Esparza v. Diaz

• Decision Date: 29 November 1990
• Docket Number: No. C14-89-01086-CV,C14-89-01086-CV
• Citation: 802 S.W.2d 772
• Parties: Edward ESPARZA, Appellant, v. Sgt. Juan DIAZ, et al., Appellees. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 772

802 S.W.2d 772

Edward ESPARZA, Appellant, v. Sgt. Juan DIAZ, et al., Appellees.

No. C14-89-01086-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas Houston (14th Dist.).

Nov. 29, 1990.

Edward Esparza, Tennessee Colony, pro se.

David C. Payne, Austin, for appellees.

Before PAUL PRESSLER, CANNON and ELLIS, JJ.

CORRECTED OPINION

ELLIS, Justice.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of appellant's pro se in forma pauperis action as frivolous under § 13.001 TEX.CIV. PRACTICES ANND. REMEDIES CODE (Vernon Supp.1989). We affirm.

Appellant, Edward Esparza, an inmate in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought suit "pro se" and "in forma pauperis" against Sgt. Juan Diaz and unidentified others for an alleged violation of appellant's civil rights. Appellant brought this civil action under the auspices of Article 39.021 of the Texas Penal Code. (Vernon 1989). Upon motion of the appellees, the trial court dismissed appellant's cause of action as frivolous. This appeal follows.

In two assignments of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion because: (1) the trial court granted appellees' motion to withdraw admissions over appellant's objection; and (2) the trial court dismissed appellant's action as frivolous.

As to appellant's complaint that the trial court withdrew appellee's admissions before trial, we find no abuse of discretion. Rule 169(2) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and extensive precedent clearly allows the trial court to allow withdrawal of admissions where there is no undue prejudice to the party relying upon the admissions. Rule 169(2) reads:

The court may permit withdrawal or amendment of responses or deemed admissions upon a showing of good cause for such withdrawal or amendment if the court finds the parties relying upon the responses will not be unduly prejudiced and that the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby.

The Rules of Civil Procedure allow for liberal construction in evaluating the withdrawal prerequisites of Rule 169, Tex.R.Civ.Proc. Cf. Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206 (1950) (court declined to deem matter admitted where defendant substantially complied with rule). The objective of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equitable, and impartial adjudication of the rights of the litigants. Tex.R.Civ.Proc. § 1 (Vernon 1979). Bynum v. Shatto, 514 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Durrett v. Boger, 234 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Civ.App.--Texarkana 1950, no writ).

It is well settled that the policy which underlies Rule 169 is to provide a method for simplification of uncontested matters. As recently summarized:

Rule 169 was not promulgated as an unwary encumbrance or entrapment to defeat the presentation of the relevant, bona fide testimony and evidence in a full hearing concerning ultimate, controlling material fact issues. Rule 169 is not to be employed to defeat a search for the truth. Basically, Rule 169 is an implement for fair disposition of factual matters that could be and would be agreed to.

Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Hayden, 779 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1989, writ granted); rev'd and remanded 786 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.1990); see also Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

Moreover, "A party may not be compelled to answer legal conclusions." Gore v. Cunningham, 297 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.), or requests that call for conclusions, opinions, or statements of subjective intent. White v. Watkins, 385 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1964, no writ).

Thus, answers which constitute admissions of law are not binding on a court and a party is not precluded from proving a fact necessary to its cause or defense. American Title Co. v. Smith, 445 S.W.2d 807, 809-10 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, no writ); see also Taylor v. Lewis, supra, 553 S.W.2d 153 (admission improper that inquires into another's state of mind); Powell v. City of McKinney, 711 S.W.2d 69 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (admission improper where it asks whether party wishes to pursue his cause of action); Satterfield v. Huff, 768 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.App.--Austin 1989, no writ) (admission improper if it concerns facts outside responding party's knowledge or it is concerns facts within trial court's discretion).

In the instant case, appellant's requests for admissions violated several aspects of the prohibition specified in the above-cited precedents. Requests Nos. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, and 21 all are improper in that they inquire into the state of mind of defendant, in violation of Taylor v. Lewis, supra.

