Erickson v. General United Life Ins. Co., 46799

• Decision Date: 17 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 46799,46799
• Citation: 256 N.W.2d 255
• Parties: Vincent ERICKSON, d.b.a. E & B Agency, Appellant, v. GENERAL UNITED LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 255

256 N.W.2d 255

Vincent ERICKSON, d.b.a. E & B Agency, Appellant, v. GENERAL UNITED LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.

No. 46799.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 17, 1977.

Rehearing Denied July 13, 1977.

Syllabus by the Court

1. An account stated is prima facie evidence of the accuracy and correctness of the items noted thereon, as well as the liability of the party against whom the balance refers. An action for an accounting cannot be maintained by a party for amounts which are includible within the account stated absent proof of fraud or mistake.

2. Partial summary judgments are interlocutory in nature and an appeal should not be taken therefrom until a final judgment has been entered which fully disposes of the litigation.

3. By the determination that the parties created an account stated, the question of the propriety of the trial court's action in quashing certain interrogatories is rendered moot.

Patrick F. Sullivan and Edward A. Towey, St. Paul, for appellant.

Hvass, Weisman & King, and Charles T. Hvass, Jr., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard before TODD, YETKA and STAHLER, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.

TODD, Justice.

In October 1969, Vincent Erickson, doing business as E & B Agency, entered into an "Agency Incentive Agreement" with General United Life Insurance Company (United). Erickson was to be compensated for writing accident and health insurance policies based on an accounting procedure between the parties reflecting premiums, reserves, and losses. On August 25, 1970, United notified Erickson it was terminating the agreement effective February 22, 1971. Accounting statements were submitted by United to Erickson through April 1972. Erickson did not file a written objection to any of the accounting statements received as required by the contract. In June 1975, Erickson brought an action for an accounting between the parties. The trial court granted United partial summary judgment as to the transactions and amounts reflected in the accounting statements through April 17, 1972, and further sustained United's objections to certain interrogatories submitted by Erickson. We affirm.

The agency agreement entered into between the parties entitled Erickson to compensation for accident and health insurance policies written by him. In order to determine the amount of compensation due Erickson, monthly accounting statements were prepared by United, in accordance with the agency agreement, reflecting certain amounts credited to Erickson ¹ and deductions from those amounts. ² Through this process, Erickson was informed on a monthly basis of the proposed accounting between the parties. The agency agreement required Erickson to file a written objection with United to each accounting statement which he claimed to be erroneous " * * * on or before the next monthly accounting is due * * *." The agreement also provided that it was to be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Iowa.

Beginning in July 1970 and continuing through April 1972, consistent with the provisions of the agreement, United forwarded accounting statements to Erickson indicating that he owed the company varying amounts of money. Erickson never filed a written objection with United to any of these statements, as required by the agency agreement. The final accounting statement transmitted in April 1972 reflected a deficit balance in Erickson's account of $17,287.14.

In June 1975, Erickson commenced this action asking for an accounting between the parties and for judgment against United for the amount determined to be due. Thereafter, Erickson served certain interrogatories upon United. United filed objections to several of the interrogatories ³ and at the same time moved for partial summary judgment regarding all the transactions and charges between the parties reflected in the accounting statements through April 1972. The trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment based upon the provision in the agreement which required written notice of objections to accounting statements claimed to be erroneous. ⁴ The trial court order also sustained United's objections to the interrogatories and in a memorandum accompanying the order provided that Erickson was nevertheless still entitled to an accounting for any monies determined to be due subsequent to April 1972.

The issues presented on appeal are (1) whether Erickson provided the trial court with sufficient evidence of timely written objections to the accounting statements submitted by United to successfully oppose the motion for partial summary judgment, and (2) whether the trial court's action in quashing the interrogatories objected to by United was proper.

1. Erickson contends that the trial court's order granting United partial summary judgment was improper because there is an issue of material fact present concerning whether he filed timely objections to the accounting statements. United's motion for partial summary judgment was accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the particular accounting statements submitted to Erickson from July 1970 through April 1972. In addition to the affidavit, United filed a memorandum with the trial court in support of the motion stating that Erickson had failed to object to any of the accounting statements. Erickson submitted an affidavit in response to the motion for summary judgment in which he stated in part:

"That on or about April 17, 1970, he received a copy of a memorandum from defendant claiming an overpayment of $2,162.67.

"That immediately upon receipt of this memorandum, he called defendant numerous times to discuss this matter.

"That on or about May 6, 1970, he received a letter from Dale Squires, the treasurer of defendant, asking for the $2,162.67.

"That on or about May 13, 1970, he sent a letter to the attention of Mr. Squires, at defendant's address.

"That he has continuously objected to the statements and accountings of defendant."

Erickson asserts that these averments create an issue of material fact as to whether he made timely objection to the accounting statements submitted by United. The first four averments are not material to the issue in dispute because all of these events occurred before July 1970 which is the first month an accounting statement was received by Erickson. It is rather obvious that events preceding the submission of the first statement cannot be construed as an objection to those statements.

The final averment included in the affidavit is general in nature. As such, it is insufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment. It is the rule in Minnesota that summary judgment is proper when the nonmoving party fails to provide the court with specific facts indicating that there is a genuine issue of fact. ⁵ In order to successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely upon mere...