Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner

Decision Date19 December 1927
Citation300 S.W. 565,156 Tenn. 278
PartiesERWIN BILLIARD PARLOR v. BUCKNER, SHERIFF, ET AL.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Appeal from Chancery Court, Unicoi County; S.E. Miller, Chancellor.

Suit by the Erwin Billiard Parlor against W. M. Buckner, sheriff, and others, under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Law. The chancellor dismissed the bill on demurrer, and complainants appeal. Decree entered declaring the law unconstitutional as prayed, but denying injunctive relief sought.

SWIGGART J.

The bill was filed in this cause by complainants against the sheriff, foreman of the grand jury, and the District Attorney General, under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments Law (Acts 1923, chapter 29), for a decree declaring unconstitutional chapter 104 of the Private Acts of 1925, as amended by chapter 290 of the Private Acts of 1925, and for a decree of injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding in the criminal court against complainants for violations of said Private Acts. The chancellor dismissed the bill on demurrer, and complainants have appealed.

Private Acts of 1925, c. 104, as amended, declare unlawful the operation of pool and billiard rooms for profit and pay in counties of the state having a population of not less than 10,115, nor more than 10,125, by the federal census of 1920 or any subsequent federal census.

The bill avers that the complainants are engaged in the operation of pool and billiard rooms for pay and profit, in Unicoi county, the population of which county brings it within the application of said statute, and that complainants have made investments of money in their said business, so that their property rights would be destroyed by the enforcement of the statute.

The bill further avers that the complainants had been served with notice by the sheriff that he would procure warrants against them and close their places of business and continue to prosecute them for every separate offense committed by them contrary to the provisions of said statute, etc.

The chancellor was correct in declining to issue an injunction against the defendants, as prayed in the bill.

In Lindsey v. Drane, 154 Tenn. 458, 285 S.W. 705, a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgments Law, this court followed Kelly & Co. v. Conner, 122 Tenn. 339, 123 S.W. 622, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 201, holding that "the chancery court has no power to enjoin prosecutions for the violation of penal statutes." The effect of that decision is that the Declaratory Judgments Law was not intended to increase the jurisdiction of the chancery court in this regard, or to change the public policy against such an extension of jurisdiction as so clearly defined and stated in Kelly & Co. v. Conner, supra.

In Lindsey v. Drane, supra, the court did, however, entertain the bill of the complainants, filed against the District Attorney General for a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of a statute, penal in its nature affecting the property rights of the complainants. A similar bill was maintained successfully in Pettit v. White County, 152 Tenn. 660, 280 S.W. 688. In neither of these cases does it appear that the jurisdiction of the court to render the declaratory judgment was challenged.

In Hodges v. Hamblen County, 152 Tenn. 395, 277 S.W 901, the court said:

"This court is committed to a liberal interpretation of the Declaratory Judgments Act so as to make it of real service to the people and to the profession."

The statute (Acts 1923, c. 29) provides that:

"Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Section 1.

Section 2 provides:

"That any person * * * whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."

The complainants show by the averments of their bill that they have a special interest in the question of the constitutionality of the penal statute described in ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
18 cases
  • Perez v. Ledesma
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 23 Febrero 1971
    ...advised to purport to violate the statute and then their rights could be determined, with Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner (156 Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565, 1927), where a declaratory judgment under such circumstances was issued and settled the controversy. * * 'The fact is that the declaratory......
  • Vincent Realty Co. v. Brown
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 4 Abril 1939
    ...730, 53 S.Ct. 345; Acme Finance Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341; Washington Beauty College v. Huse, 80 P.2d 403; Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565; Revis v. Daugherty, 215 Ky. 823, 287 S.W. Banning v. Marsh, 124 Neb. 207, 245 N.W. 775; Perry v. Elizabethton, 160 Tenn. 10......
  • Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • 5 Julio 1939
    ...... Commission." . . . [ * ] Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckney (1927),. 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565; Lindsey ......
  • Tennesseans for Sensible Election Laws v. Tenn. Bureau of Ethics & Campaign Fin.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Tennessee
    • 12 Diciembre 2019
    ...pending or threatened prosecutions for the violation of the criminal laws of this State." Id. (citing Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565 (1927); Lindsey v. Drane, 154 Tenn. 458, 285 S.W. 705 (1926); Brackner v. Estes, 698 S.W.2d 637 (Tenn. App. 1985)). Likewise, w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT