Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher
Decision Date | 02 October 1953 |
Citation | 34 Del.Ch. 76,99 A.2d 490 |
Parties | EQUITABLE TRUST CO. v. GALLAGHER. |
Court | Supreme Court of Delaware |
Stephen E. Hamilton, Jr., Wilmington (H. Albert Young, Wilmington, on the brief), for appellant.
Joseph Donald Craven, Wilmington, for appellee.
Hugh F. Gallagher, the defendant, during the whole period with which this suit is concerned, has been the president, the majority stockholder, and one of the three members of the board of directors of Union Park Motors, Inc., a corporation engaged in the automobile business at Wilmington, Delaware.
Margaret C. Kane, a cousin of defendant, was for a number of years employed by Union Park Motors, Inc., and up until her death she remained its trusted and valued employee. She was the corporation's secretary-treasurer and one of the members of the board of directors. Since 1936 Miss Kane had owned one share of stock in the corporation.
In 1941 the defendant, out of his personal holdings 1 of Union Park stock, made a gift to Miss Kane of an interest in 19 shares. The instrument of gift was in the form of an assignment to Union Park Motors, Inc., as trustee, to hold the stock for Margaret C. Kane for her life, and upon her death to assign it, free of the trust, unto three named sons of the defendant.
As of September 27, 1946, another instrument was prepared for defendant by defendant's counsel of record in this cause, in an attempt to enlarge Miss Kane's stock holdings. This instrument was duly signed and sealed in triplicate by defendant in his individual capacity, by Union Park Motors, Inc., by Margaret C. Kane, and, because of an interest in certain terms of the agreement which are of no concern to us, by Catherine Gallagher, defendant's sister. However, no new or other stock certificate was issued to Margaret C. Kane or to anyone in her behalf prior to her death on the 18th day of January, 1947.
Letters were not at once taken out on Margaret C. Kane's estate, and for a time there was some uncertainty as to whether the Equitable Trust Company, which was named in the will as executor, would serve or would renounce. While matters so stood, the defendant made a visit to the Kane home, where he obtained both Margaret C. Kane's copy of the 1946 agreement and also Catherine Gallagher's copy, which Miss Kane had been keeping because Miss Gallagher had no safe deposit box. After some interval defendant destroyed all three copies. So far as the record shows, although the paper was, as stated above, prepared by defendant's attorney, no copy of it, either signed or unsigned, thereafter remained in existence.
In due course Equitable Trust Company qualified as executor and demanded the 19 shares of stock which it claimed were right-fully Margaret C. Kane's at the time of her death. Upon defendant's refusal to deliver or to account for non-delivery, suit was commenced in the Court of Chancery. Plaintiff claimed the right to recover, either on the theory of a completed gift or on the ground that there was an enforceable contract. It prayed alternatively for delivery of the 19 shares or of their equivalent in money, in either case with an accounting for dividends.
The case was tried below before Chancellor Harrington, who included among his factual findings a determination that the following excerpt from the testimony of one of the witnesses was a fair reconstruction of that portion of the instrument of September 27, 1946, which concerned Margaret C. Kane:
The Chancellor's opinion is reported in 31 Del.Ch. 88, 67 A.2d 50.
Plaintiff appealed. The matter came on to be heard by this court as it was constituted prior to the constitutional amendment of 1951, art. 4, § 1 et seq., Del.C.Ann. It was at first decided that the Chancellor had been right in denying the plaintiff relief on the gift theory and that since plaintiff had not relied upon the contract theory before the Chancellor, that point could not be urged for the first time on appeal. Del., 77 A.2d 548.
Before any mandate went down to the Court of Chancery, however, a petition for re-argument was filed, representing, inter alia, that the contract theory had in fact been argued in the court below. The Supreme Court was impressed by this contention, and in an unreported opinion dated the 28th day of February, 1951, speaking through Judge Layton, it said:
'It occurs to us that the most effective way of solving the difficulty is to remand this case for re-trial before the Chancellor, but that the re-trial be limited to the question whether the trust agreement of 1946 is a contract based upon valid consideration requiring the transfer in fee to decedent's personal representatives of 19 shares of the stock of Union Park Motors, Inc.'
Neither this second opinion nor the mandate entered thereon on May 2, 1951, made any express reference to that portion of the petition for re-argument which contained plaintiff's application to re-argue its gift theory. The mandate covered the contract point in language similar to what we have quoted from the opinion.
The case was thereupon remanded to the Court of Chancery and by stipulation was submitted to Vice-Chancellor Bramhall 'on the basis of the pleadings, depositions, testimony, opinions of the Supreme Court and briefs * * *'. The Vice-Chancellor's opinion, reported in Del.Ch., 95 A.2d 470, 471, held in substance that the 'trust agreement of 1946', to which his attention had been directed by the Supreme Court, was totally lacking in consideration and, therefore, was not enforceable as a contract.
Following this opinion and the decree entered upon it, plaintiff applied to the Vice-Chancellor for relief grounded upon its 'gift theory', basing its application upon the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Court of Chancery, Del.C.Ann. A memorandum opinion was handed down, and a decree entered on the 29th day of April, 1953, denied this form of relief.
From both these decrees of the Vice-Chancellor the plaintiff has appealed. These two appeals are the ones designated in the caption hereof as No. 17, 1953, and No. 18, 1953, respectively. Plaintiff further contends that the petition for reargument filed in this court as it was formerly constituted still stands open and undisposed of, because it says that no judgment or mandate ever ruled upon that portion of the petition which was based upon its gift theory. Plaintiff, therefore, now relies upon one old appeal and two new ones.
Plaintiff elected first to argue the alleged error of the Vice-Chancellor in holding that the contract is unenforceable for want of consideration. We shall adopt the same order of treatment.
Was there, then, consideration to support defendant's promise?
We agree with defendant that the written instrument dated the 27th day of September, 1946, as it was reconstructed below, is couched in donative language, and, consequently, if the inquiry here were to be confined within the limits of that paper-writing, no supporting consideration could be found. But, as we see the facts, only a portion of the agreement 2 of 1946 was reduced to writing, and our view of the scope of the present inquiry is that it embraces the whole contract. We agree with the Vice-Chancellor that the question left open by the mandate is the broad one of whether there 'was any contractual relationship between the parties'...
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