Esler v. Walters

• Decision Date: 05 November 1981
• Parties: In the Matter of John ESLER et al., Respondents, v. Carl J. WALTERS, as Supervisor of the Town of Guilderland, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 961

444 N.Y.S.2d 961

83 A.D.2d 91

In the Matter of John ESLER et al., Respondents,

v.

Carl J. WALTERS, as Supervisor of the Town of Guilderland,

et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Nov. 5, 1981.

Tabner, Carlson, Daffner & Farrell, Albany (John W. Tabner, Albany, of counsel), for appellants.

Hoffman & Stockholm, Albany (Jeffrey E. Stockholm, Albany, of counsel), for respondents.

Before SWEENEY, J. P., and MAIN, MIKOLL, WEISS and HERLIHY, JJ.

MIKOLL, Justice.

On June 10, 1980, the Town Board of the Town of Guilderland passed a resolution calling for a public hearing concerning the consolidation of the Westmere and McKownville Water Districts pursuant to section 206 (subd. 7) of the Town Law. A hearing was held on July 8, 1980, and the town board adopted a resolution establishing the consolidation of the two water districts. On August 27, 1980, a special election on the question was submitted to public vote of owners of taxable property situated within the districts as assessed upon the last preceding town assessment role pursuant to subdivision 7 of section 206 of the Town Law. The two water districts were financed pursuant to provisions of the Town Law. Both were financed by ad valorem taxes upon real property situated within the districts and water rents. If either was unpaid, the debt became a lien on the realty.

Petitioners are residents of the affected districts. They were declared ineligible to vote in the instant election because they were not property owners within the districts. Petitioners sought an invalidation of the election on the ground that they had been unconstitutionally denied their right to vote. Special Term declared section 206 (subd. 7) of the Town Law unconstitutional and prohibited respondents from taking any further actions to consolidate the two districts based on the special election held on August 27, 1980 upon authority of Matter of Wright v. Town Bd. of Town of Carlton, 41 A.D.2d 290, 342 N.Y.S.2d 577, affd. 33 N.Y.2d 977, 353 N.Y.S.2d 739, 309 N.E.2d 137. It is clear that the Wright decision cannot be differentiated factually from the instant matter. Both cases involved the creation of new water districts and, in both, the applicable State statutes required submission of the question for vote solely to property owners in the districts. In the Wright case, the Fourth Department declared subdivision 3 of section 209-e of the Town Law unconstitutional, departing in its holding from the contrary decision of the United States Supreme Court in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659. The court held that the Salyer case was inapposite and should be limited to its narrow facts. The court further stated that property owners and non-property owners were equally interested in the matter of public water supply, and there existed no compelling State reason to limit the franchise based on property ownership (Matter of Wright v. Town Bd. of Town of Carlton, 41 A.D.2d 290, 293-294, 342 N.Y.S.2d 577, affd. 33 N.Y.2d 977, 353 N.Y.S.2d 739, 309 N.E.2d 137, supra ).

If the Wright case left unclear the applicability of the correct standard in deciding whether a limited franchise was permissible, the question was unmistakenly resolved by Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 68 L.Ed.2d 150). There, the United States Supreme Court approved of a limited franchise, apportioned to landowners according to the amount of land they owned. The stipulated facts in the Ball case disclose that the water district had vast governmental powers including the right to condemn land, to sell tax-exempt bonds and to levy taxes on real property. The district also sold electricity to one-half of the State's population and had influence on flood control and environmental management. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the one-person-one-vote principle applied and differentiated the district from the more sparsely populated and largely agricultural one involved in the Salyer case (James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180). It found that the Salyer decision dealt with a water district which merely stored and delivered water for agriculture and had no other general public purpose. The Ninth Circuit opined that the substantial factual difference in its case justified a dissimilar result than that reached in the Salyer case. In Ball, the district was the major supplier of electric power in Arizona and 40% of its water went not to the association's agricultural members but to urban areas of the State. All these facts led the Ninth Circuit to the conclusion that the water district did not serve the sort of special, narrow purpose approved in Salyer in limiting the voting franchise. Of significance to the court was the fact that though the district's obligation bonds were secured by liens on land owned by the association's members, the bonds had been paid out of revenue bonds which were junior to the general obligation bonds of the members. It found, too, that the cost of running the water district did not fall primarily on voting landowners.

The Supreme Court noted with approval the tests applied by the Ninth Circuit in deciding whether the principle of one-person-one-vote applied, that is, was the purpose of the water district sufficiently specialized and narrow and did its activities bear on landowners so disproportionately as to distinguish the district from public entities whose more general governmental functions demand application of the one-person-one-vote rule. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court came to the opposite conclusion and held that the one-person-one-vote principle did not apply (Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 372, 101 S.Ct. 1811, 1821, 68 L.Ed.2d 150, supra ).

Acknowledging that the district in Ball was much more extensive and diverse than that in Salyer, supra, the Supreme Court nevertheless found that the differences did not amount to a constitutional difference. The court concluded that the district did not exercise the governmental powers referred to inReynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12...