Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc. v. Fire Ins. Exchange

• Decision Date: 13 November 1968
• Docket Number: ERLIN-LAWLER
• Citation: 73 Cal.Rptr. 182,267 Cal.App.2d 381
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 37 A.L.R.3d 1378 ENTERPRISES, INC., a California corporation, dba Bestways Market #1, and Jacqueline Erlin and Betty Mae Robison, stockholders in said corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 31758.

Page 182

73 Cal.Rptr. 182

267 Cal.App.2d 381, 37 A.L.R.3d 1378

ERLIN-LAWLER ENTERPRISES, INC., a California corporation, dba Bestways Market #1, and Jacqueline Erlin and Betty Mae Robison, stockholders in said corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 31758.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

Nov. 13, 1968.

Ben Waxman, Sherman Oaks, for Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc., plaintiff and appellant.

Early, Maslach, Foran & Williams and Kenneth H. Wechsler, Los Angeles, for Fire Insurance Exchange, defendant and respondent.

AISO, Associate Justice.

Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc., a California corporation, dba Bestways Market #1, Dan Erlin, and James H. Lawler, as plaintiffs, brought this action against the defendant Fire Insurance Exchange and others for the purpose of collecting fire insurance under policies covering loss by fire to the equipment and fixtures and stock in trade of the plaintiff corporation and loss from business interruption caused by fire.

Defendant insurance company denied liability, Inter alia, on the ground that the fire was deliberately caused by plaintiffs Dan Erlin and James H. Lawler, who had been convicted for arson for setting the fire. Defendant insurance company cross-complained against the three plaintiffs for reimbursement of the sum it had paid out to the Union Bank under a 'Lender Loss Payable Endorsement' for damage to the equipment and fixtures on which the Union Bank held a security interest.

The trial court, sitting without a jury, denied recovery on the complaint and granted judgment on defendant's cross-complaint for $8,287.50 against plaintiffs and cross-defendants, Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc., Dan Erlin and James H. Lawler.

From this judgment the plaintiff corporation, Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc., alone appeals. Two stockholders, Jacqueline Erlin and Betty Mae Robison, attempted to appeal from said judgment, but their attempted appeals were dismissed for lack of standing to appeal. (265 A.C.A. No. 4, Minutes, p. 8.)

Plaintiff corporation contends that the conclusion of law upon which the judgment is predicated, namely, 'That plaintiff, Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc., was merely the alter ego of plaintiffs, Dan Erlin and James H. Lawler' is neither supported by the findings nor the evidence. We agree.

The congenital infirmity of this case is the attempted stipulated submission on the agreed facts in the joint pretrial statement and the statement of facts as delineated in the defendant's trial brief filed with the court, the latter to 'be considered by the Court as evidence.' The stipulation did not cover sufficient facts or evidence to enable the court to render a judgment for either party based on the law and substantial evidence. The court should have set aside the stipulation of counsel and reopened the case for the taking of additional evidence or the obtaining of further stipulations as to necessary facts, ultimate or evidentiary. (McCarthy v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. (1934) 97 Mont. 540, 37 P.2d 579, 582--583, 97 A.L.R. 292.)

There is no dispute as to defendant insurance company having issued a policy to plaintiff corporation covering losses under the risks alleged in its complaint, that a fire occurred on December 30, 1961, that a proof of loss claiming $85,854.63 was filed and the claim denied by defendant insurance company, that plaintiffs Dan Erlin and James H. Lawler had been convicted for arson on August 16, 1963, for wilfully and maliciously setting the fire with intent to defraud the insurer, and that defendant insurance company (cross-complainant) had paid to the Union Bank the sum of $8,287.50 under a 'Lender Loss Payable Endorsement' for damages to equipment and fixtures caused by the fire.

The factual issues, dispositive of this litigation, were presented to the trial judge for resolution with only the following as the evidence:

'Erlin-Lawler Enterprises, Inc. was incorporated in August, 1960. The incorporators were Dan Erlin, his wife, James H. Lawler and his ex-wife. Each became equal stockholders upon contribution of cash to the corporation in equal amounts. Dan Erlin became president of the corporation and James H. Lawler, secretary-treasurer. The two women also became officers of the corporation. All but Mrs. Erlin took an active, full-time role in the operation of the food market in Inglewood and each received a salary as compensation. In the early part of 1961, James H. Lawler sold his entire stock interest to Dan Erlin, who would up with 50% Of the stock in his name, 25% In his presently ex-wife's name, and 25% In the name of Lawler's ex-wife. Mr. Lawler ceased all official connections with the corporation upon sale of his stock interest but remained to render advice as a friend.

