Eschborn v. Ohio Dep't of Transp.
| Decision Date | 21 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2016-00171 |
| Citation | 2017 Ohio 824 |
| Parties | ANNE ESCHBORN Plaintiff v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Defendant |
| Court | Ohio Court of Claims |
{¶1} Now before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed, pursuant to Civ.R. 56, by Defendant, Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT). Reply briefs have been submitted and reviewed. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that she was wrongfully terminated by ODOT, based on her gender, in violation of R.C. 4112.99.
{¶2} On January 12, 2015, Plaintiff was hired as a seasonal employee referred to as a Highway Tech I. She was hired, primarily, to operate a truck that plowed and spread salt on roads within ODOT's jurisdiction. At the time of her hiring, she was the only female employee in the Cortland post. After less than a month of employment, she was terminated on February 10, 2015. Plaintiff contends that she was given multiple reasons for her termination: 1) she had not been performing her duties up to the standards expected for the position; 2) she was terminated due to lack of work; and 3) she was terminated due to her alleged use of foul language and sexual harassment. Plaintiff contends that the reasons offered by ODOT are pretext for unlawful gender discrimination.
{¶3} Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Thus, in order to determine whether Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the Court must ascertain whether the evidentiary materials presented by Defendant show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact involved in the case. In making this determination it is necessary to analyze the landmark Ohio Supreme Court decision which addresses the "standards for granting summary judgment when the moving party asserts that the nonmoving party has no evidence to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's case." Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 285, 1996-Ohio-107, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996); see also Saxton v. Navistar, Inc., 2013-Ohio-352, 986 N.E.2d 611 (10th Dist.), ¶ 7.
{¶4} In Dresher, the Ohio Supreme Court held:
{¶5} Dresher, supra, at 292-293.
{¶6} In interpreting the United States Supreme Court decision in Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986), the Dresher Court found no express or implied requirement in Civ.R. 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Dresher, supra, at 291-292. Furthermore, the Dresher Court stated that it is not necessary that the nonmoving party produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. Id. at 289, quoting Celotex. In sum, the Dresher Court held that the burden on the moving party may be discharged by "showing"-that is, pointing out to the Court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id.
{¶7} "If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied." Id. at 293. If the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden as outlined in Civ.R. 56(E):
{¶8}
{¶9} Plaintiff claims discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of R.C. 4112. R.C. 4112.02 states, in pertinent part:
{¶10} "It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
{¶11} "(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military status, origin, disability, age or ancestry of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment."
{¶12} To establish an employment discrimination claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate an adverse employment action causally linked to discriminatory intent. A plaintiff may introduce direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence to show that the motivation for the adverse employment action plaintiff suffered was intentional discrimination. Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457 (6th Cir.1990); Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 864-65 (6th Cir.2003). The ultimate inquiry is "whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. USPS Bd. Of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). A prima facie claim for employment discrimination may be established with either direct evidence or indirect evidence. Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St. 3d 578, 1996-Ohio-265, 664 N.E.2d 1272, 1276-77 (1996). Direct evidence Mauzy, 664 N.E.2d at 1279. Direct evidence of discrimination may be present in the rare case, such as where an employer says, "I fired you because you are disabled." Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir.1998).
{¶13} Under the direct evidence method, once the plaintiff sets forth a prima facie claim of employment discrimination, no further inquiry is required. The Court will then consider whether Defendant presents evidence of valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff. Then, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff establishes evidence that Defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Plaintiff were merely pretext. Mauzy; Barnes; see also Kittle v. Cynocom Corp., 232 F.Supp.2d 867, 875 (S.D.Ohio 2002). One can reasonably infer pretext from an employer's shifting or inconsistent explanation for the decision to terminate employee. Tinker v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 127 F.3d 519 (6th Cir.1997).
{¶14} Plaintiff has provided no direct evidence of discrimination. In the absence of direct evidence, the plaintiff may establish a prima facie case using the disparate treatment method. Disparate treatment discrimination has been described as Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977) fn. 15. In a disparate treatment case, liability depends upon whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer's decision. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). For example, the "employer may have relied upon a formal, facially discriminatory policy that required adverse treatment" of protected employees, or the "employer may have been motivated by the protected trait on an ad hoc, informal basis." Id. "Whatever the employer's decision making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome." Id.
{¶15} To determine whether the employer's actions were motivated by discriminatory intent, and thereby establish a prima facie case, courts may employ the framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas. Under the McDonnell Douglas standard, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case discrimination on the basis of sex by establishing that she: 1) was a member of a protected class; 2) suffered an adverse employment action; 3) was qualified for the position held; and 4) that she was replaced by someone outside of the protected class. ld. at 802. The fourth prong can also be satisfied by demonstrating that "a comparable non-protected person was treated better." Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344 (6th Cir.1998); Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992), citing Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 585 F.2d 345 (6th Cir.1998).
{¶16} Plaintiff has not met her burden of establishing her prima facie case. She did not plead in her Complaint that she was replaced by a non-protected individual nor does she provide any evidence that she was replaced by a non-protected individual in her reply memorandum.
{¶17} Plaintiff admits that she does not know whether or not she was actually replaced. When asked in her deposition...
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