Erickson v. General Motors Corp., Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac Division, Kansas City, Kan.

• Decision Date: 13 November 1954
• Docket Number: No. 39481,BUICK-OLDSMOBILE-PONTIAC,No. 497-42-8761,C,497-42-8761,39481
• Citation: 276 P.2d 376,177 Kan. 90
• Parties: Clinton ERICKSON et al., S. S.laimants and Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,DIVISION, KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Employer, and P. G. Baird, State Labor Commissioner, State of Kansas Labor Department, Employment Security Division, Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 376

276 P.2d 376

177 Kan. 90

Clinton ERICKSON et al., S. S. No. 497-42-8761, Claimants and Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, BUICK-OLDSMOBILE-PONTIAC DIVISION, KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Employer, and P. G. Baird State Labor Commissioner, State of Kansas Labor Department Employment Security Division, Appellees.

No. 39481.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Nov. 13, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

The record examined in a proceeding originally instituted by employees to obtain benefits for unemployment, under the provisions of the employment security law, following which an action was commenced in the district court and later tried, all as provided in the law now appearing in G.S.1949, Ch. 44, Art. 7 and G.S.1953 Supp., Ch. 44, Art. 7, and held:

1. An eligible individual claiming benefits for unemployment under the employment security law is entitled to a liberal interpretation of that law.

2. The right of an individual to receive benefits for unemployment under the employment security law is to be determined by the provisions of that law.

3. Under the employment security law an individual shall be deemed unemployed and therefore entitled to benefits for unemployment for a particular week only where he performs no service and where no wages are payable to him with respect to that week.

4. The above mentioned law defines 'wages' as all compensation for services including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all remuneration in any medium other than cash, and provides that the word 'wages' does not include certain remuneration and other payments specified. Holiday pay is not mentioned in the exclusions and must be held to be 'wages'.

5. Where an individual, employed by an employer whose operations are within the purview of the employment security law and who is otherwise eligible for benefits for unemployment, performs no work or labor during the week commencing December 24, 1951, but does receive holiday pay for December 25, 1951, and later makes a claim to the state labor commissioner for benefits for unemployment payable from the employment security fund, he is entitled to an amount equal to his weekly benefits less the amount he received for holiday pay.

Harry C. Clark, Kansas City, Mo., argued the cause, and James H. Barnes, Kansas City, was with him on the brief for appellants.

John Murphy, Kansas City, Mo., argued the cause, and Thomas M. Van Cleave, Jr., Kansas City, was with him on the brief for the appellee General Motors Corp.

Lynn D. Smith, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee P. G. Baird, State Labor Commissioner.

THIELE, Justice.

This appeal arises out of a proceeding originally commenced by employees for benefits allegedly due under the 'employment security law' which was originally enacted as Laws 1937, Ch. 255. Various amendments were made to the act and as it then existed it appears as G.S.1949, Ch. 44, Art. 7. Further amendments were made by Laws 1951, Ch. 307 and appear in 1953 Supp., Ch. 44, Art. 7. The amendments made in 1951 do not affect the question involved in this case. For brevity such reference as is made hereafter to particular sections of the act as it now exists will be only by chapter and section number and will refer to the latest enactment of the law as it appears in the Statutes of 1949 or the 1953 Supplement, as the case may be.

The plaintiff Clinton Erickson was an employee of General Motors Corporation, Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac Division at Kansas City, hereafter referred to as the corporation. Under circumstances set out later, he did not work during the week commencing December 24, 1951, and ending December 29, 1951. He was paid 'holiday pay' for Christmas Day, December 25, 1951. Later he made claim to the state labor commissioner, hereafter referred to as the commissioner, for benefits for the full week he did not work under the provisions of 44-709(a), and the examiner designated by the commissioner, 44-709(b), deducted from the benefits the amount of 'holiday pay' Erickson had received and allowed his claim as to the balance. Under 44-709(c. d) Erickson appealed to the appeal tribunal and the appeal was referred to an appeals referee, and at a hearing held before the referee, notice was taken of the fact that many other employees of the corporation were in similar situation and that the referee had suggested the appeal be filed for the benefit of all, and that was agreed. Evidence was taken before the appeals referee, and on June 11, 1953, he filed a written decision in which he found, in part, that:

