Erhart v. Great Western Sugar Co., 13130

• Decision Date: 03 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. 13130,13130
• Citation: 546 P.2d 1055,33 St.Rep. 302,169 Mont. 375
• Parties: Lawrence W. ERHART, Claimant and Respondent, v. GREAT WESTERN SUGAR COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. . Submitting
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 1055

546 P.2d 1055

169 Mont. 375

Lawrence W. ERHART, Claimant and Respondent, v. GREAT WESTERN SUGAR COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 13130.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitting Feb. 3, 1976.

Decided March 8, 1976.

Hutton, Sheehy & Cromley, Billings, Brent R. Cromley (argued), Billings, for appellant.

Michael J. Whalen (argued), Billings, for respondent.

JAMES T. HARRISON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in district court, Yellowstone County, reversing an order of the Workmen's Compensation Division denying compensation to claimant on the grounds no industrial accident or injury had occurred.

Lawrence W. Erhart (claimant) was employed by Great Western Sugar Company in its Billings, Montana, plant. Claimant began work for Great Western in August, 1968, as a laborer. Due to his electronics background, he worked himself up to an instrument man performing technical work with electronic and automatic equipment.

In 1969, Great Western began converting its older sugar conversion system to a computerized system operated pneumatically and electronically. Claimant was told by the company management he had the final responsibility to see that the new system worked. When outside engineers came to the plant to assist with the hook-up and explain the process to claimant, he would go home at night and make schematic drawings of the process. At this time claimant claims he worked twelve hour days for six to seven days a week.

The new system was going to result in many employees being laid off, resulting in some animosity toward those working to put the system on line. Claimant alleges he was subject to taunts and insults, with suggestions of infidelity on the part of his wife.

On December 9, 1970, claimant left work during the middle of the day. On December 15, 1970, claimant's wife called the plant manager to inform his claimant and suffered a mental and physical breakdown. Meanwhile, claimant had made his way to the Veterans Administration Hospital at For Harrison, seeking help. At the hospital he related a rather disjointed and bizarre story regarding his beliefs as to why everyone was against him.

Claimant was transferred to the V. A. Hospital at Sheridan, Wyoming for psychiatric treatment. He was later treated at the Fort Meade, South Dakota V. A. Hospital for the same schizophrenic condition.

Since the time of his nervous breakdown, claimant has been unable to perform physical or mental labor for more than two or three hours without rest.

The psychiatrist treating claimant at Sheridan, Wyoming, attributed claimant's condition to stress at work and the imminent birth of an unplanned child. He would not state whether the breakdown would not have resulted in time absent the stresses.

In February, 1971, claimant filed a Workmen's Compensation claim indicating a complete mental and physical breakdown on December 9, 1970. Great Western refused the claim, stating no industrial accident was involved.

In September, 1971, claimant filed suit in district court against Great Western and the plant's group health insurance carrier for wrongful deprivation of his job and disability insurance payments. The suit was settled in March, 1972, and claimant signed a release and settlement agreement. The district court dismissed the suit with prejudice.

In January, 1973, claimant's counsel requested a Workmen's Compensation hearing on the 1971 claim. A hearing was held in March, 1973. Additional time was allowed for taking of depositions of claimant (who was hospitalized at the time of the hearing), and the doctor and psychiatric worker at Sheridan, Wyoming. The matter was not deemed submitted until March, 1974. The claim was denied in April, 1974, with a rehearing also denied.

In July, 1974, claimant appealed to the district court which reversed the denial of the Division after a hearing on the certified record of the Division with additional testimony from claimant's wife on his condition at that time.

Great Western appeals from the judgment of the district court.

Of the seven issues presented for review by this Court, four main issues appear:

1. Was there an injury entitling claimant to compensation under the Montana Workmen's Compensation Act?

2. Did the district court err in not according every presumption of correctness to the decision of the Division?

3. Did the district court have authority to convert claimant's award into a lump sum?

4. Did the district court err in assessing costs of depositions to Great Western?

In section 92-418(1), R.C.M.1947, an 'injury' is defined, for workmen's compensation purposes, as:

'* * * a tangible happening of a traumatic nature from an unexpected cause, or unusual strain, resulting in either external or internal physical harm, and such physical condition as a result therefrom and excluding disease not traceable to injury * * *.'

