Escalanti v. Department of Corrections, 1

• Decision Date: 20 April 1993
• Docket Number: CA-HC,No. 1,1
• Citation: 851 P.2d 151,174 Ariz. 526
• Parties: Eldon Salvador ESCALANTI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Samuel Lewis, Director of Prisons for the State of Arizona, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Thomas Agnos, Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona Prison--Tucson, Jim Thomas, Santa Rita Unit, Jeff Hood, Deputy Warden, and The State of Arizona, Respondents-Appellees. 92-0001.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 151

851 P.2d 151

174 Ariz. 526

Eldon Salvador ESCALANTI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Samuel Lewis, Director of Prisons for the State of Arizona, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Thomas Agnos, Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona Prison--Tucson, Jim Thomas, Santa Rita Unit, Jeff Hood, Deputy Warden, and The State of Arizona, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 1 CA-HC 92-0001.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 1, Department B.

April 20, 1993.

[174 Ariz. 527] Grant Woods, Atty. Gen. by Ronald M. Andersen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for respondents-appellees.

Thomas E. Higgins, Jr., Tucson, for plaintiff-appellant.

OPINION

JACOBSON, Judge.

This habeas corpus action requires us to determine whether petitioner Eldon Salvador Escalanti is parole eligible because "copper time" and "double time" credits he earned while in prison should apply to his minimum sentence. ¹

The facts are not in dispute. On May 27, 1977, Escalanti was sentenced to a prison term of twenty years to life after a plea of guilty to second degree murder under the sentencing provisions of the "old code." Escalanti was a first time offender. The Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) calculated his parole eligibility date to be October 8, 1996. Escalanti contends that he was parole eligible on December 8, 1987.

Escalanti argues that, under statutes in effect at the time of his sentencing, his statutory credits under A.R.S. § 31-251 ("copper time") and A.R.S. § 31-252 ("double time") must be subtracted from his minimum sentence. These statutes on their face contradict such an interpretation. The version of A.R.S. § 31-251(B) in effect at the time Escalanti was sentenced provided in pertinent part:

B. Every prisoner faithfully performing [the labor specified in subsection A] and conforming in all respects to the rules, or if unable to work, but complying in all respects to the rules, shall be allowed, from the maximum term of his sentence, a deduction of two months in each of the first two years, four months in each of the next two years, and five months in each of the remaining years of the term.

Laws 1974, ch. 137, § 1, repealed by Laws 1977, ch. 142, § 181 (emphasis added). The version of A.R.S. § 31-252 in effect at the time Escalanti was sentenced provided in pertinent part:

A prisoner under commitment to the department, while working ... as a trusty outside the prison walls and without requiring armed guards, or performing any other assignment of confidence and trust either within or without the prison walls ... shall be allowed double time while so employed, and each day so employed shall be counted as two days in computing time on his or her sentence which shall be deducted from the maximum term of such prisoner's sentence.

Laws 1974, ch. 137, § 2, repealed by Laws 1977, ch. 142, § 182 (emphasis added). Undaunted by this clear statutory language, Escalanti emphasizes the language of A.R.S. § 31-411 to argue that former A.R.S. §§ 31-251 and 31-252 do not mean what they say.

The version of A.R.S. § 31-411 in effect at the time of Escalanti's sentencing provided in part, that any prisoner who met either of the following requirements may apply to the board of pardons and paroles "for release upon parole, or for an absolute discharge:"

1. Any prisoner who has served one-third of his or her maximum sentence, computed without any time deductions credited, if such prisoner has served more than one calendar year; or

2. Any prisoner who has less than sixty days left before expiration of his or her minimum term, whichever is less.

Laws 1974, ch. 137, § 4, amended by Laws 1977, ch. 142, § 183, repealed by Laws 1978, ch. 164, § 14. Escalanti argues that, because under the first requirement of A.R.S. § 31-411, time deductions are not to be considered at all in determining who can apply for "parole or discharge," then such credits must be applied in determining "parole or discharge" under the second requirement, that is, a deduction from the minimum sentence.

This convoluted analysis is supported by reference to a case in which the court did in fact hold that "good time" credits are to be deducted from the minimum sentence. State v. Rice, 110 Ariz. 210, 516 P.2d 1222 (1973). Following Rice, however, the legislature amended the statutes involved to provide that credits accumulated under A.R.S. §§ 31-251 and 31-252 be deducted from the maximum sentence only. As our supreme court has stated:

Since 1974 the credits for "good behavior" (A.R.S. § 31-251) and "double time" (A.R.S. § 31-252) have been allowed as deductions only from the maximum term of a prisoner's sentence.... Any statutory credits are applicable to the maximum term.

Arnold v. Moran, 114 Ariz. 335, 336, 560 P.2d 1242, 1243 (1977).

In addition, we interpret the time credit provisions under former A.R.S. §§ 31-251 and 31-252 to apply when the prisoner is entitled to release upon completion of sentence, not to parole eligibility. If a prisoner acquires credits on his or her sentence under A.R.S. §§ 31-251 or 31-252, these credits reduce the maximum sentence, and that prisoner is entitled to absolute release--having served the imposed term.

This is not the relief Escalanti requests. Rather, he contends that his credits under the "copper time" and "double time" statutes entitle him to consideration for parole....