Ervin v. State
| Decision Date | 11 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | 28128 |
| Parties | Maunwell Ervin, Respondent, v. State of South Carolina, Petitioner. Appellate Case No. 2020-000574 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Submitted May 16, 2022
Appeal from Greenwood County J. Mark Hayes II, Post-Conviction Relief Judge.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Clarence Rauch Wise, of Greenwood, for Respondent.
KITTREDGE JUSTICE.
We issued a writ of certiorari to review the award of post-conviction relief (PCR) to Respondent Maunwell Ervin. Ervin was tried twice for multiple offenses stemming from a search of Ervin's rented residence. The charges ranged from trafficking in cocaine to possession of a firearm. At the first trial, the jury acquitted Ervin of the firearm charge. The jury, however, was unable to reach a verdict on the trafficking charge, and the trial court declared a mistrial as to that offense. A second jury trial resulted in another mistrial on the trafficking charge after the jury was unable to reach a verdict yet again. Ervin and the State ultimately reached a negotiated plea agreement by reducing the trafficking charge to a lesser offense and imposing the minimum sentence. No direct appeal was taken.
Ervin then filed an application for PCR from his negotiated guilty plea. The PCR court granted relief on Ervin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, premised on counsel's failure to raise a double jeopardy objection based on the rule established in Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009). We find the PCR court misapplied Yeager, thereby erring in granting Ervin relief. Accordingly, we reverse and reinstate Ervin's negotiated guilty plea and sentence.
I.
After law enforcement executed a search warrant on Ervin's residence, he was arrested and charged with trafficking in cocaine, trafficking in cocaine within proximity of a school, possession with intent to distribute (PWID) marijuana, PWID marijuana within proximity of a school, and possession of a controlled substance. The search revealed a gun, prompting the State to additionally charge Ervin with possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.[1]Ervin proceeded to trial and was acquitted of the firearm charge, but the trial court declared a mistrial on the drug offenses after the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
Subsequently, the State retried Ervin on the remaining charges, which resulted in convictions for PWID marijuana, PWID marijuana within proximity of a school, and possession of a controlled substance.[2] However, the trial court declared a second mistrial on the trafficking charges following another hung jury. Eventually, Ervin entered a negotiated guilty plea to a lesser trafficking offense and received the mandatory-minimum sentence of seven years' imprisonment. The proximity trafficking charge was dismissed as a result of the negotiated plea agreement.
Following entry of his guilty plea, Ervin became aware of a potential double jeopardy argument in defense of the trafficking charge. In response, Ervin filed an application for PCR, alleging counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the trafficking charge on double jeopardy grounds prior to his second trial and ultimate guilty plea.
At the PCR hearing, Ervin argued the State was prohibited from retrying him on the mistried trafficking charge because the acquittal on the firearm charge triggered the issue preclusion doctrine embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause.[3] To support this argument, Ervin cited the Yeager decision, in which the United States Supreme Court held "that acquittals can preclude retrial on counts on which the same jury hangs." 557 U.S. at 125. Ervin's trial counsel acknowledged she became aware of this potential argument prior to the second trial, but after independently researching the issue and consulting with another experienced criminal attorney, trial counsel concluded the double jeopardy argument manifestly lacked merit and, therefore, never presented it to Ervin or raised it to the trial court.
The PCR court granted Ervin relief on the trafficking charge, concluding counsel was deficient for failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge based on the rule established in Yeager. The PCR court found Ervin's prior acquittal on the firearm charge necessarily determined he was not guilty of the underlying trafficking charge. As a result, the PCR court found Ervin was prejudiced by the deficient representation and dismissed the trafficking charge, finding double jeopardy applied and Ervin was immune from re-prosecution as to that offense.
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR court's decision.
II.
In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCR applicant must prove his counsel's deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Thus, when challenging a guilty plea, a PCR applicant must show (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the applicant would not have pled guilty. Smith v. State, 369 S.C. 135, 138, 631 S.E.2d 260, 261 (2006) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-58 (1985)). "The [applicant] is required to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective in order to receive relief." Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 118, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989).
"Our standard of review in PCR cases depends on the specific issue before us." Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 180, 810 S.E.2d 836, 839 (2018). Generally, we "will uphold the PCR court's factual findings if there is any evidence of probative value in the record to support them." Thompson v. State, 423 S.C. 235, 239, 814 S.E.2d 487, 489 (2018) (citing Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016)). However, "[q]uestions of law are reviewed de novo, and we will reverse the PCR court if its decision is controlled by an error of law." Frierson v. State, 423 S.C. 257, 262, 815 S.E.2d 433, 435-36 (2018) (citing Jamison v. State, 410 S.C. 456, 465, 765 S.E.2d 123, 127 (2014)).
III.
The State argues the PCR court erred as a matter of law in granting Ervin's PCR application because Yeager is inapplicable, and counsel's performance was not deficient in failing to raise a double jeopardy challenge. We agree with the State that Ervin's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is manifestly without merit. Trial counsel's determination that Yeager did not apply to Ervin's situation was correct.
The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions prevent the State from making repeated attempts to convict an individual for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V (); S.C. Const. art. I, § 12 (); see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) ("[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual . . . ."); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (). Nonetheless, generally, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the State from re-prosecuting defendants on mistried counts unless the doctrine of issue preclusion applies. See United States v. Crabtree, 878 F.3d 1274, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018).
Issue preclusion "prevents a party from relitigating an issue that was decided in a previous action." State v. Hewins, 409 S.C. 93, 106, 760 S.E.2d 814, 821 (2014). Although the doctrine of issue preclusion originated in civil cases, its application has long since been extended to criminal proceedings. Id. at 106-07, 760 S.E.2d at 821 (citing State v. Brown, 201 S.C. 417, 23 S.E.2d 381 (1942)). As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, issue preclusion in the criminal context is derived from the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 107, 760 S.E.2d at 821; see also Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 56 (1971) (per curiam) ().
The United States Supreme Court first linked the issue preclusion inquiry to the Double Jeopardy Clause in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). There, the Supreme Court held that the issue preclusion aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the State from relitigating any issue of ultimate fact that was necessarily decided by a jury's verdict of acquittal in a prior trial. See id. at 443-45;[4] cf. Hewins, 409 S.C. at 107, 760 S.E.2d at 821 (). The Supreme Court explained that the issue preclusion analysis "requires a court to examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration." Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Subsequently in Yeager, the Supreme Court applied Ashe's issue preclusion analysis under the Double Jeopardy Clause to a case involving a partial mistrial on certain charges and a partial verdict of...
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