABLE GUARANTEE AND TRUST COMPANY v. JOHN P. DONAHOE, Collector of Taxes for the Northern District of the City of Wilmington

Superior Court of Delaware

May 16, 1901

Court in Banc.

ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT (No. 143, May Term, 1900). Case stated in the Superior Court for New Castle County.

The material facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Williard Saulsbury and Anthony Higgins for plaintiff.

John H Rodney, Henry C. Conrad and Peter L. Cooper Jr., for defendant.

LORE C. J., and SPRUANCE, GRUBB, PENNEWILL and BOYCE, Associate Justices, sitting.

OPINION

LORE, C. J.

This is an action of assumpsit, brought by the Equitable Guarantee and Trust Company, the plaintiff, to recover from John P Donahoe, Collector of Taxes for the Northern District of the City of Wilmington, the defendant, certain taxes assessed for the years 1898 and 1899 against the plaintiff, under the provisions of Chapter 381, Volume 20, Laws of Delaware, passed May 29, 1897, entitled "An Act to Equalize Taxation for State and County Purposes," and under the provisions of Chapter 24, Volume 21, Laws of Delaware, approved May 25, 1898, entitled "An Act to Amend Chapter 381, Volume 20, of the Laws of Delaware, entitled 'An Act to Equalize Taxation for State and County Purpose;'" which said taxes were paid by the plaintiff under protest.

The plaintiff claims that these acts, collectively known as the Adams Tax Law, are unconstitutional, null and void, for the following reasons:

First, because neither the title of the original act of 1897 (Chapter 381, Volume 20), nor of the amending act of 1898 (Chapter 24, Volume 21), discloses the subject of municipal taxation, which is embraced in the text of the amending act, and is therefore within the inhibition of Section 15, Article 2 of the Constitution of 1897.

Second, because the title is deceptive, false and misleading; in that it claims to be an act "to equalize," when in fact the provisions of the amending act of 1898 produce inequality in taxation; requiring as it does citizens of rural New Castle County to contribute three times as much for county purposes as is required of a citizen of Wilmington.

Third. The plaintiff further claims, that in any event it must recover the amount paid as taxes for 1898, because the tax for that year was not assessed according to law; in that no opportunity of review or of appeal from the assessment was given to the taxable; that he had no day in court.

The first inquiry is, does the title disclose the subject of municipal taxation, within the scope of Section 16, Article 2, of the Constitution of 1897.

The title of the original act of 1897 is, "An Act to Equalize Taxation for State and County Purposes."

The text of that act relates to the assessment and collection of taxes for State and County purposes, upon all investments paying interest or yielding an income which are not taxed for either State or County purposes or exempt from taxation and provides that one-fourth of the money so raised in each county shall be for the use of the State, and the other three-fourths for the use of the county in which the same was levied and collected.

The title of the amending act of 1898 is, "An Act to Amend Chapter 381, Volume 20, Laws of Delaware, entitled 'An Act to Equalize Taxation for State and County Purposes.'"

Section 7 of the latter act provides as to New Castle County as follows: "That of the moneys which shall be levied and collected under the provisions of this act, within the limits of the City of Wilmington, one-fourth thereof shall be for the use of the State and another one-fourth thereof shall be for the use of New Castle County, and the remaining two-fourths thereof shall be for the use of 'The Mayor and Council of Wilmington.'"

Thus introducing into the act as amended the subject of municipal taxation.

Section 16, Article 2 of the Constitution of 1897, as already stated, is as follows: "No bill or joint resolution except bills appropriating money for public purposes, shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title."

Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations, 143 has concisely stated the reasons for the insertion of provisions like this in State Constitutions. He says: "It may be assumed as settled, that the purpose of these provisions was, first to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation:

"Second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the Legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles give no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted;

"Third, to fairly apprise the people through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have an opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire."

So far as the subject of taxation for municipal purposes is concerned, is not this title open to all of the three objections stated by Judge Cooley? First, as tending to log rolling or omnibus legislation; second, surprise or fraud upon the Legislature, there being no intimation of this subject; third, giving no fair notice to the people of this subject of legislation.

In addition, does not the title negative the presence of legislation for municipal purposes, by expressly confining the scope of the act to be "for State and County purposes;" and to that extent deceiving and misleading the Legislature and the people?

If the title had stopped with the words "An Act to Equalize Taxation;" a different question would have been presented. In that case, the general subject of taxation, without any qualification other than that of equality, would be covered. When to these words, however, are added the limitation "for State and County purposes;" it becomes the legislative declaration that no other than state and county taxation are contemplated.

In Montgomery Building and Loan Association vs. Robinson, 69 Ala. 413, this whole subject is very ably discussed, and this clear rule is laid down. "The question must always be, whether, taking from the title the subject, we can find anything in the bill which cannot be referred to that subject. If we do, the law embraces a subject not described in the title." The provision of the Alabama Constitution is as follows: "Each law shall embrace but one subject, which shall be described in the title."

In the case of Sewickley Borough vs. State, 118 Pa. 165, 12 A. 302, it was held that under "an act to exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes and places of religious worship," etc. that a provision in the act taxing other property not used for such purposes was unconstitutional, under the following constitutional provision: "No bill except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in the title."

It was decided in Hyman vs. The State, 87 Tenn. 109, 9 S.W. 372, that "A statute prohibiting sales of liquor to drunken husbands is unconstitutional and void if enacted either as an original or amended act, under the caption 'An Act to Prevent the Sale, Giving or Delivery of Liquor to Minors.' Its purview is not germane to its caption."

The provision of the Tennessee Constitution was that "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title."

The Court in that case uses the following language: "The precise question to be determined in this case is, whether the title of the original act, entitled; 'An Act to prevent the Sale or Giving or Delivery of Liquors to Minors,' is broad enough to embrace an amendment, not relating in any way to prohibiting sales or gifts of liquors to minors, but which prohibits the sale or giving liquors to drunken husbands. We are not at all disposed, to construe this constitutional provision strictly. On the contrary it should be given a liberal construction, so as not to embarrass legislation by a construction unnecessary to accomplish the beneficial purposes for which it was adopted. Yet, as stated by the eminent constitutional lawyer already cited (Cooley), the Legislature may make the title to an act as restrictive as they please. It is obvious that they may sometimes so form it, as to preclude many matters being included in the act, which might with entire propriety have been embraced in the enactment with the matter indicated in the title, but which must not be extended because the bill has been made unnecessarily restrictive. The Court cannot enlarge the scope of the title; they are vested with no dispensing power. The Constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the legislative intent, as to what shall have operation. It is no answer to say that the title might have been made more comprehensive if in fact the Legislature has not seen fit to make it so. (Colley Const. Lims., 179). It is not to be doubted that the Legislature might have in one act, prohibited the sale of liquors to both minors and habitual drunkards, and that many other classes of persons might have been included within the prohibition. But in such case, the title to the act should have been comprehensive enough to have included the several prohibitions.

"The title of the act in question is an exceedingly restrictive one. It clearly indicates, that the subject of the act is the sale of liquors to minors. The subject of legislation is not the sale or giving of liquors generally but the sale to a very limited class, to wit; minors. It would never occur to legislator or layman that under such an index would be found legislation prohibiting the sale of liquors to any other class of...