Ericson v. Conagra Foods, Inc.
| Decision Date | 24 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:20-cv-11022-ADB |
| Parties | POCHANART ERICSON, Plaintiff, v. CONAGRA FOODS, INC., CONAGRA BRANDS, INC., and FULL-FILL INDUSTRIES, LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
BURROUGHS, D.J.
Plaintiff Pochanart Ericson ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Defendants Conagra Foods, Inc. ("Foods"), Conagra Brands, Inc. ("Brands" and, together with Foods, "Conagra"), and Full-Fill Industries, LLC ("Full-Fill," and, collectively with Conagra, "Defendants"), alleging that she was injured by a cooking spray product designed, developed, manufactured, tested, packaged, sold, and distributed by Defendants. [ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1-2 ("Compl.")]. Plaintiff asserts multiple state-law tort claims as well as a claim for unfair and deceptive practices under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A. [Id. ¶¶ 24-173].
Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim. [ECF No. 24]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, [id.], is DENIED.1 Although the Court lacks personal jurisdiction, the case will be transferred rather than dismissed.
Most of the following facts are taken from the complaint, [Compl.], the factual allegations of which are assumed to be true when considering a motion to dismiss, Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014). In assessing whether personal jurisdiction exists, the Court may also consider "whatever supplemental filings (such as affidavits) are contained in the record, giving credence to the plaintiff's version of genuinely contested facts." Baskin-Robbins Franchising LLC v. Alpenrose Dairy, Inc., 825 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff is a resident of Weymouth, Massachusetts. [Compl. ¶ 3]. Foods was a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Omaha, Nebraska. [Id. ¶ 4; ECF No. 25 at 12].2 Brands is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. [Compl. ¶¶ 5-7]. Conagra designed, sold, and distributed "various branded and private label [c]ooking [s]prays," including the Chef's Quality Pan Spray ("Cooking Spray") at issue in this action, to retailers nationwide. [Id. ¶¶ 13, 26]. Full-Fill is an Illinois corporation, with its principal place of business in Henning, Illinois. [Id. ¶ 9]. Full-Fill manufactured the Cooking Spray cans for Conagra by "fill[ing], assembl[ing] and packag[ing] vented DOT-2Q cooking spray cans" and "performed various performance, tolerance and control testing on the products." [Id. ¶ 16]. Conagra then sold the Cooking Spray exclusively to the New York-based company Jetro Holdings, Inc. ("Jetro"), or to one of Jetro's subsidiaries (including Restaurant Depot, LLC, R.D. Enterprises, and RD/JET, LLC), which are also based in New York. [ECF No. 25-1 ¶ 8 ("Schlewitt Decl.")]. Neither Jetro nor any of its subsidiaries are parties to this action.
At some point prior to June 3, 2017, Plaintiff purchased the Cooking Spray at the Restaurant Depot store in Avon, Massachusetts. [ECF No. 26-2 ¶ 2]. On June 3, 2017, she was working in a food truck in Worcester, Massachusetts when the Cooking Spray "suddenly and without warning began spraying its extremely flammable contents through the u-shaped vents on the bottom of the can causing a flash fire, flames and/or explosion causing burns and injuries to Plaintiff." [Compl. ¶¶ 20-23]. Plaintiff asserts that "the [] Cooking Spray was some distance away from a heat source in [the] food truck" and that she used reasonable care when handling it. [Id. ¶¶ 20-21].
