Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States v. Askew

• Decision Date: 25 January 1943
• Docket Number: 35248.
• Citation: 11 So.2d 441,194 Miss. 347
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES v. ASKEW.

11 So.2d 441

194 Miss. 347

EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF UNITED STATES v. ASKEW.

No. 35248.

Supreme Court of Mississippi

January 25, 1943

Heidelberg & Roberts, of Hattiesburg, Watkins & Eager, of Jackson, and Alexander & Green, of New York City, for appellant.

Hannah Simrall & Foote, of Hattiesburg, for appellee.

SMITH Chief Justice.

The appellee is the beneficiary in two life insurance policies issued by the appellant to Charles D. Askew, each in the sum of $1,000 and both of which contained this clause:

"Upon due proof that the death of the Insured resulted solely from bodily injuries caused directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes by external, violent and purely accidental means, subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter stated, the Society agrees to increase the amount payable as stated on the face hereof, to Two Thousand Dollars.

This increased amount of insurance in case of accidental death shall be payable upon receipt of due proof that the death of the Insured occurred while this policy was in full force and effect, and resulted solely from bodily injuries, caused directly, exclusively and independently of all other causes by external, violent and purely accidental means, provided that death shall ensue within 90 day from the date of such injuries and shall not be the result of or be caused directly or indirectly by self-destruction, sane or insane, disease or illness of any kind, physical or mental infirmity."

On May 26, 1941, the insured fell breaking his hip and died on July 5, 1941. The appellant paid the $2,000 absolutely due under the policies on the death of the insured, but denied liability for the additional $2,000 agreed to be paid therein on the happening of the events set forth in the clause thereof hereinabove set out, for the collection of which this action was brought. When the appellee rested her case the appellent did likewise, introducing no evidence. A request by the appellant for a directed verdict was denied, but a similar request by the appellee was granted and there was a verdict and judgment accordingly. In support of its contention that the appellee's request for a directed verdict should have been denied and that its request therefor should have been granted, the appellant says that the appellee did not meet her burden of proving (a) that the insured's fall was caused by accidental means, and (b) that his death was not the result of...