Error v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 28 February 1850
• Docket Number: No. 40.,40.
• Citation: 8 Ga. 236
• Parties: Joseph S. Worthy et al. plaintiffs in error. vs. Sanky T. Johnson et al. defendants.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

8 Ga. 236

Joseph S. Worthy et al. plaintiffs in error. vs. Sanky T. Johnson et al. defendants.

No. 40.

Supreme Court of the State of Georgia

FEBRUARY TERM, 1850.

Bill for discovery and relief, in Troup Superior Court. Demurrer decision, by Judge Hill, at November Adjourned Term, 1849.

The heirs of Thomas Worthy filed this bill against certain purchasers of negroes, sold by his executors, at public sale, and against the present holders of certain other slaves that were bought by said executors, at their own sale, and which had been sold by the Sheriff, as the property of said executors.

The bill avers that Thomas Worthy died testate, leaving all the negroes here in dispute for equal distribution between his wife and children. He conferred no power on the executors to. sell the same. The executors obtained an order of the Ordinary Court, to sell said slaves and the real estate, which order did not recite the existence of the specified pre-requisites of the Statute to the granting of said order, but simply recited that it was applied for, and the executors had published said application in terms of the law—did not recite that the other personal property and the hire of the negroes, were not sufficient to pay the debts, &c.; that under said order, the executors proceeded, and sold the said negroes, without having advertised said sale sixty days, in any public gazette, or at the court-house door; that at said sale, a part of the negroes were purchased by some of these defendants, and another portion were purchased by said executors, which latter portion had thereafter been sold to some others of these defendants.

The bill was demurred to— 1st. For multifariousness; no privity in defendants; cause of action is separate and distinct against each one; and no combination shown.

2d. It is brought in the name of the wrong parties; should have been brought by Worthy's legal representative. 3d. That complainants have a Common Law remedy. 4th. There is no equity in the bill.

The Court sustained each of the grounds, and dismissed the bill; and to this decision complainants excepted.

John L. Stephens, for plaintiff in error, cited—

Mitford's Plead. 241. 2 Vern. 37. 1 Athyns, 283. 5 Maddox Ch. R. 93, '4. McCartney et al. vs. Calhoun et al. 11 Ala. (N. S.) Rep. 110. 8 Ves. 347. Lester vs. Lester, 6 Ib. 631. 10 Ib. 393. 17 Ib. 168. 5 Ib. 680. Prince's Dig. 234, 238.

B. H. Hill and O. A. Bull, for defendants in error, cited—

Story's Eq. Pl. 218, 394, 406, '7, 412. 2 Ves. Jr. 95, 486. 6 Johns. Ch. R. 115. Fellows vs. Fellows, 4 Cowen, 682. 1 McCord, 132. 3 Ib. 371. 3 Peere Williams, 394. 2 McCord Ch. R. 169. 4 Paige, 47. 6 Ves. 748. bond et al. vs. Zeigier et al. 1 Kelly, 342.

By the Court. —Lumpkin, J. delivering the opinion.

The first ground taken in the demurrer is, that the bill is multifarious, because it joins defendants, some of whom purchased directly themselves, at the executor's sale, while others bought at second hand, under executions against the executors, who purchased at their own sale.

All the defendants, as purchasers of the slaves, as the property of Worthy, have a common interest in resisting the equity of complainant's demand. They have, also, a common interest in sustaining the validity of the executor's sale, under which they all derive title; and these points being common to all, the bill is not multifarious. It is not indispensable that all the parties should have an interest in all the matters contained in the suit; it will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some matter in thesuit, and they are connected with others. Addison vs. Walker, 4 Young Cull. 444. Parr vs. Attorney General, 8 Clarke & Fin. 435.^*

The second ground of demurrer is, that the bill should have been brought by the administrator, de bonis non, and not by the heirs.

The general rule undoubtedly is, that creditors and heirs can sue only through the legal representative—the exception is, " unless there bo collusion, insolvency, unwillingness to collect the assets, or some other special facts to warrant it. Gilbert vs. Thomas et al. 3 Kelly, 575, and authorities there cited. The bill in this case expressly charges, that application to sue has been made to the administrator, and that he refused to institute proceedings for the recovery of this property. He is properly, therefore, made a co-defendant.

