Erickson v. U-Haul Intern., Inc.
| Decision Date | 07 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. S-05-1163.,S-05-1163. |
| Citation | 274 Neb. 236,738 N.W.2d 453 |
| Parties | Shari ERICKSON and George Erickson, Appellants, v. U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC., doing business as U-Haul Company, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
P. Shawn McCann and Mary M. Schott, of Sodoro, Daly & Sodoro, P.C., Omaha, for appellants.
Ronald F. Krause and Daniel J. Epstein, of Cassem, Tierney, Adams, Gotch & Douglas, Omaha, for appellees U-Haul International, Inc., and U-Haul Center of N.W. Omaha.
The appellants, Shari Erickson and her husband, George Erickson, sued U-Haul International, Inc., and U-Haul Center of N.W. Omaha (U-Haul Center). The district court granted U-Haul Center's motion for summary judgment, finding that it owed no duty to the Ericksons. The court also sustained U-Haul International's special appearance because the company did not satisfy the minimum contact requirements for the court to have jurisdiction.
This appeal raises two issues. First, whether, absent any special relationship between a lessor of a vehicle and a third party, the lessor has an affirmative duty to protect the third party from injury. Second, whether U-Haul International had sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska to make it fair and reasonable to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the company. We conclude that (1) a lessor of a chattel has a duty to warn third-party users of the dangerous condition of the chattel and (2) U-Haul International had sufficient contacts to warrant a Nebraska court's exercise of general personal jurisdiction over it. We reverse, and remand for further proceedings on the Ericksons' claims.
Shari's parents, Dale and Judith Carstens. rented a truck from U-Haul Center to move from Walnut, Iowa, to Herman, Nebraska. The truck, known as a 17-foot easy-loading mover, was licensed in Kentucky.
While operating the truck, Dale attempted to back it up to a porch, but the loading ramp was a few inches short of the top step. Shari held the ramp up while Dale attempted to reverse the truck a few more inches. When the truck was engaged, however, it first jumped forward, throwing Shari off balance, and as Dale backed up the truck, it pinned Shari's foot between the concrete step and the truck's ramp.
In deposition testimony, Shari testified that she did not see any warning labels on the truck instructing that the ramp should not be extended while the truck was in motion. In Judith's deposition, she testified that when she and Dale rented the truck, they did not receive a user's guide with any warnings about using the ramp. After Shari's injury, Judith inspected the truck for warning labels and the only label she found was a partial warning label that was "ragged" and hard to read.
The affidavit of the general manager of U-Haul Center contains a picture that shows a warning sticker below the latch to the truck's rear door stating, The affidavit also includes a copy of the "U-Haul Household Moving Van User Instructions," which U-Haul Center alleged that it gives to everyone to whom it rents a truck. On the first page of the instructions is a warning to "NEVER put the Household Moving Van in motion while the loading ramp is extended [or] being held."
The assistant corporate secretary of U-Haul International in an affidavit, averred that U-Haul International, a Nevada corporation, has its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona; that it did not own the vehicle the Carstens rented; that it was never qualified to do business in Nebraska and did not employ anyone in the state; and that it does not possess any real estate in Nebraska or have a registered agent, maintain any office or bank accounts, conduct any meetings, or perform any kind of services in Nebraska.
U-Haul International, however, is the parent company and owns all of the stock of U-Haul Company of Nebraska (U-Haul Nebraska) and U-Haul Company of Kentucky, which owned the truck involved in the accident. U-Haul Center is a rental center of U-Haul Nebraska. U-Haul International owns the trademark used in Nebraska and displayed on all U-Haul trucks in the state. Also, U-Haul International operates a toll-free telephone number and Web site accessible from Nebraska.
Under the contract it had with U-Haul Nebraska, U-Haul International provided all rental contracts and other forms and stationery for the operation in Nebraska. It was also under contract with U-Haul Nebraska to provide accounting, record-keeping, technical, and advisory services. Finally, it coordinated the exchange of rental equipment between U-Haul Nebraska and other rental centers and prepared all federal and state tax reports.
The Ericksons assign that the district court erred in (1) finding there was no duty owed by U-Haul Center to the Ericksons and failing to find a foreseeable risk of injury to rental truck users, (2) holding that no genuine issue of material fact exists and granting summary judgment, (3) denying the Ericksons' motion to amend or alter, (4) granting the special appearance of U-Haul International, and (5) failing to recognize the existence of sufficient minimum contacts between the State of Nebraska and U-Haul International.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing disclose no genuine issue regarding any material fact or the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 In reviewing a summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and give such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.2
When a jurisdictional question does not involve a factual dispute, the issue presents a matter of law. We review questions of law independently of the lower court's conclusion.3
The district court granted U-Haul Center's motion for summary judgment, finding that U-Haul Center did not owe a duty to Shari. Shari views the matter differently. She contends U-Haul Center owed her a duty because her mother, Judith, rented the truck and her father, Dale, drove it. She argues it was reasonably foreseeable that friends and family would assist Judith and Dale in moving, so a special relationship existed. Shari argues U-Haul Center had a duty to warn of the dangers of using the truck, which extended not just to Judith, who signed the contract, but to all those who used the rental truck.
U-Haul Center counters that for a duty to exist, a relationship must exist between the parties that imposes a legal obligation on one party to protect another party. It argues that because no contractual or special relationship existed between Shari and U-Haul Center, U-Haul Center owed her no duty.
The threshold inquiry in any negligence action is whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty.4 Actionable negligence cannot exist if there is no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from injury.5 Whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence is a question of law dependent on the facts in a particular case.6
A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.7 When determining whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence, a court considers (1) the magnitude of the risk, (2) the relationship of the parties, (3) the nature of the attendant risk, (4) the opportunity and ability to exercise care, (5) the foreseeability of the harm, and (6) the policy interest in the proposed solution.8
The duty of reasonable care generally does not extend to third parties absent other facts establishing a duty.9 The common law has traditionally imposed liability only if the defendant bears some special relationship to the potential victim.10 Regardless of whether a duty of reasonable care exists, a duty to warn cannot be imposed absent a special relationship.11
The Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses the duty of a supplier of chattels:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.12
Therefore, under § 388 of the Restatement, a supplier has a common-law duty to warn expected users that a chattel may be dangerous. The comments to § 388 show that the term "supplier" includes lessors. And § 407 of the Restatement specifically extends the duties imposed by § 388 to lessors.13
This court has adopted and applied § 388 in finding liability against a manufacturer.14 In Libbey-Owens Ford Glass Co. v. L & M Paper Co.,15 a corporation purchased a forklift, which overheated and caused a fire. The corporation was unaware that the forklift's resistor coil could heat to 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit. The corporation sued the forklift's manufacturer for the damage caused by the fire. We held that the manufacturer acted negligently because...
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