ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson

• Decision Date: 05 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-288,98-288
• Citation: 977 S.W.2d 212,335 Ark. 63
• Parties: ERC CONTRACTOR YARD & SALES and Liberty Mutual Insurance, Appellants, v. Lonnie ROBERTSON, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 212

977 S.W.2d 212

335 Ark. 63

ERC CONTRACTOR YARD & SALES and Liberty Mutual Insurance, Appellants, v. Lonnie ROBERTSON, Appellee.

No. 98-288.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 5, 1998.

James A. Arnold, Rebecca D. Hattabaugh, Fort Smith, for Appellants.

David L. Rush, Craig L. Cook, Paris, for Appellee.

IMBER, Justice.

This case is before us on review from the Arkansas Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals agreed with appellants ERC Contractor Yard & Sales and Liberty Mutual Insurance (hereinafter referred to as ERC) that there was a presence of alcohol, however small, in appellee Lonnie Robertson's blood. However, the Court of Appeals concluded that substantial evidence existed to support the finding by the Workers' Compensation Commission that Mr. Robertson's injury was not substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 60 Ark.App. 310, 961 S.W.2d 36 (1998). The Court of Appeals further affirmed the Commission's determination that Mr. Robertson's fall was caused by an alcohol-withdrawal condition which was personal in nature, or idiopathic, and that the fall was compensable because his employment placed him on a scaffolding twelve to fifteen feet off the ground and thereby increased the effects of his fall. Id. Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's determination of Mr. Robertson's rate of compensation. Id. We affirm the decision of the Commission.

On September 18, 1995, Mr. Robertson fell from scaffolding while he was working on a building demolition for ERC. While being treated for his injuries at the hospital, Mr. Robertson submitted to a urine drug screen and a blood-alcohol test. The urine drug screen showed a negative result, while the blood-alcohol test showed a blood-alcohol level of less than 0.01%. Mr. Robertson subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. ERC and its workers' compensation carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance, controverted this claim on the basis that Mr. Robertson's injuries were "substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol" and were not compensable under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Supp.1997).

At the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), Mr. Robertson admitted his history of alcohol abuse. Medical reports corroborated this history and also reflected that Mr. Robertson told his doctors he was not drinking on the day of the accident or the day before the accident. Similarly, Mr. Robertson's girlfriend told his doctors that he was not drinking on the day of the accident, although he drank two beers the day before the accident. Mr. Robertson's supervisor, Mr. Michael Austin, also testified that he was not drinking on the day of the accident. Medical reports noted that on September 18 and 19 Mr. Robertson had "the faint smell of alcohol on his breath," and "the smell of a fruitescent substance on his breath." However, the toxicology report reflected conflicting test results for the presence of alcohol on September 18, the day of the accident: no alcohol was detected in the specimen collected at 9:50 p.m. and less than 0.01% was detected from blood drawn at 9:55 p.m. Finally, Mr. Robertson's doctors concurred that a seizure related to alcohol-withdrawal syndrome caused him to fall on September 18, 1995.

The ALJ awarded workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Robertson, finding that no alcohol was present so as to raise the statutory presumption set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv), and that, even if the presence of alcohol was established, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Mr. Robertson's injury was not substantially occasioned by alcohol. The ALJ further concluded that Mr. Robertson's fall was idiopathic and compensable because the conditions at his worksite contributed to the injury. ERC appealed the ALJ's decision to the Workers' Compensation Commission. After conducting a de novo review of the record, the Commission adopted the findings of the ALJ and affirmed the ruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision. ERC Contractor Yard & Sales, supra.

We granted ERC's petition for review because this case presents an opportunity to address the statutory presumption created by Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv). We also address whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's determination that Mr. Robertson's injury was not substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol.

It is well settled that upon a petition for review, we consider the case as though it were originally filed in this court. Frette v. City of Springdale, 331 Ark. 103, 959 S.W.2d 734 (1998); Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998). On appeal of a workers' compensation case from the Court of Appeals to this court, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission's decision, and we uphold that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 313 Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993). We will not reverse the Commission's decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Id.

A prima facie presumption existed under our prior workers' compensation law that an injury did not result from intoxication of the injured employee. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-707(4)(1987). Under this statute, the employer bore the burden of rebutting that presumption by proving that the employee was intoxicated and that the employee's injury resulted from intoxication. In 1993, Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-707(4) (1987) was repealed and replaced with the following provision, codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Supp.1997):

(B) "Compensable injury" does not include:

* * * *

(iv)(a) Injury where the accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician's orders.

(b) The presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician's orders shall create a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician's orders.

* * * *

(d) An employee shall not be entitled to compensation unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs utilized in contravention of the physician's orders did not substantially occasion the injury or accident.

The two issues presented for resolution both involve statutory construction. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ellison, 334 Ark. 357, 974 S.W.2d 464 (1998); Citizens to Establish a Reform Party v. Priest, 325 Ark. 257, 926 S.W.2d 432 (1996). The well-established approach for determining the intent of the legislature is to look first at the plain language of the statute and, giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning, construe the statute just as it reads. Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 407, 939 S.W.2d 280 (1997). If the language of the statute is not ambiguous and plainly states the intent of the legislature, then we will look no further. Id.

The first issue raised by ERC is whether the evidence in this case triggered the rebuttable presumption that an injury was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b). Specifically, ERC contends that Mr. Robertson's blood-alcohol-test results established the presence of alcohol, thereby triggering the statutory presumption. We agree.

A statutory presumption is a rule of law by which the finding of a basic fact gives rise to the existence of a presumed fact, unless sufficient evidence to the contrary is presented to rebut that presumption. Stone v. State, 254 Ark. 1011, 498 S.W.2d 634 (1973); Black's Law Dictionary 1185 (6th ed.1990). In the instant case, the basic fact that will invoke the application of the presumption is the presence of alcohol. The plain language of Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102 provides that once the presence of alcohol is established as a fact, there is a presumption that any injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol. The statute does not quantify the term "presence." Therefore, alcohol is present whenever any amount of alcohol is revealed, no matter how small. Although Mr. Robertson's blood-alcohol test revealed a low alcohol level, it nonetheless revealed the presence of alcohol. We thus agree with ERC that this evidence triggered the statutory presumption.

ERC next argues that the evidence presented by Mr. Robertson was insufficient to rebut the presumption; that is, that Mr. Robertson failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his injury was not substantially occasioned by the...