Erskine v. Board of Educ., No. CIV.A. DKC 2000-2552.

Decision Date22 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A. DKC 2000-2552.
Citation197 F.Supp.2d 399
PartiesCharles ERSKINE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Mary Ann Ryan, Laurel, MD, for Plaintiff.

Sheldon L. Gnatt, Knight, Manzi, Nussgaum and LaPlaca, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination and civil rights case is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For reasons that follow, the court shall grant Defendants' motion.

I. Background

The following facts are uncontroverted or in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

Charles Erskine, a white male, had been employed as a teacher by the Prince George's County Board of Education for 26 years at the time of the incidents giving rise to this case. He held a B.S. degree, a masters' degree in special education, and an advanced professional certification as a teacher. Paper no. 15, Ex. A. In April 1997, Erskine was teaching Foreign Language Exploration ("FLEX") at James Madison Middle School ("Madison") in Upper Marlboro, Maryland. Part of the FLEX program consisted of teaching conversational Spanish, Japanese, and French to the students through the use of lesson plans approved by Prince George's County Schools. Paper no. 15, Ex. C, D.

In an April 15, 1997, letter, the principal of Madison, Paul Lewis, received a complaint about Erskine from Loretta Bethea, the parent of a student in Erskine's class. In that letter, Bethea alleged that Erskine had told her daughter's class that they would never amount to anything, and that they would never get good jobs, and she alleged that Erskine refers to the students as "niggas" in class. Paper no. 14, Ex. 1, attachment 1.

Erskine was called to meet with Lewis and his vice-principal on that same day. Paper no. 15, Ex. C. Erskine was advised of the complaint and told not to do anything that could be construed as degrading or racially insensitive. Further, he was told that an investigation would ensue. Id., Ex. E. Lewis testified in his deposition that he had several complaints from parents involving Erskine and had verbally counseled Erskine about his behavior. Paper no. 14, Ex. 1, attachment 2. However, he could not recall specific examples of such counseling and produced no record of it. Paper no. 15, at 6, Ex. B. Erskine can only recall being counseled by Lewis on two occasions a number of years before the incident. Id., at 7, Ex. C.

Later that week, on April 18, 1997, Lewis heard an allegation from one or more students that Erskine had written the word "nigger" on the blackboard of his classroom. In response to this allegation, Erskine was called to meet with Lewis and Susan DePlatchett, Chief Educational Administrator of the Frederick Douglass cluster of schools, which included Madison. He denied ever using the word "nigger" in the classroom. Paper no. 15, at 3. Erskine explained to them that, in the course of a class exercise, he had written on the board the names of colors in Spanish and their English translations. Erskine, apparently, had written on the board the Spanish word for black, "negro." Paper no. 15, at 3, Ex. C. DePlatchett made an "executive decision" and pulled Erskine from his classroom, assigning him to administrative duties. Lewis requested that a school security guard investigate the alleged use of the word "nigger" and Deplatchett assigned a school investigator, Mable Nelson, to prepare a report to determine whether Erskine had used the word. Id., Ex. B, G.

On April 29, 1997, Erskine was called into a meeting with Dr. Sterling Marshall, Chief Divisional Administrator for Personnel, and school administrators, including the other individual defendants. Defendants describe this meeting as a due process conference. Paper no. 14, at 4. At this meeting, the administrators told Erskine that they had some concerns about his classroom statements and asked him to explain. Erskine explained that he was teaching Spanish colors and that he did not use derogatory language or make statements to students that might affect their self-esteem. Paper no. 15, at 4, Ex. C. Erskine also stated that he had been told by Nelson that the complaints against him were determined to be unfounded by her report. Id. During the course of this meeting, in addition to the alleged black-board incident, the discussion included other complaints from students and parents regarding Erskine's methods and motivations. Paper no. 14, Ex. 2; Paper no. 15, Ex. C, at 69-70. At this meeting, Erskine was not charged with any misconduct or shown any evidence, witness statements, or Nelson's report. Erskine claims that he was not given the opportunity at this meeting to ask questions or rebut evidence and that, as he understood it, any evidence supported his version of the events. Erskine was told only that the matter was being investigated and that he would be advised of the results of the investigation. Paper no. 15, at 5, Ex. C.

Prior to the meeting, Erskine had been placed on temporary assignment with pay away from a classroom. Paper no. 14, Ex. 1, 2. Effective May 13, 1997, after the meeting with administrators, Erskine was returned to classroom duties, temporarily reassigned for the remainder of the school year to Frederick Douglass High School, where DePlatchett was principal. Id., at 5, Ex. J. Erskine describes his position as that of a substitute and contends that he was required to report to work early each day to receive his class assignment and was not assigned to teach in areas of his certification. Id., Ex. C. Substitutes in Prince George's County schools do not require the same degrees or certification as a permanent teacher. Paper no. 15, at 6, Ex. G. There is no allegation that Erskine suffered any loss in pay.

Erskine scheduled a meeting with DePlatchett to find out the status of the investigation. DePlatchett refused to discuss the investigation with Erskine and told him, "I know you did it." Id., Ex. C, at 112. Erskine became increasingly despondent had trouble sleeping, withdrew from his friends and family and was unable to work. Paper no. 15, at 6. At the end of the year, Erskine received an unsatisfactory evaluation from Lewis. This evaluation was based on complaints received about Erskine rather than personal observations by Lewis of Erskine's work in the classroom. Paper no. 15, at 6, Ex. B.

Prior to the opening of the 1997-1998 school year, Erskine reported to Frederick Douglass High School to receive his teaching assignment. Lewis spotted him in the auditorium and led him out of the building, causing him to feel stigmatized and humiliated. Paper no. 15, at 6, Ex. C. Shortly afterwards, he was advised that he would be assigned as a permanent substitute. Id., at 6, Ex. G. The official notification to Erskine indicates that he continued to be assigned as a teacher with no change in pay. Paper no. 14, at 7, Ex. B. Erskine suffered a breakdown and severe depression and was unable to return to work until the 2000-2001 school year. Paper no. 15, at 6, Ex. K. Upon his return, apparently Erskine was reassigned to a classroom position. Paper no. 15, at 7.

Plaintiff brings three counts against Defendants. In Count I, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Erskine alleges that his reassignment was an adverse employment action taken against him by Defendants in retaliation for his exercise of free speech protected by the First Amendment. In Count II, brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3 et seq. ("Title VII"), Erskine alleges that Defendants illegally discriminated against him by disciplining him for the use of racially offensive language while black teachers using the same language have not been disciplined. Finally, in Count III, also under § 1983, Erskine alleges that adverse job actions taken by Defendants deprived him of his property interest in his teaching position without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. For reasons that follow, summary judgment will be granted as to all counts.

II. Standard of Review

It is well established that a motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In other words, if there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co., 601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., 181 F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir.1950). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Pulliam Inv. Co., 810 F.2d at 1282 (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979)).

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 773 F.2d 592, 595 (4th Cir.1985). A party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element ... necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct 2548. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for summary...

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