We have held a compensable injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act must meet the definitional requirements of the statute. Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Company, Mont., 538 P.2d 344, 346, 32 St.Rep. 752. In Hurlbut we stated:

'* * * there are two elements in the statute (section 92-418, R.C.M.1947) which must be met (1) there must be a tangible happening of a traumatic nature, and (2) this must be shown to be the cause of physical harm.'

Workmen's compensation cases normally deal with physical injury resulting from an accident, as the term is used in everyday language. When a shipping crate falls on a worker breaking a bone or two, the causation and the tangible happening are easily identifiable. In the present case we are dealing with a nervous disability, which may or may not be causally related to the employment situation.

Section 92-418, R.C.M.1947, was amended by Section 1, Chapter 270, Laws of 1967, adding 'or unusual strain' to the definition of an injury. The first case interpreting the statute as amended in 1967 was Jones v. Bair's Cafes, 152 Mont. 13, 19, 445 P.2d 923, 926. In Jones a waitress picked up an unusually heavy tray of dishes from the floor and suffered a back injury. This Court, in sustaining the district court finding of an industrial accident, stated:

'Now, in 1967, the legislature included the words 'or unusual strain'. What is the meaning? How do we measure 'unusual strain'. It seems clear that the legislature intended to change and modify the James decision. (James v. V. K. V. Lumber Co., 145 Mont. 466, 401 P.2d 282; wherein compensation was denied for an injury due to strain but not from an unexpected cause.) By adding the separate distinct phrase, 'or unusual strain', the legislature intended to cover just such a situation as we have here. There was no 'unexpected cause' but there was an 'unusual strain'; thus the measure would seem to be the result of a tangible happening of a traumatic nature which results in physical harm, be it a rupture, a strain or a sprain. We can only rely on credible medical evidence to determine it. Here we have such medical evidence.'

In the instant case the credible medical evidence is not determinative of an unusual strain, nor is it determinative of the cause of claimant's condition being an industrial accident or injury. The psychiatrist who treated claimant at the Sheridan, Wyoming, V. A. Hospital was, at best, vague and uncertain as to the cause of claimant's schizophrenia. He testified that no one knows for sure the cause of schizophrenia and in this particular instance it was not possible to attribute the condition to any particular stress in the life of claimant.

This Court said in Stordahl v. Rush Implement Co., 148 Mont. 13, 20, 417 P.2d 95, 99:

'Whenever a medical expert testifies that an asserted cause of disease is possible, this alone is not to be accepted as reasonable medical proof. * * *'

See also, McAndrews v. Schwartz, 164 Mont. 402, 523 P.2d 1379.

Claimant cites the earlier case of Gaffney v. Ind. Acc. Board, 129 Mont. 394, 404, 287 P.2d 256, 261, for the position that an injured workman may recover compensation if the causal connection can be shown by direct, indirect or circumstantial evidence; a positive statement by a medical witness of a causal relationship is unnecessary. The actual wording in Gaffney is:

'* * * The frank admission of the testifying doctor that he could not state positively one way or another need not bar the claimant from recovery if on the whole record it can be said that he is entitled thereto. * * *'

In the instant case, the record as a whole does not indicate claimant is entitled to compensation.

In Robins v. Ogle, 157 Mont. 328, 333, 485 P.2d 692, 695, we found compensable, a back injury received by a cook mopping a cafe floor when she lifted a heavy pail of water. In that case we stated:

'* * * The preposition 'or' preceding the term 'unusual strain' simply signifies a tangible happening of a traumatic nature either (1) from an unexpected cause, or (2) from an unusual strain. Accordingly, a tangible happening of an unexpected nature from an unusual strain...