Erving v. Chicago & North Western Railway Company
| Decision Date | 08 April 1927 |
| Docket Number | 25,913 |
| Parties | ROBERT R. ERVING v. CHICAGO & NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Defendant appealed from an order of the district court for Goodhue county, Johnson, J., denying its motion, made on special appearance, to set aside the service of the summons.Affirmed.
Minnesota policy respecting transitory actions against foreign corporations.
1. The established policy in this state permits the suing of transitory actions, against foreign corporations, regardless of where the cause of action arose, if they may be reached by process.
Must be the same with its citizens and nonresidents.
2. Such policy must operate in the same way upon its own citizens and those of other states.
What constitutes "doing business" in Minnesota.
3. A foreign corporation is "doing business" in the state when the character and extent of its business warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the state.
No undue burden on such companies in submission to jurisdiction of Minnesota courts.
4. Interstate commerce should carry the burdens incident to a foreign railroad corporation submitting, in transitory actions, to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state wherein it owns or operates trackage or rolling stock.
When the statute cited does not violate the commerce clause of the constitution.
5. G.S 1923, § 7493, when applied to the facts stated in the opinion, does not violate the commerce clause of the federal constitution.
Commerce, 12 C.J. p. 118 n. 55.
Constitutional Law, 12 C.J. p. 1108 n. 48; p. 1127 n. 5 New.
Corporations, 14a C.J. p. 1245 n. 61; p. 1270 n. 81; p. 1382 n. 60, 65, 67; p. 1383 n. 73; p. 1387 n. 13.
See 12 R.C.L. 115; 2 R.C.L. Supp. 1395; 4 R.C.L. Supp. 747.
See note in 70 L.R.A. 532; 7 R.C.L. 1037.
Brown, Somsen & Sawyer, for appellant.
Herbert P. Keller and George G. Chapin, for respondent.
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion, made on special appearance, to set aside the service of the summons.
Defendant is a railroad corporation organized under the laws of Illinois, Wisconsin and Michigan. Plaintiff, a nonresident of Minnesota, prosecuted this action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered in Illinois because of defendant's negligence at a time when plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's trains. The cause of action did not arise out of any business transacted in Minnesota. Defendant owns and operates a line of road between Chicago and points in Wyoming and another line between Chicago and the Black Hills in South Dakota. It has numerous branch lines. It is located in Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Minnesota, Iowa, South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska and Wyoming. It crosses this state and has several branches in Minnesota. It has about 650 miles of road in this state with the usual railroad equipment and stations. One of the branch lines extends into Goodhue county wherein this action was commenced.
The statutes of this state authorize the service of a summons upon any railroad company by delivering a copy thereof to any ticket or freight agent of such company within the county in which the action is begun. G.S. 1923, § 9233.
Every foreign corporation is required, in order to transact business in this state, to appoint, in writing, an agent duly authorized to accept service of process and upon whom service of process may be had. G.S. 1923, § 7493. Defendant complied with this statute and the service in this case was made upon its duly authorized agent.
1. The established policy foreign corporations, regardless of the place where the cause of action arose, if they may be reached by process. Herrick v. M. & St. L. Ry. Co. 31 Minn. 11, 16 N.W. 413, 47 Am. Rep. 771; Rishmiller v. D. & R.G.R. Co. 134 Minn. 261, 159 N.W. 272. This is the prevailing rule. 7 R.C.L. 1037; 12 R.C.L. 115; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 67, 29 S.Ct. 397, 53 L.Ed. 695; 14A C.J. 1383; 15 C.J. 791 (97).
2. "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." U.S. Const. art. 4, § 2. The state policy decides whether and to what extent the state will entertain in its courts transitory actions where the causes of action have arisen in other jurisdictions. But such policy must operate in the same way upon its own citizens and those of other states. Any other law would be in conflict with the above provision in the federal constitution. Chambers v. B. & O.R. Co. 207 U.S. 142, 28 S.Ct. 34, 52 L.Ed. 143; State ex rel. Prall v. District Court, 126 Minn. 501, 148 N.W. 463, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 198; State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N.W. 589, 1 A.L.R. 145; Davis v. M. St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. 134 Minn. 455, 159 N.W. 1084; State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court, 156 Minn. 380, 194 N.W. 780.