It is suggested that the name of the representative might be used, without his consent, to maintain this suit. A ne exeat, however, or some other proceeding, requiring his voluntary action, might become necessary, in the course of the litigation, to protect the interest of the heirs.

The third ground taken in the demurrer is, that the complainants have an ample Common Law remedy. None has been pointed out—none occurs to this Court; on the contrary, they are compelled to resort to Equity to make their election—not to" ratify the purchase made by the executors at their own sale. This step is equally necessary to render a satisfactory reason for not 6ueing through the legal representative of the estate.

The next and last ground in the demurrer is, that there is no equity in the bill; and the main points insisted on here, are, first, that the sale is valid, and secondly, if it is not, that the defendants, being bona fide purchasers, cannot be affected by any irregularity in the sale, or in the proceedings of the Court of Ordinary, under which it was made.

Does the doctrine of caveat emptor apply to the public sales of executors, administrators and guardians, made under the authority of law? "While the rules relating to market overt in England, by which certain privileges are allowed, which are not granted to private sales, have not generally been recognized or enforced inthis country, and the doctrine obtains here, that no person can make a valid sale of property to which he has no title, and which he is not authorized by the real owner to sell:

Judicial sales are an exception; and in respect to these, as well as sales made under the Probate Acts of the several States, and sales of goods found, and of estrays, the general rules of market overt apply. The Monte Alegre, 9 Wheat. Reps. 616. Heacock vs. Walker, 1 Tyler's R. 341. Forsylhe vs. Ellis, 4 J. J. Marsh. 298. Sims vs. Alexander, 3 Yeates' R. 268.

In South Carolina, it has been expressly held, that caveat emptor is the best possible rule that can be laid down. The Court emphatically stales, that all who attend such sales, ought to take care and examine into the title, &c.; that no warranty, express or implied, can be raised on the part of the owner, as to whom the proceeding is compulsory; nor of the Sheriff, who is the mere agent of the Court; nor of the Court itself—and that the purchaser was compelled to pay the money bid at such sale, notwithstanding any defect in the title. The Creditors of Thayer vs. Sheriff of Charleston, 2 Bay. 170.

In the case cited from Wheaton, the question of liability in judicial sales, particularly as to the quality of goods, was very fully considered, and it was there held—

1. That the owner is not chargeable for any representation or warranty of the agent of the law in selling.

2. That the officer is only the minister of the law, to execute the orders of the Court, and cannot be considered as warranting the property sold, so as to render himself personally liable, while he acts within the scope of his authority; and that the rule caveat emptor applies, generally, from the nature of the transaction, to all judicial sales.

Where a Sheriff sells goods on execution, there is, probably, an implied warranty, that he does not know that they are not the property of the execution debtor; and for a broach thereof, assumpsit would lie, perhaps, at the instance of the purchaser against the officer, to recover to the extent to which he has been damnified by the deception. Pets vs. Blades, 5 Taunt. 657.

The same doctrine applies to sales made by executors and administrators, under authority of law. A license to sell, gives no power, by warranty, to bind the estate which they represent. It would be but reasonable, that the Legislature should conferthis power, under certain restrictions. It would enable trustees to sell for a better price. And why should not the estate, at any rate, to the extent of the residue in the hands of the representative, bo responsible to the holder for any failure?

Still, I repeat, the principle unquestionably is, that the representative has no power of charging the effects of the estate, by any contract originating with himself; neither is he required, by any duty of his office or trust, to enter into personal obligations respecting property which he sells. He is at liberty, to be sure, to do so, if he chooses, and by thus exciting the confidence of purchasers, enlarge the proceeds of the sale.

The exemption of executors, administrators and other trustees, from personal responsibility to a purchaser, except where fraud exists, or there is an express warranty, seems to be indispensable. For who would accept an office of this kind, if he were to become necessarily the guarantee, of him whom he represents, of the good title and soundness of all the property submitted to his charge, and which he may be obliged, by order of Court, to sell. It would be but poor indemnity to have to look, if a recovery were had against him, to creditors, distributees and legatees. It would but ill comport with the policy of the law, that officers so necessary should be subject to the operation of a principle, so fraught with danger to their interest, as to deter every one from the acceptance. 2 Har. & Gill. 176. It might be otherwise, if the purchase...