Jarallah v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 17 August 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. DKC 14–1772.
• Citation: 123 F.Supp.3d 719
• Parties: Tajudin JARALLAH v. Warren THOMPSON, et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

123 F.Supp.3d 719

Tajudin JARALLAH

v.Warren THOMPSON, et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 14–1772.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

Filed Aug. 17, 2015.

Tajudin Jarallah, Aiken, SC, pro se.

Thomas P. Dowd, Littler Mendelson PC, Washington, DC, Corlie McCormick, Jr., Thomas Faulk, Maryland Office of the Attorney General, Baltimore, MD, Vincent Daniel Palumbo, Jr., The Palumbo Law Group LLC, Fort Washington, MD, for Warren Thompson, et al.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW, District Judge.

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this employment discrimination case are the following motions: (1) a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment filed by Defendants Warren Thompson, Maurice Jenoure, and Dina Zaikouk (ECF No. 12); (2) a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment filed by Defendant Dan Kelly (ECF No. 26); (3) a motion to amend the complaint filed by Plaintiff Tajudin Jarallah (ECF No. 32); (4) motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Bowie State University ("Bowie State") (ECF No. 4), Morgan State University ("Morgan State") (ECF No. 5), and Prince George's Community College ("PGCC") (ECF No. 16) (collectively the "school Defendants"); (5) a motion to dismiss voluntarily without prejudice filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 24); and (6) a motion to disqualify counsel filed by Plaintiff (ECF No. 25). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motions of Defendants Thompson, Jenoure, Zaikouk, and Kelly to dismiss or alternatively, for summary judgment will be granted. Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend will be denied. School Defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted. Plaintiff's motion to dismiss voluntarily without prejudice will be denied. Plaintiff's motion to disqualify counsel will be denied.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff worked in various capacities for Thompson Hospitality Corporation ("Thompson Hospitality"). Thompson Hospitality is a food services provider that contracts with colleges and universities to provide cafeteria and other food services. Plaintiff began working for Thompson Hospitality in early 2011. Plaintiff initially worked as an Executive Chef for Thompson Hospitality at Bowie State. While at Bowie State, Plaintiff raised multiple concerns to Thompson Hospitality management regarding alleged discrimination by his supervisors. (ECF No. 1–4, at 1–33). Thompson Hospitality management investigated Plaintiff's allegations and found them to be without merit. (ECF No. 1–4, at 32).

In August 2011, Plaintiff emailed Thompson Hospitality a request for a transfer to a location in the South because he found the rent in Maryland too high and maintained a home in Atlanta, Georgia. (ECF No. 1–4, at 46–47). In December 2012, Plaintiff was transferred within Thompson Hospitality, and began working as a Food Service Director at Paine College in Augusta, Georgia. (ECF No. 13–1, at 1). In January 2013, Thompson Hospitality lost its contract with Paine College. Plaintiff was offered to transfer again within Thompson Hospitality, but chose to stay at Paine College. (Id. ). The record indicates that, as of at least May 9, 2014, Plaintiff has remained employed by ABL Educational Enterprise, Thompson Hospitality's replacement, at Paine College as a Food Service Director. (ECF No. 1–5, at 1).

B. Procedural Background

Shortly after his departure from Thompson Hospitality, Plaintiff filed three complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). In his EEO complaints, Plaintiff alleged that he was discriminated against based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, and disability, and was also retaliated against based on an earlier EEO complaint. (ECF No. 13–1, at 5–15). Plaintiff and Thompson Hospitality communicated extensively throughout the spring and summer of 2013 regarding settling the EEO complaints. (ECF Nos. 31–4 and 31–6). Plaintiff and Thompson Hospitality exchanged multiple draft settlement proposals.

On August 12, 2013, Plaintiff attended an EEOC mediation session with representatives from Thompson Hospitality. (ECF No. 13–2, at 1–2). According to Plaintiff, during the EEOC mediation session, he "stood up to walk out of the negotiation and promised to continue to sue the Defendants for the next ‘hundred years.’ " (ECF No. 31, at 7). The parties continued to negotiate, however, and ultimately signed a Separation Agreement and Release ("Release"). (ECF No. 13–3, at 2–8). In the Release, Plaintiff agreed to "waive, release, and forever resolve all claims, demands, or causes of action arising out of, relating to, or touching or concerning Thompson [Hospitality]." (Id. at 3). In exchange for this release, Thompson Hospitality paid, what Plaintiff contends amounts to, roughly the equivalent of one year of his salary.¹

The record indicates that the EEOC closed at least one of Plaintiff's EEO complaints against Bowie State on May 16, 2014 because "[t]here [was] no employee/employer relationship." (ECF No. 1–3). The record does not indicate the disposition or current status of the other EEO complaints against Bowie State or the other school Defendants.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this suit on June 3, 2014. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges discrimination based on race, color, nationality, religion, and sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") while employed by Thompson Hospitality at Bowie State. Plaintiff also alleges numerous other claims, but provides nothing more than conclusory allegations and buzzwords without adequate facts to support his allegations.²

On September 24, 2014, Bowie State and Morgan State filed separate motions to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 4 and 5). On October 21, 2014, PGCC also moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff filed oppositions to each motion. (ECF Nos. 18, 19, and 24). Plaintiff also moved to dismiss his complaint voluntarily in order to bring his complaint in state court. (ECF No. 24).

On October 20, 2014, Defendants Thompson, Jenoure, and Zaikouk filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. (ECF No. 12). Defendant Kelly moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on November 14, 2014.³ (ECF No. 26). Plaintiff filed an opposition, (ECF No. 31), and Defendants Thompson, Jenoure, Zaikouk, and Kelly (collectively "individual Defendants") replied (ECF No. 35).

On November 13, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify individual Defendants' attorney. (ECF No. 25). The individual Defendants filed an opposition. (ECF No. 33). Plaintiff filed a supplemental motion. (ECF No. 34).

Finally, on November 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add additional defendants. (ECF No. 32). Individual Defendants filed opposition, (ECF No. 37), and Plaintiff replied (ECF Nos. 40 and 41).

II. Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

The individual Defendants have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Ordinarily, a court cannot consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir.2007). If the court does consider matters outside the pleadings, "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) ; see also Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk S. Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir.1997) ("[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss supported by extraneous materials cannot be regarded as one for summary judgment until the district court acts to convert the motion by indicating that it will not exclude from its consideration of the motion the supporting extraneous materials."). It is appropriate to consider the extraneous materials submitted by Defendants, and Plaintiff had notice by virtue of the motion filed by Defendants. See Warner v. Quilo, No. ELH–12–248, 2012 WL 3065358, at *2 (D.Md. July 26, 2012) ("When the movant expressly captions its motion ‘in the alternative’ as one for summary judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur[.]") (quoting Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir.1998) ). Accordingly, Defendants' motion will be treated as one for summary judgment.

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56(a) when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is plainly entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Supreme Court explained that, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the "judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." A dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, "the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962) ); see also EEOC v....