The case of State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court, supra, however, involved a case brought under the federal employers liability act which specifically gave jurisdiction to the state court. Doll v. C.G.W.R. Co. 159 Minn. 323, 198 N.W. 1006.
3 & 4. Defendant seeks to escape the jurisdiction of the court on the theory that by such action interstate commerce is unduly burdened and, hence, the statute attempting to authorize the service was ineffectual. Its claim centers about the cases of Davis v. Farmers Co-Op. Equity Co. 262 U.S. 312, 43 S.Ct. 556, 67 L.Ed. 996; Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101, 44 S.Ct. 469, 68 L.Ed. 928, and Iron City Produce Co. v. Am. Ry. Exp. Co. (Ohio App.) 153 N.E. 316.
The gist of the decision in the Davis, as well as the Wells case, was the fundamental falsity of the particular statute, involved in each case, to permit a citizen and resident of another state to prosecute in the particular state a cause of action which arose elsewhere against a railroad corporation of another state, which was engaged in interstate commerce, which neither owned nor operated a railroad in the particular state and which had not consented to be sued therein. The falsity of the statute consisted in its converting a mere soliciting agent into one capable of accepting service in actions of every kind. Many railroads have soliciting agents in most of the states and if all the states adopted a similar statute it would have a far-reaching effect and subject the company to litigation far from its real territory. It was held that such statutes would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. Federal control was also emphasized. The disturbing element of interference with interstate commerce, under federal control, is particularly objectionable because the courts are jealous of the right of the public to have public servants give their undivided efforts and attention to their usual and ordinary duties.
In our judgment there is a distinction between a foreign corporation having only a soliciting agent in a state where it owns no property and where, as in the case at bar, it is an important factor in the business industry of the state. Defendant's large local holdings and commercial activities in Minnesota make it impossible to distinguish its position before our courts from residents of the state. For all practical purposes defendant is physically here. The courts have control over it. We need not consider theoretically whether a corporation may be present in a foreign jurisdiction. People's Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Am. Tobacco Co. 246 U.S. 79, 38 S.Ct. 233, 62 L.Ed. 587, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 537. A contrary view has been expressed. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet, 519, 589, 10 L.Ed. 274.But the important thing is that if it is not technically present its representatives are. The power of the court will be effectual.
Plaintiff's counsel argues that by filing the statutory prerequisite as a condition upon which it may do business in this state defendant has impliedly agreed to be bound thereby. The state may not require defendant to surrender its constitutional rights as a condition to its doing business in the state. Western U. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 190, 54 L.Ed. 355; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56, 30 S.Ct. 232, 54 L.Ed. 378; Looney v. Crane Co. 245 U.S. 178, 38 S.Ct. 85, 62 L.Ed. 230; Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 13 S.Ct. 44, 36 L.Ed. 942; Terral v. Burke Const. Co. 257 U.S. 529, 42 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed. 352, 21 A.L.R. 186; Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 458, 22 L.Ed. 365; Henderson, Position of Foreign Corporations, c. VIII, 132.
Our statute requires that a foreign corporation doing business in our state shall submit to the jurisdiction of our courts by appointing an agent upon whom service of process may be had. This is a reasonable exercise of power to regulate business. It does not, in itself, impose an improper burden upon interstate commerce. Int. Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 34 S.Ct. 944, 58 L.Ed. 1479; Davis v Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co. 217 U.S. 157, 30 S.Ct. 463, 54 L.Ed. 708, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 823, 18 Ann. Cas. 907; Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U.S. 560, 36 S.Ct. 168, 60 L.Ed. 439; 21 Illinois Law Rev. 724. The state may certainly compel such corporation to submit to the jurisdiction of its courts. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222; Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, supra; Maverick Mills v. Davis, (D.C.) 294 F. 404. The state may impose such conditions upon the right of a foreign corporation to do business therein as it may see fit so long as they do not conflict with the federal constitution. Ordinarily an acceptance of such conditions is binding. O'Brien v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial