Slicker v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 21 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-10592,99-10592 |
| Citation | 215 F.3d 1225 |
| Parties | (11th Cir. 2000) Howard V. SLICKER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JACKSON, Officer, Fulmer, Officer, et al., individually and in their official capacities as police officers for the Summerville Police Department, Defendants-Appellees, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. (No. 97-00148-4-RLV), Robert L. Vining, Jr., Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
This is an appeal of a district court order granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendants, Officers Clifford D. Jackson, Roger T. Fulmer, and Thomas H. Kendricks, of the Summerville, Georgia Police Department, at the close of plaintiff Howard V. Slicker, Jr.'s civil rights case prosecuted under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In essence, Slicker alleged that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by subjecting him to an unlawful seizure when they placed him under arrest and by using excessive force in the process of arresting him. The central issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that Slicker failed to produce evidence that he suffered a monetary loss as a result of the officers' conduct.1 Because a 1983 plaintiff alleging excessive force may receive compensatory damages for such things as physical pain and suffering and mental and emotional anguish, and because a 1983 plaintiff whose constitutional rights are violated is entitled to receive nominal damages even if he fails to produce any evidence of compensatory damages, we hold that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law, we vacate the judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The procedural history and relevant facts are straightforward. Slicker brought suit against the officers based on an incident that occurred on August 2, 1995. On this date, Slicker accompanied his friend, Patricia Snead Montgomery, to the Summerville Police Department to inquire as to why Ray Teague, against whom Montgomery had filed a criminal complaint, alleging he had illegally entered her home, had been released on bond. At trial, Slicker testified that Officer Jackson refused to tell him why Teague had been released. He also testified that as he was leaving the police station building, Officer Kendricks arrested him for disorderly conduct, at which time the officers slammed his head against the pavement and knocked him unconscious. Specifically, he testified in these words:
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Slicker said that after the officers dragged him inside the police station and took off his handcuffs, he was treated at a hospital emergency room, although he did not offer into evidence any medical bills. He also testified that he sought medical treatment after he left the emergency room. Slicker did not claim that he missed work or that he incurred any other direct monetary loss as a result of the officers' conduct.
Ms. Patricia Snead Montgomery's trial testimony amplified the plaintiff's account. She said that Officer Jackson asked Slicker to leave the police station because the matter did not involve him. She added that as Slicker left the building, Officer Jackson went out after him and that Officers Fulmer and Kendricks were also outside. Ms. Montgomery testified about the critical encounter in these terms:
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Although she said that she never saw the officers beat him on the head, she testified that she knew that they had because she saw the knots on his head that resulted from the beating. Several minutes later, the officers brought Slicker inside and an ambulance was called. According to Montgomery, Slicker's eyes were open but he had a starry-eyed look and was unresponsive. Slicker was taken off on a stretcher to the hospital.
At the close of Slicker's case, the officers moved for judgment as a matter of law on the grounds that they were entitled to qualified immunity and, in the alternative, because Slicker failed to present any evidence of damages. The district court found that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because Slicker presented enough evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether the officers used excessive force in arresting Slicker. However, the court entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of the officers because it found that Slicker had failed to present any evidence in support of his claim for damages. Specifically, the district court held that under Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), Slicker was required to prove actual injury in order to be entitled to compensatory damages. Moreover, the court observed that under Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), compensatory damages may not be awarded based on the "abstract value" or "importance" of constitutional rights. Finally, the court noted that punitive damages may be awarded only where a plaintiff shows that there are aggravating circumstances such as reckless indifference, ill will, or malice. The district court concluded that because Slicker did not present any evidence that he suffered a monetary loss in the form of "medical bills," "missed work," or "lost wages," and because he did not present any evidence of aggravating circumstances permitting the award of punitive damages, the officers were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
We review de novo a district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50, applying the same standards as the district court. Morris v. Crow, 117 F.3d 449, 455 (11th Cir.1997). In evaluating a defendant's Rule 50 motion, made at the close of the plaintiff's case, we consider all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and grant the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences. We may affirm a judgment as a matter of law only if the facts and inferences " 'point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant ... that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.' " Bogle v. Orange County Board of County Commissioners, 162 F.3d 653, 656 (11th Cir.1998)(quoting Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep't, 71 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir.1995)).
In finding that Slicker was required to present evidence of monetary loss in the form of medical bills, missed work, or lost income, we think the district court misapprehended the "actual injury" requirement set forth in Carey v. Piphus and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura. In both of these cases the Supreme Court held that compensatory damages under 1983 may be awarded only based on actual injuries caused by the...
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