Erwin v. City of Palmyra
| Decision Date | 04 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 81699.,ED 81699. |
| Citation | 119 S.W.3d 582 |
| Parties | Pauline ERWIN, Eugene H. Hinds, Clara June Hinds, Myrl B. Sternke and Mary R. Sternke, Appellants, v. CITY OF PALMYRA and Town and Country Butcher Shop, Inc. d/b/a Country Butcher Shop, Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Charles L. Hickman, Hannibal, MO, for respondent City of Palmyra.
John M. Hark, Hannibal, MO, for respondent Town and Country Butcher Shop.
Branson L. Wood, Hannibal, MO, for appellants.
Pauline Erwin, the Hinds and the Sternkes appeal the judgment in favor of the City of Palmyra and the Town and Country Butcher Shop, Inc., denying their petition for quiet title and trespass. We reverse and remand.
The appellants own real estate in Palmyra. In 1962, they granted to the State Highway Commission1 "and unto its successors and assigns, forever" an easement in a portion of their property "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a state highway according to the plans of the State Highway Commission of Missouri or for the purposes above set out." This language is found in the preprinted habendum clause of the deed conveying the easement. The "purposes above set out" refers to language elsewhere in the deed describing the Commission's "right of ingress and egress and the right to excavate, remove and/or place earthy material in a tract of land on which a channel is to be constructed and maintained to aid the natural flow of water."
At the time the easement was granted, the Commission planned to build an interchange for improved access from Highway 61 to the City, but none was ever built. In 1999, the Commission conveyed a portion of this easement by quitclaim deed to the City, who then gave permission to the Butcher Shop to build a road on the property for improved access to its shop. When the appellants noticed dirt being moved on the property that fall, they approached the City and the Butcher Shop with their concerns that this construction was beyond the purposes of the easement they granted to the Commission in 1962. The City, the Butcher Shop and the Commission met to discuss the property owners' concerns and then amended the quitclaim deed to include a statement that the conveyance was "for roadway purposes." The Butcher Shop funded the construction, built the road to City specifications and plans to dedicate the road to the City. The road does not connect any portion of a state highway to another, was not constructed according to any Commission plans and is not maintained by the State. It connects city streets and, upon dedication, will be maintained by the City. The road is being used by the public.
The property owners filed a petition asserting two counts against the City and the Butcher Shop. In the first, they alleged that they owned the property and had conveyed an easement to the Commission, but that the Commission had no legal right to assign the easement for construction of this road. The property owners sought a judgment quieting title in the property to them and forever barring the City or the Butcher Shop from asserting rights to the property. In the second count, they alleged that the City and the Butcher Shop trespassed and asked for the street to be removed and for damages. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the City and the Butcher Shop on both counts, finding that the easement was "assignable for road purposes" from the Commission to the City.
On appeal of a court-tried case, we will sustain the judgment of the trial court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, it erroneously declares the law, or it erroneously applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). All issues of fact about which the court has not made a specific finding are considered as having been found in accordance with the result reached. Rule 73.01.
The parties' rights to this property are governed by the 1962 easement. The interpretation of this deed, like any contract, is a question of law that we review de novo and without deference to the trial court's interpretation. Holbert v. Whitaker, 87 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Mo.App. E.D.2002); see also Dean Machinery Co. v. Union Bank, 106 S.W.3d 510, 520 (Mo.App. W.D.2003). When interpreting easements, we must ascertain the intention of the grantor from the instrument itself. Robert Jackson Real Estate Co., Inc. v. James, 755 S.W.2d 343, 346-47 (Mo.App. E.D.1988); Blackburn v. Habitat Development Co., 57 S.W.3d 378, 386 (Mo.App. S.D.2001). "[O]nly if the language of the deed is unclear and ambiguous" may we resort to rules of construction and consider extrinsic evidence. James, 755 S.W.2d at 347.
A contract is not ambiguous simply because the parties disagree about its meaning. Blackburn, 57 S.W.3d at 386. Rather, an ambiguity arises "when the terms are susceptible of more than one meaning so that reasonable persons may fairly and honestly differ in their construction of the terms." Chehval v. St. John's Mercy Medical Center, 958 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Mo.App. E.D.1997). The ambiguity must appear from the four corners of the contract—extrinsic evidence cannot be used to create an ambiguity. Blackburn, 57 S.W.3d at 386.
We find no ambiguity in this deed and, thus, are limited to determining the property owners' intent from the deed alone. On its face, the easement clearly limits the purposes for which the property may be used to constructing a state highway according to Commission plans and a channel to aid water flow. There is only one reasonable meaning ascribable to those terms, and it does not include a grant to either the Commission or its successors and assigns the right to construct a roadway that is not a state highway constructed according to Commission plans.
The City and the Butcher Shop argue that because the easement was assignable, its purpose cannot be limited to construction of "state highways," which only the Commission can build. Thus, they contend, the grantors must have intended to allow construction of any public road. We disagree. First, the statutory definition of "state highway" includes not only highways constructed or maintained with State or federal government funds, but also "any highway included by authority of law in the state highway system." Section 226.010(7) RSMo 2000.2 Thus, a road built by an assign of the Commission could be a "state highway," even though privately funded, if it were included in the state highway system. More importantly, to say that simply by extending an easement to the successors and assigns of the grantee, the grantors intended the easement to be used for purposes beyond those expressly stated in the deed would render the "purposes" language of the habendum clause meaningless. That construction is strained and unreasonable. Rather, the plain language of this deed evinces the grantors' intent that this property be used—whether by the successors and assigns of the Commission or by the Commission itself—only for the limited purpose of building a state highway according to Commission plans.
The City and the Butcher Shop assert that the Supreme Court in Floreth v. State Highway Commission held that the intent of the grantors under a virtually identical easement was to allow any public roadway and that "state highway" only meant to distinguish public from private roads. 472 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Mo.1971). Floreth did not so hold and does not support the respondents' argument. There, the State Highway Commission had been given an easement "for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a State Highway on the land herein conveyed according to the plans of the State Highway Commission, ... and unto its successor and assigns forever." Id. at 615. The Commission constructed a state highway and in later years, when a part of the highway became impassable, it added a new section of roadway leading from the highway to a public lake. Id. The issue before the Court was whether the easement authorized the new section to be used as a public route from the highway to the lake. Id. at 616.
The Court first found that the "original immediate object of the grant was fulfilled" by construction of the state highway. Id. at 617. Moreover, because the new section of roadway was constructed at the state's expense, it too was a "state highway" within the statutory definition. Id.; see also section 226.010(7). "We do not believe that a roadway loses its status as a state highway merely because it no longer is a through or main highway." Floreth, 472 S.W.2d at 617. The respondents ignore this part of the Court's holding and focus instead on the remainder of the opinion, in which the Court discusses whether a change in the purpose a road serves causes the road to be any...
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