Ernie v. Trinity Lutheran Church

• Decision Date: 11 March 1959
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: Jessie F. ERNIE, Appellant, v. TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH (a Nonprofit Corporation), Respondent. S. F. 19821.

Page 525

336 P.2d 525

51 Cal.2d 702

Jessie F. ERNIE, Appellant, v. TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH (a Nonprofit Corporation), Respondent.

S. F. 19821.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

March 11, 1959.

Joseph A. Brown and Miguel A. Leite, San Francisco, for appellant.

John B. Ehlen, San Francisco, for respondent.

SHENK, Justice.

The plaintiff appeals from a judgment quieting title in the defendant church and enjoining the plaintiff from asserting any claim in or to a disputed strip of land 9/10 of a foot wide and 140 feet long located in the city of San Rafael. The issues on appeal are whether the plaintiff failed to prove her cause of action and whether the judgment properly quieted title in the defendant in and to this narrow strip.

The complaint alleged that the plaintiff owned a described parcel of land 55 feet by 140 feet fronting on Fifth Avenue in San Rafael; that the defendant owned the adjoining property to the west; that without her wishes and against her consent the defendant maintained encroachments consisting of a cement walkway, a rectory building and a fence on a strip of land 9/10 of a foot wide within the westerly boundary line for its entire 140 foot length; that the defendant was claiming some right, title or interest in this strip, and that this claim was without right. The answer denied the plaintiff's ownership and asserted defendant's ownership and possession of this strip. Separate defenses based on adverse possession, agreed boundary, and the bar of the statutes of limitation contained in section 318 and subdivision 2 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure were pleaded. The answer prayed that the plaintiff take nothing by her complaint, that the defendant be awarded its costs of court and 'such other and further relief as is meet and just in the premises.'

The plaintiff introduced as evidence of her title a deed to her from a Mrs. Anna Hock dated May 17, 1944, the description in which included the disputed strip, and a survey map prepared for the plaintiff in 1952 which showed the extent of the encroachments upon this land. She also introduced evidence that she had paid the taxes on the land deeded to her, and that the description of the adjoining property in a deed to the defendant's predecessor from a Mrs. Clara Hock, dated January 9, 1925, did not include this strip.

It appears without conflict that the evidence supports the findings that in the year 1925 the defendant's predecessor, the St. Matthew's Evangelical Church of San Rafael, owned the property described in Finding II; that in the year 1926 that church built, as an integral part of its church building, a rectory building having a concrete foundation, upon a portion of the disputed strip, described in Finding III; that at that time it built on other portions of this strip a cement walkway about six feet wide leading from the southerly line of Fifth Avenue to the rectory; that along the easterly line of this walkway it built a substantial wooden fence, the supporting posts of which were firmly and substantially embedded in the walkway and attached to the rectory building; that at that same time it built a substantial wooden fence, the uprights of which were firmly and substantially embedded in the soil, extending southerly from the rectory along the easterly line of the strip to the rear property line; that continously, and ever since these structures were erected and until June 30, 1942, the St. Matthew's Evangelical Church was in the sole and exclusive possession of this strip of land; that the church, its parishioners, pastors, Sunday School and Confirmation Classes openly, visibly, peaceably, notoriously, and without objection from any one used the walkway and rectory for the purposes of the church; that from January 1926 until October 1952 no one made any claim or demand of any kind adverse to the use of, or claim to this strip by the church, its parishioners, pastors, Sunday School and Confirmation Classes; that on June 30, 1942, the defendant purchased its property from St. Matthew's Evangelical Church in the belief that the easterly line of the property purchased was along the easterly line of the strip, and that ever since June 30, 1942, the defendant, its pastors, parishioners, Sunday School and Confirmation Classes have solely and exclusively, openly, visibly, peaceably and notoriously used said cement walkway, said rectory and said fences.

The court found further, also without any conflict in the evidence, that on May 17, 1944, one Mrs. Anna Hock executed a conveyance to the plaintiff of the 55 140 foot parcel described in Finding VI; that ever since that date the plaintiff has paid all taxes levied or assessed upon this property and that no taxes were at any time levied or assessed upon any easement over the disputed strip; that neither Mrs. Anna Hock, nor the plaintiff at any time used, occupied or possessed this strip or any of the improvements thereon; that in October of 1952 the plaintiff, for the first time, informed the defendant that she claimed title to this strip, and that she commenced the present action on January 30, 1956.

As conclusions of law from these facts the court found that the plaintiff's action was barred by the provisions of section 318 and of subdivision 2 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and by laches and lack of due diligence of the plaintiff and her predecessor in interest; that the defendant was entitled to judgment that the plaintiff and all persons claiming under her be enjoined from asserting any claim adverse to the defendant or to the disputed strip, together with the defendant's costs of suit, and that judgment should be entered quieting the defendant's title in the strip. The legal description of the strip is set forth in Conclusion IV.

In this state a quiet title action may be brought by a party not in possession (Code Civ.Proc. § 380) against another who claims an estate or interest in property adverse to him (Code Civ.Proc. § 738). Section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that 'No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seised or possessed of the property in question, within five years before the commencement of the action.' The plaintiff may recover only upon the strength of his or her own title, however, and not upon the weakness of the defendant's title. Where the plaintiff relies on a paper title alone he must trace his title (1) to the government; or (2) to grantor in possession at the time of the conveyance to the plaintiff; or (3) to a source common to the chains of title of plaintiff and defendant. Helvey v. Sax, 38 Cal.2d 21, 24, 237 P.2d 269; Rockey v. Vieux, 179 Cal. 681, 682 178 P. 172. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. Akley v. Bassett, 189 Cal. 625, 646, 209 P. 576; Haney v. Kinevan, 73 Cal.App.2d 343, 344, 166 P.2d 361.

The plaintiff did not offier evidence to establish a prima facie case on any of these alternatives or to overcome the bar of the statute of limitations contained in section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was offered to deraign her title from the government or to show that any common grantor appeared in the chain of title of herself and the defendant. What title the plaintiff's grantor had or how she acquired it does not appear, and no proof was offered that she or her grantor ever had possession. The mere introduction of the deed from her immediate grantor was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Coffin v. Odd Fellows Hall Ass'n, 9 Cal.2d 521, 525, 71 P.2d 266; San Diego Improvement Co. v. Brodie, 215 Cal. 97, 100, 8 P.2d 1027. The plaintiff...