Erickson v. First Advantage Background Servs. Corp., No. 19-11587

• Decision Date: 04 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 19-11587
• Citation: 981 F.3d 1246
• Parties: Keith William ERICKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SERVICES CORP., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

981 F.3d 1246

Keith William ERICKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.FIRST ADVANTAGE BACKGROUND SERVICES CORP., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-11587

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

December 4, 2020

Micah S. Adkins, The Adkins Firm, PC, Franklin, TN, Lauren K.W. Brennan, John Soumilas, Francis Mailman Soumilas, PC, Philadelphia, PA, Cliff R. Dorson, Justin Tharpe Holcombe, Skaar & Feagle, LLP, Tucker, GA, Kris Skaar, Skaar and Feagle, LLP, Woodstock, GA, for Plaintiff - Appellant

Frederick T. Smith, Esther Slater McDonald, Megan Hall Poonolly, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Raymond Charles Baldwin, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Washington, DC, H. Lamar Mixson, Tiana S. Mykkeltvedt, Bondurant Mixson & Elmore, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant - Appellee

Before GRANT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and AXON,^* District Judge.

GRANT, Circuit Judge:

Keith Erickson had his heart set on coaching his son's Little League team. He authorized a search of sex-offender records as part of his application, apparently without much worry—his record was entirely clean. To his surprise, he soon received a letter in the mail from First Advantage, the consumer reporting agency that performed the search. That letter brought unwelcome news: Erickson's name had returned a match. Though Erickson's own record was clear, his estranged father's was not. And because the two shared a name, the name-only search that Little League requested had flagged his father's record.

Erickson eventually sued First Advantage, claiming that the company's upsetting report failed to comply with the Fair Credit Reporting Act's "maximum possible accuracy" standard. The question for us is what that standard requires. The answer is that a report must be both factually correct and free from potential for misunderstanding. And because the report here met that standard, we affirm.

I.

As we've already said, Keith Erickson signed up to serve as an assistant coach for his oldest son's Little League team—a role he had filled twice before. When he signed his application, Erickson authorized Little League to run a background check, which included a search of registered sex-offender records. He provided Little League with his name (at the time, Keith Dodgson), as well as his date of birth, social security number, and home address.

Little League passed this information on to First Advantage, a consumer reporting agency it had worked with for several years to obtain background reports on its applicants. According to its agreement with Little League, First Advantage enters applicants’ information into its own database to search for matching criminal and sex-offender registry records. That database includes records and files purchased from Experian Public Records, Inc., which is yet another consumer reporting agency.

In a typical search for sex-offender records, First Advantage inputs an applicant's name, complete date of birth, and, if available, Social Security number. It is not uncommon for the database to contain a sex-offender registry record without the underlying record of conviction. And for some jurisdictions, including the one at play here, First Advantage's database (for reasons that are unclear and not challenged) only contains sex offenders’ names and birth years, but not complete dates of birth. In an attempt to cast a broad net where information is incomplete, the Little League agreement specifies that First Advantage will search for sex-offender records using only an applicant's first and last name in any jurisdictions where the database lacks those complete dates of birth. And if one of those name-only searches returns a result, Little League in turn would need to review available demographic data from the relevant State's website before determining that a sex-offender record actually belongs to an applicant.

That brings us to the facts behind this case, none of which are in dispute. At the direction of Little League, First Advantage searched its database using Erickson's identifying information and did not find any matching criminal records. But it did find a sex-offender record: a "Keith Dodgson" in Pennsylvania. That match was obtained by a name-only search because the database did not include the sex offenders’ complete dates of birth.

First Advantage prepared a background report on Erickson to send to Little League. After identifying the sex-offender record that matched Erickson's name, the report stated "This Record is matched by First Name, Last Name ONLY and may not belong to your subject. Your further review of the State Sex Offender Website is required in order to determine if this is your subject." The report then directed Little League to Pennsylvania's sex-offender data to compare the "demographic data and available photographs," noting that Little League might "conclude that the records do not belong to" Erickson.

First Advantage also sent Erickson a letter informing him that he "share[d] the same name with a known criminal or registered sex offender" and that the record would be sent to Little League for review. The letter noted that "Little League is aware this record may not be yours" and explained that Little League was "committed" to investigating further if it planned to deny Erickson's application based on the report. It also stated that the potential match was confidential and would not be provided to anyone outside of Little League. Finally, the report itself assured Erickson that if Little League planned to take "adverse action based in whole or in part on the contents of this report," it must first provide him with a copy of the report.

Any non-sex offender would likely feel worried after receiving that kind of report—but Erickson was devastated. He shared a name with his biological father, and though he had severed all contact years before, he knew that his father was the source of the match.

He went into damage control mode. Erickson called First Advantage to explain the situation, and his wife contacted Little League. A First Advantage representative explained that the match was based only on his name, and a Little League affiliate explained that this kind of thing "happens." Still, though it was unclear whether anyone at Little League had even seen the report yet, Erickson decided not to coach his son's team because of his humiliation.

To avoid further association with his father, Erickson and his wife decided to change their family's last name from Dodgson to Erickson—a decision that particularly stung Erickson, who had been known by his last name throughout his military career. What's more, military rules required him to disclose the reason for his name change to others in his chain of command, a process that he reports was painful. Erickson also made numerous disclosures to colleagues, neighbors, and friends about his father's status as a registered sex offender to explain why his family no longer went by the name "Dodgson."

Two months after receiving the sex-offender notification, Erickson initiated this lawsuit against First Advantage, alleging that the company failed to "follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy" of the information concerning Erickson in the report, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). To succeed, Erickson needed to show both that First Advantage's report failed to comply with the Act's "maximum possible accuracy" standard and that the report caused him harm. Id.

A jury trial followed. Erickson called three witnesses—himself, his wife, and First Advantage's Vice President of Operations—and introduced, among other exhibits, his application to coach, the background report, and the notification letter. After he rested his case, First Advantage moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion, finding that Erickson had failed to establish two essential elements of his case: that the report was inaccurate and that it caused him harm. This appeal followed.

II.

We review a district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Slicker v. Jackson , 215 F.3d 1225, 1229 (11th Cir. 2000). Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if "reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Bogle v. Orange Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs , 162 F.3d 653, 656 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). We view the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it in "the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Eghnayem v. Bos. Sci. Corp. , 873 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2017).

We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Frazier , 387 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004). A district court abuses its discretion "if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous." Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. , 263 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001). It enjoys "considerable leeway" in making evidentiary decisions. Frazier , 387 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael , 526 U.S. 137, 152, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) ).

III.

On appeal, Erickson raises three arguments, though our rejection of the first turns out to be enough to resolve his case. That argument is that First Advantage's report violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act's "maximum possible accuracy" standard because it was false and misleading. Erickson follows up with an evidentiary argument related to his contention that First Advantage not only violated the Act, but did so willfully, opening the door to punitive damages. And finally, he says that the entire damages phase of the case should be retried because he was not allowed to enter evidence of his name change and subsequent disclosures at trial in support of his theory of reputational harm. Because we conclude that First Advantage did not violate the Act, there can be no willful violation; nor can there be any actionable reputational harm.

A...