Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 February 1995
• Citation: 320 Or. 509,888 P.2d 544
• Parties: Edwin M. ERRAND, Petitioner on Review, v. CASCADE STEEL ROLLING MILLS, INC., an Oregon corporation, Respondent on Review. CC CV91283; CA A80487; SC S41195.
• Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Page 544

888 P.2d 544

320 Or. 509

Edwin M. ERRAND, Petitioner on Review, v. CASCADE STEEL ROLLING MILLS, INC., an Oregon corporation,

Respondent on Review.

CC CV91283; CA A80487; SC S41195.

Supreme Court of Oregon,

In Banc.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 2, 1994.

Decided Feb. 2, 1995.

Sharon C. Stevens, of Callahan and Stevens, Keizer, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner on review.

Ronald W. Atwood, of Williams, Zografos, Peck & Atwood, Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the briefs was Brad G. Garber.

Robert Wollheim, of Welch, Bruun, Green & Wollheim, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass'n and Oregon Workers' Compensation Attys.

Deborah L. Sather, of Stoel Rives Boley Jones & Grey, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Self-Insured Ass'n.

Jerald P. Keene, of Roberts, Reinisch, MacKenzie, Healey & Wilson, P.C., Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Associated Oregon Industries and Oregon Restaurant Ass'n.

VAN HOOMISSEN, Justice.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court against defendant, his employer, alleging statutory and common law negligence claims and seeking damages for economic losses, past and future medical bills, lost wages, and impairment of earning capacity. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that defendant is immune from liability and that plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under the Workers' Compensation Law. ORS 656.018. ¹ The Court of Appeals affirmed. Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 126 Or.App. 450, 454-55, 869 P.2d 358 (1994). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

Plaintiff, a worker at defendant's manufacturing plant, had a preexisting condition of chronic infectious paranasal sinusitis that was not caused by his current work experiences or environment. That preexisting condition, which predisposes plaintiff to experience airway irritation, became symptomatic due to his inhalation of substances in the workplace. Plaintiff sought treatment for his symptoms and filed a workers' compensation claim. The insurer denied the claim, explaining that "it does not appear your condition was worsened by or arose out of and in the course of your employment, either by accident or occupational disease." Plaintiff appealed that denial.

A referee defined the issue as whether plaintiff's work exposure caused or worsened his chronic infectious paranasal sinusitis or "caused a complex of symptoms that would be recognized in workers' compensation law as a disease." After noting that plaintiff's sinusitis predisposed him to experience airway irritation, the referee found:

"Claimant does not have a reactive airway disease or occupational asthma. He does have transient irritation of the upper respiratory tract and paranasal sinuses as a result of inhalation of substances found in his workplace.

"Claimant's work exposure is not the major cause of his chronic infectious paranasal sinusitis." ² The referee upheld the insurer's denial of the claim. In its final order, the Workers' Compensation Board adopted the referee's order and held that plaintiff had not established that his condition was compensable, because work was not the "major cause" of his condition. Plaintiff did not seek judicial review of the Board's order.

Plaintiff then brought this action in circuit court against his employer, based on inhalation of and exposure to particulates in the workplace, alleging statutory and common law claims. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's exclusive remedy is under the Workers' Compensation Law and that, under ORS 656.018, defendant is immune from liability. The trial court granted defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding:

"With certain exceptions not involved here, if the Workers' Compensation Act is applicable, and if the employer has satisfied its obligation to comply with the requirements of the Act, then the employer's liability to the worker for the worker's work-related injury or condition is exclusively under the Act, and the Act is also the exclusive remedy for the injured worker. That is one part of the quid pro quo that underlies our workers' compensation system; the other part requires the employer to assume liability for work-related injuries without fault.