Appellant Requests Nos. 12, 15, 17, 19, 20, and 22 all call for legal conclusions in violation of Gore v. Cunningham, supra, or call for conclusions, opinions, or statements of subjective intent, in violation of White v. Watkins, supra. It is clear that the trial judge acted properly in allowing answers to these improper questions to be withdrawn.

Recently, an analogous case addressed the broad discretion trial courts possess to permit or deny withdrawal of deemed admissions. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Halton, 792 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied). In Employers, the Dallas Court of Appeals found that appellant made a sufficient showing of "good cause" under Rule 169 to warrant withdrawal of deemed admissions. Two points made by the court in Employers are directly germane to the case at hand.

First, the above cited "good cause" language was added to the rule by an amendment that took effect January 1, 1988. The remaining language has been part of the rule since 1973. The court distinguished cases interpreting Rule 169 prior to the 1988 amendment and stated that while "good cause" has now been adopted as the threshold standard for the withdrawal of deemed admissions, the reasoning focused on the answering parties' delinquency in taking no adequate action to correct the initial failure to timely respond. See Eckman v. Centennial Savings Bank, 757 S.W.2d 392 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1988, no writ); Carry v. Clayton, 715 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, no writ); Crime Control, Inc. v. RMH-Oxford Joint Venture, 712 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Texas Employers Inc. Ass'n v. Bragg, 670 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Trevino v. Central Freight Lines, Inc., 613 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1981, no writ).

Second, an analogy to Rule 320 and its language that "new trial may be granted and judgment set aside for good cause ..." is persuasive to interpreting Rule 169. The Court concluded that under Rule 320 even slight excuse will suffice especially where delay or prejudice would not result against the plaintiff." Employers, supra. The Court of Appeals carefully noted that in determining "whether a defendant's failure to timely answer was the result of accident or mistake, the controlling fact is the absence of a purposeful or bad faith failure to answer." Employers, supra quoting Gotcher v. Barnett, 757 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).

Equally as important is the court's conclusion that even where negligence arose from mere accident or mistake, it was still insufficient to undermine the discretion afforded under either Rule 320 or Rule 169. Employers, at 466, referring to Southland Paint Co. v. Thousand Oaks Racket Club, 724 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1988, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Evans v. Woodward, 669 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1984, no writ). Nevertheless, the significant aspect of Employers is that where the plaintiff is not injured and the trial not delayed, even a slight excuse for the original failure to answer will suffice.

The instant case presents a scenario where the court was well within its discretion in allowing withdrawal of any deemed admissions. Appellee took adequate action to mitigate any initial delinquency in failing to respond to appellant's discovery requests. Appellee filed answers to appellant's request for admissions six months prior to judgment. Further, appellant has failed to show how the delay in responding to his request for admissions far in advance of trial resulted in any prejudice. There has also been no showing that the appellee's delay in answering the request for admissions was purposeful or a display of a "bad faith" failure to answer. The controlling aspect of appellant's request for admissions is that they were for the most part improper requests, and the trial court did not err in permitting the defendant's withdrawal.

The broad discretion normally afforded trial courts in permitting withdrawal of deemed admissions will be set aside only upon a showing of clear abuse. Crime Control, Inc., supra, at 552. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court acts without reference to guiding rules or principles or acts arbitrarily or unreasonably. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex.1985). Again, appellant has failed to show how the trial court abused its broad discretion in permitting the withdrawal of defendant's admissions. Appellant's point of error one is overruled.

In his second assignment of error, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his action as frivolous. Appellant's suit was for compensatory damages in the amount of one million dollars to compensate him for an alleged conspiracy by appellees which appellant claims ultimately resulted in appellant being wrongfully placed in Administrative Segregation while under confinement in the Ramsey II Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In his complaint, appellant alleged the following violations of his civil rights: Appellee Diaz maliciously accused appellant of an intimate relationship with one or more female employees...