In support of their motion, Defendants filed declarations from Todd Schlewitt, a Category Marketing Manager with Brands, and Chad Steinbaugh, a General Manager at Full-Fill. [Schlewitt Decl.; ECF No. 25-2 ("Steinbaugh Decl.")]. Plaintiff does not dispute the facts contained in the declarations and the Court therefore accepts them as true. See Baskin-Robbins, 825 F.3d at 34. According to Schlewitt's declaration, Conagra has no business activities related to Plaintiff's claim in Massachusetts. [Schlewitt Decl. ¶ 5]. "Any work in which Conagra was involved relating to the design, labeling, marketing, or manufacturing took place in states other than the Commonwealth of Massachusetts," and after it sends the Cooking Spray to Jetro, "Conagra does not further control, direct, or have any say in whether, or if, the product is resold or where." [Schlewitt Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9]. Similarly, "[n]o aspect of Full-Fill's work relating to [] Cooking Spray takes place in Massachusetts," "Full-Fill does not have any business activities in Massachusetts related to the incident at issue in this case," and "Full-Fill did not sell or distribute [the] Cooking Spray in Massachusetts." [Steinbaugh Decl. ¶¶ 7-8].
In sum, the Defendants made the Cooking Spray in Illinois and then sold it to a distributor in New York. Without further input or direction from Defendants, the distributor, a non-party, sold the Cooking spray nationwide, including in Massachusetts. Plaintiff purchased the Cooking Spray in Massachusetts and was injured here.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Defendants on May 28, 2020. [Compl.]. On July 24, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss. [ECF No. 24]. Plaintiff opposed, [ECF No. 26], and Defendants replied, [ECF No. 31].
Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's "power to require the parties to obey its [orders]." Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002)). "A plaintiff consents to the personal jurisdiction of a court by bringing suit in that court." Roberts v. Jack L. Marcus Co., No. 17-cv-11782, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6373, at *4 (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2018) (citing Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 (1938)). As to a defendant, however, the Due Process Clause "protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations.'" Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). Therefore, a court may not assert jurisdiction over a defendant unless "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). In addition to satisfying Due Process concerns, "[t]o establish personal jurisdiction in a diversity case, a plaintiff must satisfy . . . the forum state's long-arm statute . . . ." C.W. Downer & Co. v. Bioriginal Food & Sci. Corp., 771 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1994)).
As a rule, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Daynard, 290 F.3d at 50. Under the "prima facie" standard for determining whether a plaintiff has met this burden, "the inquiry is whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction." Bluetarp Fin., Inc. v. Matrix Constr. Co., 709 F.3d 72, 79 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)). Plaintiffs may not, however, establish a court's personal jurisdiction over defendants with "unsupported allegations in [the] pleadings," and are instead "obliged to adduce evidence of specific facts." Platten v. H.G. Berm. Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 134 (1st Cir. 2006) (). The Court may also "add to the mix facts put forward by the defendants, to the extent that they are uncontradicted." Daynard, 290 F.3d at 51 (quoting Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998)).
"Because the [Massachusetts] long-arm statute imposes specific constraints on the exercise of personal jurisdiction that are not coextensive with the parameters of due process . . . a determination under the long-arm statute is to precede consideration of the constitutional question." SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc., 85 N.E.3d 50, 52 (Mass. 2017). Section 3 of the Massachusetts long-arm statute allows for the exercise of "personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from" various activities within or outside of the Commonwealth. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 223A, § 3.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient contacts between Defendants and Massachusetts to establish personal jurisdiction. [ECF No. 25 at 6-7, 12-15]. In support, they assert that neither Conagra nor Full-Fill has business activities in Massachusetts that are related to Plaintiff's claim or to the Cooking Spray and deny any involvement in the final distribution and sale of the Cooking Spray after it is sent to Jetro. [Schlewitt Decl. ¶¶ 1, 7, 9; Steinbaugh Decl. ¶¶ 7-8].
Plaintiff contends that she has satisfied the requirements of both the Massachusetts long-arm statute and the Due Process clause. [ECF No. 26 at 3-8]. Specifically, she asserts that Defendants placed the Cooking Spray into the stream of commerce by selling it to a national distributor, Jetro, who ultimately sold it through Restaurant Depot to Plaintiff at a store in Massachusetts. [Id. at 5-6]. Therefore, Plaintiff argues, it can be presumed "from this ongoing relationship with Jetro Holdings and other contacts with the state that Defendants knew or reasonably could have foreseen and expected that the Cooking Spray would be sold in Massachusetts." [Id. at 6]...
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