Erie Ins. Exch. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2:11-cv-429
Decision Date | 07 September 2012 |
Docket Number | 2:11-cv-429 |
Parties | ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Plaintiff, v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Pending before the Court is the MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, filed at Doc. No. 30, a concise statement of material facts (Doc. No.31), an appendix to the concise statement of material facts (Doc. No. 32), and a brief in support of its motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 33). Also pending before the Court is PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMNT, filed at Doc. No. 36. In support of its amended motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff has also filed a concise statement of material facts with attached exhibits (Doc. No. 37), and a brief in support of its amended motion (Doc. No. 38). Both parties have also responded to their opponent's respective motions for summary judgment with briefs in opposition (Plaintiff's brief filed at Doc. No. 40, and Defendant's brief filed at Doc. No. 41), as well as responsive concise statements of material fact (Plaintiff's responsive statement at Doc. No. 39, and Defendant's responsive statement at 42). The issues have been fully presented and briefed, and are now ripe for disposition.
On or about March 2, 2011, Plaintiff, Erie Insurance Exchange ("Erie"), initiated an action for Declaratory Judgment against Defendant, Scottsdale Insurance Company, via a Complaintfiled in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Pennsylvania, docketed at Case No. GD-11-003925. See Doc. No. 1, Notice of Removal, at Ex. A ("Complaint"). Generally speaking, the civil action arises from insurance coverage claims made by Kyrk A. Pyros under insurance policies issued to him for defense and indemnification relative to two civil action complaints that had been filed against him which alleged discriminatory housing actions and practices in the George Washington Hotel (the "Hotel"), a residential building located in Washington, PA.1 The Hotel is owned and operated by The George Washington, L.P. ("Washington, L.P.") and is managed by PyRsquared Group, Inc. ("PyRsquared"). According to the two discrimination complaints, Kyrk A. Pyros is the general partner of Washington, L.P., and is also the owner and/or principal officer and agent of PyRsquared Group, Inc. and PyRsquared Management Company, Inc. In a nutshell, Plaintiff Erie seeks an award ordering Defendant Scottsdale to reimburse it for all sums expended by Erie for the defense and indemnification of Mr. Pyros in those two civil actions.
Defendant removed the action to this Court, and subsequently answered on April 15, 2011, see Doc. Nos. 1 & 7, and a period of discovery commenced. After discovery concluded, both parties moved for summary judgment. Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the claims for declaratory relief. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant Scottsdale.
Summary judgment must be granted when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant must identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). To withstand summary judgment, the non-movant must show a genuine dispute of material fact by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). A dispute is "genuine" only if "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Cross-motions for summary judgment "are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist." Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir.1968).
The court must determine the governing state law. A federal district court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state where it sits. Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fogel, 656 F.3d 167, 170 (3d Cir.2011). Under Pennsylvania law, the law of the state in which an insurance policy is issued and delivered governs the action. Bennison v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Pa. D. & C.4th 466, 473 (Pa.Ct.Com.Pl.1999). The named insureds procured the insurance policy in Pennsylvania, and Pennsylvania law governs this action.
The court interprets an insurance policy as a matter of law when the facts are not in dispute.Pac. Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 760 (3d Cir.1985).
The following facts are taken from the evidentiary record and are not in dispute.
Defendant Scottsdale issued a commercial general liability policy, number CLS1421707, to PyRSquared Management, Inc. and The George Washington, L.P., which was effective from December 31, 2007 to December 31, 2008. Pl. App. at Ex. E. The policy limits of liability for Coverage B, "Personal and Advertising Injury Liability", are $1 million per occurrence, and $2 million in the aggregate (the "Scottsdale Policy"). Doc. No. 32 at Ex. C ("Def. App. at Ex. C"). The "Description of Business" block on the Scottsdale Policy's declaration pages states that the Named Insured is an "organization including a corporation (other than a partnership, joint venture or limited liability company)." Id. In terms of Coverage B, the Scottsdale Policy included in relevant part:
The Scottsdale Policy contains the following "Who Is Insured" provision, in pertinent part:
Id. The Scottsdale Policy also contains the following "Other Insurance" provision, as modified via endorsement, in pertinent part:
Plaintiff Erie issued an Ultraflex Package Policy, ULF (Ed. 3/01) UF-8126, #Q48-0450306 (the "Ultraflex Policy") to Kyrk Pyros, with a policy effective date of December 4, 2007, and a termination date of December 4, 2008, and with limits of $1 million for personal and advertising injury and $2 million in the aggregate. See Doc. No. 37 at Ex. A () ; see also, id. at Ex. B ("Ultraflex declarations page"). Erie also issued a HomeProtector policy, #Q59-1507624 (the "HomeProtector Policy") to Mr. Pyros. See Pl. App. at Ex. C (policy) and Ex. D (declarations page). The commercial general liability coverage part of the Erie Ultraflex Policy includes the following "Who Is An Insured" provision, in pertinent part:
Id. The commercial general liability coverage part of the Ultraflex Policy contains the following "Other Insurance" provision, in pertinent part:
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