Escobar v. Gary
| Decision Date | 16 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-00321-DAD-GSA-PC |
| Parties | BRYAN ESCOBAR, Plaintiff, v. LIEUTENANT C. GARY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 1983, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO FILING A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 14.)
Plaintiff, Bryan Escobar, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 28, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action in the Sacramento Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) On March 11, 2019, the case was transferred to this court. (ECF No. 5.) On May 28, 2020, the court issued a screening order dismissing the Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 13.) On June 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint which is now before the court for screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (ECF No. 14.)
The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
A complaint is required to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional Facility in San Diego, California. The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there. Plaintiff names as defendants Lieutenant C. Gary; CDCR Prison, CA; Corcoran, CA; DDI Mental Health Dept.; Warden-Supervisor; and Captain-Assistant (collectively, "Defendants.").
Plaintiff's allegations are difficult to decipher. The gravamen of the First Amended Complaint is that Plaintiff was wrongly charged and found guilty of a Rules Violation for fighting, resulting in a forfeiture of credits.
Plaintiff's first claim reads as follows:
"8th Amendment cruel and unusual punishment at prison with liberty (Azeez 568 F.) Spencer v. Moore, the argument that anyone violates knowingly Green, Haney v. Htay (2017). Liberty to have freedom at prison level where violence on an inmate has right to appeal, restitution, and demand correction due process at "substantive" [illegible] and justice from injuries and evidence of medical. Prop 57 - early release and etc. (please clear my name) & from relief get claim accepted for time restoration deserved qualification. C. Gary Lt. added more time & pers. emotional distress suit. 1. Relief, remedy, comp. 2. 2nd hearing 3. (injuries, deny my right to appeal).
Plaintiff's second claim reads as follows:
Due Process - for 2nd hearing, restitution, and remedy to actor. Check again my due process for compensation of injuries in civil suit or remedy "iceberg syndrome" as of color of code on duty. Cross examination and examine my case. 1983 amend [illegible] curing the deficiencies (none) at "cognizable" Edw. v. Balisok (1997) to case number #1:19-cv-00321-GSA-PC at bullet 4 to response Pg. 11 () in reference [sic] to "my religion is Catholic, right petition English speech allowed protection civil citizen rights," Writ of Habeas Corpus - Sacramento, CA Boercke 1 9th 2000. I was in custody at California Corcoran State Prison and fully understand of 1-10 Constitutional amendment rights as provided that search & seizure was found guilty when I was battered & punished 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Hall v. City of Los Angeles F.3d (9th) 2012. Lieutenant C. Gary omits to perform under 'quoting' (Johnson v. Duffy 588 F.2d740, 743 (1978) as to self defense hearing. Screening law 28 U.S.C.§ 1915A. "I said: I was assaulted x3 times, no action" seized illegally and Court take control of the action amendment 8, 9, 10] [1] - self defense and he [illegible] self discrimination, also federal laws to Amend 7.
Plaintiff's request for relief:
I would like compensation instruction and would proceed to get matters taken off my record and C-File. My time given back to me for bad procedure at "his" watch that was incorrect to my personal & physical injuries that be avoided for the next person under responsibility "injuries" of CDCR. I am asking for injuries reestablish the compensation I need & deserve.
(Id. at 7.)
///
///
///
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).
To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, "within the meaning of § 1983, 'if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 'series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms." Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation "closely resembles the standard 'foreseeability' formulation of proximate cause." Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).
///
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that any of the individual defendants -- Lieutenant C. Gary, Warden-Supervisor, or Captain-Assistant -- personally acted against him. Plaintiff cannot state a claim against a defendant unless he demonstrates in his allegations that the defendant, identified by name, personally acted or failed to act, violating Plaintiff's rights. Liability may not be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior, and there must exist some causal connection between the conduct of each named defendant and the violation at issue. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Lemire v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012).
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing personal conduct by any of the individual defendants against him. Therefore, the court finds that Plaintiff fails to state any claims against any of the individual defendants, Lieutenant C. Gary, Warden-Supervisor, or Captain-Assistant.
It appears that Plaintiff brings claims against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the state prison in Corcoran, California. However, "[t]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits ...
To continue reading
Request your trial