'On May 29, 1950, an agreement was entered into between General Motors Corporation of which the employer is a part and the UAW-CIO in which claimants, production and maintenance workers, hold membership by virtue of their affiliation with Local 31, UAW-CIO, bargaining unit at the employer's. Such agreement includes, among other things, Sections 138 through 143 titled 'Holiday Pay'. This provides that hourly rated employees be paid for certain named holidays, Christmas included, provided certain eligibility requirements are met, i. e., seniority of 90 days; that they would have otherwise been scheduled to work if the day had not been observed as a holiday, and that the employee work the last scheduled work day prior to and the next scheduled work day after the holiday within his scheduled work week. * * *

'During the week ended December 29, 1951, and because of governmental material restrictions as set out in a combined holiday and lay-off notice, dated December 14, 1951, and posted at employer's plant in the Fairfax District of Kansas City, Kansas, the claimants performed no work. Most of the claimants, with exceptions noted in the individual claims, returned to work on January 2, 1952, and shortly thereafter filed claims for the week ended December 29, 1951. The matter arose when certain officials of the local were advised by the division's Kansas City Kansas, office that the pay for December 25, 1951, was wages and would be deducted from the weekly benefit amount to which the claimants were otherwise entitled. These officials promptly communicated with the division legal department respecting appeals and it was agreed at that time that one appeal would be perfected and one hearing held for all claimants involved.'

The appeals referee further stated in his decision that the one question involved was whether the pay received by claimants for Christmas Day, 1951, was wages as defined in 44-703(o) and if such pay was wages then the provisions of 44-704(c) providing, in substance, that each eligible individual who is unemployed with respect to any week shall be paid with respect to such week in an amount equal to his weekly benefit amount less that part of such wages payable to him with respect to such week, was applicable and each claimant's weekly benefit amount would be reduced by the amount of his Christmas or holiday pay, and he concluded and found that the action of the examiner in finding holiday pay for December 25, 1951, was wages and as such deductible from the weekly benefit for the week ended December 29, 1951, was correct and that such action should be and it was affirmed.

Conformably to 44-709(e) the claimants appealed to the commissioner and under date of August 4, 1953, he rendered a written decision adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the appeals referee, as though fully incorporated in his decision and found that the decision of the appeals referee should be affirmed and so ordered.

Within the time fixed by 44-709(b) the claimants as plaintiffs commenced an action in the district court by filing a petition naming the corporation and the commissioner as defendants to secure a review of the decision of the commissioner, and later filed an amended petition to which the commissioner and the corporation filed answers, and a hearing was had thereon. No question has been raised thereon, but in view of the issue presented the corporation, while perhaps a proper party, is not a necessary one. The trial court, in a written opinion, stated it was controlled by 44-709(b) which provides that the findings of the commissioner as to the facts, if supported by the evidence and in the absence of fraud, are conclusive on the court, whose jurisdiction is confined to questions of law; that it was not contended the findings were not supported by the evidence nor was there any claim of fraud, and after some review of the law applicable, concluded that 'holiday pay' must be construed as wages and that the decision of the appeal tribunal (state labor commissioner) must be affirmed and on January 12, 1954, it rendered judgment in accord. In due time the plaintiffs perfected an appeal to this court. They specify that the trial court erred in affirming the decision of the commissioner, in finding as a matter of law that holiday pay was compensation for services or wages within the terms of the employment security law, in holding as a matter of law that the holiday pay for Christmas was properly due claimants on December 28, 1951, and in finding that the findings of fact of the commissioner were supported by the evidence.

As presented to this court there is no question of procedure, nor other claim of error other than that of law, the appellants in their brief stating that the sole question is whether the pay they received for Christmas Day, 1951, is 'wages' as defined by 44-703(o). And we may add, is deductible in determining benefits due under 44-704(c).

In a preliminary way, it may be stated that at the hearing before the appeals referee, it was shown that claimants, appellants here, were members of Local 31, UAW-CIO which was the recognized bargaining agent with the corporation, and that all of the claimants, as such members, were governed in their employment by an agreement entered into May 29, 1950, between the corporation and the UAW-CIO, and a copy of that agreement was admitted in evidence....