Escapes! To the Shores Condo. Ass'n v. Hoar Constr.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 1210378 |
| Parties | Escapes! To the Shores Condominium Association, Inc., individually and on behalf of Tom Allen, Gaja Bathala, Johnny Berry and Alice Berry, Anna Camus, Alexis Delcambre, Joseph Durastanti, Danny Ford, Chris Fudge and Gary Fudge, Ann Gancayo, Rick Greene, Scott Guerin, Gayle Herring, Caryle Dyer, Ted Hicks, Rodney Hogan, Peter Jolet, Ronn Babin, Gordon Jones and Vicki Jones, Pat Lee, John Mangum, Chris Nieland and Kathy Nieland, Shirley Olsen, William Ranieri, Noah Sechrest, and Jennifer Skaggs and Mark Skaggs v. Hoar Construction, LLC, and Architectural Surfaces, Inc. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court (CV-17-901106)
Escapes! To the Shores Condominium Association, Inc. ("the Association"), individually and on behalf of certain condominium-unit owners,[1] appeals from an order denying a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate a judgment entered on an arbitration award in favor of Hoar Construction, LLC ("Hoar"), and Architectural Surfaces, Inc. ("ASI"). We affirm.
The arbitration award in favor of Hoar and ASI stems from the construction of a condominium building located in Orange Beach known as Hoar was the general contractor for the construction project; Stephen G. Hill was the architect for the construction project; and ASI was the subcontractor responsible for the installation of the exterior surfaces to the condominium building. After construction of the condominium building was substantially complete, the developer of the project (Escapes!, Inc.) sold the units and transferred ownership and management of the common areas to the Association.
The Association thereafter commenced this action against Hoar ASI, and Hill in the Baldwin Circuit Court, seeking damages arising out of alleged construction and design defects to the condominium building, specifically, "stucco blistering and water intrusion." The Association's claims against Hoar and ASI proceeded to arbitration, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("the FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § 1; however, the Association's claims against Hill remained pending in the trial court. Following a hearing, a panel of three arbitrators ("the arbitration panel") issued a final award in favor of Hoar and ASI, concluding, in relevant part, that the defects to the condominium building were the result of a design defect and not a construction defect. The Association filed a timely notice of appeal in the trial court, pursuant to Rule 71B, Ala. R. Civ. P., which, as explained below, governs appeals from arbitration awards. Pursuant that rule, the trial court entered a judgment on the arbitration award. The Association thereafter filed a Rule 59 motion to vacate that judgment, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we address the Association's argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal because, it says, the judgment entered on the arbitration award, pursuant to Rule 71B, has not been certified as a final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) --which allows a trial court to certify a judgment with respect to less than all claims or all parties as final and appealable. The Association contends that, because its claims against Hill remain pending in the trial court, the judgment entered on the arbitration award requires certification under Rule 54(b) to be appealable. In other words, the Association argues that when an action involves still-pending claims that were not resolved in arbitration or additional parties who are not subject to the arbitration award, a judgment entered on an arbitration award pursuant to Rule 71B is not a final judgment unless and until a trial court certifies it as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that there is no interplay between Rule 71B and Rule 54(b). See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 281 Ala. 111, 115, 199 So.2d 653, 656 (1967) ("By and large, the construction of rules of court are for the court which promulgated them.").
Rule 71B establishes the procedure for appealing an arbitration award.[2] The rule provides, in relevant part:
(Emphasis added.) This Court has summarized the procedure for appealing an arbitration award as follows:
" '(1) A party must file a notice of appeal with the appropriate circuit court within 30 days after service of the notice of the arbitration award; (2) the clerk of the circuit court shall promptly enter the award as the final judgment of the circuit court; (3) the aggrieved party may file a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to set aside or vacate the judgment, and such filing is a condition precedent to further review by any appellate court; (4) the circuit court grants or denies the Rule 59 motion; and (5) the aggrieved party may then appeal from the circuit court's judgment to the appropriate appellate court.' "
Russell Constr. of Alabama, Inc. v. Peat, 310 So.3d 341, 346 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Guardian Builders, LLC v. Uselton, 130 So.3d 179, 181 (Ala. 2013)) (emphasis added).
As this Court's summary of the procedure for appealing an arbitration award in Peat acknowledges, the plain language of Rule 71B(f) requires that an arbitration award be "promptly" entered as "the final judgment" of the circuit court. By using the word "promptly," Rule 71B(f) contemplates that a final judgment shall be entered on the arbitration award immediately. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1468 (11th ed. 2019) (defining "prompt" as "[t]o incite, esp. to immediate action."); id. at 897 ().
Rule 71B(g) provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from the grant or denial of any Rule 59 motion challenging the award by filing a notice of appeal to the appropriate appellate court pursuant to Rule 4, Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure." Rule 4(e), Ala. R. App. P., in turn, provides that "[a]n order granting or denying a motion to set aside or vacate an arbitration award filed in accordance with Rule 59, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, is appealable as a matter of right pursuant to Rule 71B, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure …." (Emphasis added.) Neither the two relevant subdivisions of Rule 71B nor Rule 4(e) expressly references Rule 54(b).
Rule 71B unambiguously provides that a judgment entered on an arbitration award is a "final judgment" from which an appeal may be taken as a matter of right -- without resort to Rule 54(b) certification. Moreover, even if this Court were inclined to find any conflict between the two rules of procedure, Rule 71B, the more specific rule regarding appeals of arbitration awards, would prevail over Rule 54(b), the broader rule relating to certification of certain otherwise nonfinal orders as final judgments. Rule 71B, then, would be an exception to Rule 54(b). See Ex parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala. 1991) (); see also Ex parte State ex rel. Daw, 786 So.2d 1134, 1137 (Ala. 2000) (). Our conclusion that there is no interplay between Rule 54(b) and Rule 71B is entirely consistent with the purposes of private dispute resolution under the FAA. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685, (2010) (). Accordingly, this Court will consider the merits of the appeal.
In reviewing a trial court's order confirming an arbitration award under the FAA, this Court reviews questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Municipal Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 190 So.3d 895 (Ala. 2015).
The Association argues that the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the judgment on the arbitration award in favor of Hoar and ASI pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) of the FAA. That section authorizes a court to vacate an arbitration award when "the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct … in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy." Id. The Association contends that the arbitration panel engaged in misconduct by refusing to consider construction-progress photographs of the condominium building's south-elevation balconies taken from May 2007 through ...
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