" * * * * *

"The exclusivity of the Act is not limited to claims that are ultimately determined to be compensable." Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., supra, 126 Or.App. at 453-54, 869 P.2d 358 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff argues on review that the exclusivity provisions of ORS 656.018 do not apply because, although his respiratory symptoms occurred in and were caused by the workplace, he did not have a "compensable injury," as defined in the Workers' Compensation Law and, therefore, he is not entitled to compensation for his condition. See ORS 656.005(7)(a) (defining "compensable injury"); ORS 656.018(1) (limiting complying employer's liability to that "arising out of compensable injuries"). From this, plaintiff further argues that the undisputed fact that he was not entitled to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Law demonstrates that his injury did not fall within the exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018. That is, plaintiff is arguing that even if he is a subject worker and defendant is a complying employer, ORS 656.018 does not apply in this case because, as a matter of law, his condition is not compensable.

Defendant responds that a mechanical application of the statutory definition of "compensable injury" to ORS 656.018 would defeat the legislative intent behind the exclusivity provision by allowing anyone whose claim is found not to be compensable to sue the employer in a civil action. Defendant asks this court to interpret ORS 656.018 as exclusive and in place of all other liability that an employer either has or might have if the employee's condition in question is "work-related" or "occurring at work." We first turn to the text of ORS 656.018 and to the definition of "compensable injury," ORS 656.005(7)(a), in the context of the Workers' Compensation Law, to discern whether the legislature intended that a civil claim such as plaintiff's be barred. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993) (to discern intent of legislature, court first examines the text and context of statute).

ORS 656.018(1) provides that a complying employer's liability "is exclusive and in place of all other liability arising out of compensable injuries to the subject workers * * *." ORS 656.018(2) likewise provides that the "rights given to a subject worker * * * for compensable injuries under this chapter are in lieu of any remedies they might otherwise have for such injuries against the worker's employer under ORS 654.305 to 654.335 or other laws, common law or statute, [except as otherwise provided in the Workers' Compensation Law]." (Emphasis added.)

ORS 656.003 provides that, "[e]xcept where the context otherwise requires, the definitions given in this chapter govern its construction." We turn to the issue whether the statutory definition of compensable injury applies to ORS 656.018. The wording of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), that "[n]o injury or disease is compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury," and the language of ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B), that certain conditions may be "compensable only to the extent the compensable injury is and remains the major contributing cause," provide, in essence, that certain injuries, diseases, or conditions, although related to work, may not be "compensable" under certain circumstances, i.e., unless the "major contributing cause" criteria found in subparagraph (A) or (B) are met. ³

From the foregoing description of the text of the definition of "compensable injury" in ORS 656.005(7)(a), it appears to us that the legislature was using the word "compensable" to convey different meanings. In the main part of ORS 656.005(7)(a), the "compensable injury" referred to may be simply an "accidental injury" "arising out of and in the course of employment." However, the limitations set forth in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of ORS 656.005(7)(a) make it clear that one who suffers an "accidental injury" "arising out of and in the course of employment" as described in paragraph (a) nevertheless may have an injury that is not "compensable," unless the "major contributing cause" test has been met. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), (B); see also SAIF v. Drews, 318 Or. 1, 8-9, 860 P.2d 254 (1993) ("compensable injury" encompasses an application of the criteria found in ORS 656.005(7)(a), including the limitations found in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of that statute, in making initial determination of compensability).

The question is whether the legislature intended the exclusivity provision of ORS 656.018 to refer to some definition of compensable injury other than that set forth in ORS 656.005(7)(a), as qualified and limited by subparagraphs (A) and (B). Cf. Dethlefs v. Hyster Co., 295 Or. 298, 309-10 & n 10, 667 P.2d 487 (1983) (in cases decided before the addition of subparagraphs (A) and (B) to ORS 656.005(7)(a), court indicated that legislative intent behind Workers' Compensation Law was to avoid common law litigation and to grant employers immunity against liability for compensable injuries, but also recognized that it "is arguable that an action for damages may be maintained against an employer of the worker if a disease or injury is not 'compensable' ").

The definition of "compensable injury" found in ORS 656.005(7)(a), which includes the limitations found in subparagraphs (A) and (B), governs statutory construction of that term as used in the Workers' Compensation Law "[e]xcept where the context otherwise requires." ORS 656.003; see also Astleford v. SAIF, 319 Or. 225, 232-33, 874 P.2d 1329 (1994) (under ORS 656.003, a given statutory definition...