'No change has occurred in the stock holdings or offices of the corporation since early 1961, and the corporation continues in existence to the present time.'

At the trial, defendant contended that Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439 was controlling. The plaintiff corporation contended that Nuffer v. Insurance Co. of North America (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 349, 45 Cal.Rptr. 918 was the applicable case. Neither was correct; neither decision is dispositive of this case. In Teitelbaum, the insured corporations conceded that they were mere Alter egos of the arsonist. There is no such concession here. In Nuffer there was no showing that the agent who set the fire would benefit from the recovery on the policy. The court there stated, 'The courts of all jurisdictions in the United States, save one, that have considered situations such as in the case at bench, have held that recovery upon a policy of fire insurance is not defeated by the fact that the loss for which recovery is sought resulted from the intentional burning by the insured's agent of the property covered by the policy (citations omitted), unless the insured personally participated in the arson or ratified the same * * *, or the agent would benefit substantially from recovery upon the policy. (California Ins. Company v. Allen, 5 Cir., 235 F.2d 178, 179; Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., supra, (5 Cir.) 149 F.2d 359, 361; Kimball Ice Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 4 Cir., 18 F.2d 563, 565--566, 52 A.L.R 799; Meily Co. v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 3 Cir., 148 F. 683 (79 C.C.A. 454); D. I. Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assur. Co., 284 Ill. 343, 120 N.E. 268, 270, 1 A.L.R. 602; Miller & Dobrin Furniture Co. v. Camden Fire Ins. Co. Assn., supra, 55 N.J.Super. 205, 150 A.2d 276, 280, 283; Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Wright (Okl.) 322 P.2d 417, 422, 70 A.L.R.2d 1170; Bellman v. Home Ins. Co., 178 Wis. 349, 189 N.W. 1028, 27 A.L.R. 945.)' (Nuffer v. Insurance Co. of North America (1965) supra, 236 Cal.App.2d 349, 354--355, 45 Cal.Rptr. 918, 922.) Here, Dan Erlin would benefit to at least the extent of 50% Of the corporation's recovery, if the assets of the corporation consisted only of the proceeds of the policy. Neither case is, therefore on all fours with the factual situation presented here.

We have examined the cases cited by the court in Nuffer listed above, as well as others cited in the following texts on fire insurance: 18 Couch on Insurance 2d (1968) §§ 74:669--74:673, pp. 591--594; 5 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice (1941) § 3113, pp. 259--260; 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 822, p. 871; 29--A Am.Jur., Insurance, § 1305, p. 428. The question posed here appears to be of first impression in California. From the cases decided in the other jurisdictions, the following basic rule may be deduced: The arsonist's status as an officer, stockholder, employee or agent of an insured corporation does not necessarily preclude the corporation from recovering upon the policy of insurance. The basic function of the court is to see that no one takes advantage of his own wrong. (Civ.Code, § 3517.) Section 533 of the Insurance Code providing in part, 'An insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured * * *' is but a codification of the foregoing jurisprudential maxim. (Nuffer v. Insurance Co. of North America (1965) supra, 236 Cal.App.2d 349, 354, 45 Cal.Rptr. 918.) An analysis must be made in each case to see if the arsonist will benefit by the recovery on the policy, either directly or indirectly.

'When * * * the beneficial owner of practically all of the stock in a corporation, and who has the absolute management and control of its affairs and property, * * * sets fire to the property of a corporation, or causes it to be done, there is no sound reason to support the contention * * * that the corporation should be allowed to recover on a policy for the destruction of the corporate property by a fire so occasioned.' (Felsenthal Co. v. Northern Assurance Co. (1918) 284 Ill. 343, 120 N.E. 268, 1 A.L.R. 602, 607.)

If an officer or stockholder has absolute control in the conduct of the business of a corporation, his acts if he acts on behalf of the corporation become the acts of the corporation barring it from recovery even though he is not the dominant shareholder. (Northern Assur. Co. v. Rachlin Clothes Shop (1924) 32 Del. 406, 125 A. 184, 187--188, 190.) Where the fire is set by a manager owning only one-fourth of the stock, but having complete control and management of the corporation, the latter may not recover. (Kimball Ice Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (C.C.A. 4, 1927) 18 F.2d 563, 564, 565--566.) Where the minority shareholder is the...