Espinosa v. State
| Citation | 493 S.W.2d 172 |
| Decision Date | 11 April 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 46699,46699 |
| Parties | Richard ESPINOSA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
Roy R. Barrera and Carlos J. Longoria, San Antonio, for appellant.
Ted Butler, Dist. Atty., Gordon Armstrong, Michael P. Hodge, Asst. Dist. Attys., San Antonio, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., and Robert A. Huttash, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
The offense is sale of heroin; the punishment, ten (10) years.
Appellant's sole ground of error is that the court failed to properly admonish him of the consequences of pleading guilty in accordance with the terms of Article 26.13, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., in that the court 'did not adequately determine, if at all, that Appellant's plea of guilty was prompted by any delusive hope of pardon.'
Appellant first told the court, in answer to questions, that he was changing his plea of not guilty to guilty and that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty. He was then asked and answered as follows:
The court carefully admonished appellant regarding the range of punishment he might receive as a consequence of pleading guilty. The court further inquired whether appellant's counsel, who had represented him for approximately eight months, had ample opportunity to prepare for trial, had discussed the situation with appellant, considered appellant capable of assisting him in the preparation of his defense, and whether he considered appellant sane. Counsel answered all these questions affirmatively.
The latest expression of this Court on this subject appears to be Jackson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 488 S.W.2d 451, wherein the Court conducted a comparable inquiry concerning the voluntariness of the plea and where we concluded, as we did in Kane v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 808, and as we do here, that while the exact language of Article 26.13, supra, should be used in admonishing defendants, the admonishment in question reflects sufficient compliance with the statute. See also Brown v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 550.
The judgment is affirmed.
I am unable to agree with the majority that the admonishment given appellant reflects 'sufficient compliance' with Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P. As we stated in Rogers v. State, 479 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), the admonishment cannot be supplied by inference, intendment or presumption. It appears to me that is exactly what the...
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Walker v. State
...that adds to the uncertainty concerning Article 26.13, supra, visited upon the bench and bar by the majority since Espinosa v. State, 493 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Mitchell v. State, 493 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), when the majority began to seriously erode the legislative intent ......
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Bosworth v. State
...record and the court's findings we find the admonitions to be in substantial compliance with Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P. Espinosa v. State, tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 172; Mitchell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 174; Clayton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 176; Johnson v. State, Tex.Cr.App.......
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Richards v. State
...510 S.W.2d 334, 336 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (dissenting opinion). The emasculation of the mandatory statute began with Espinosa v. State, 493 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Mitchell v. State, 493 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and continued unabated. See, e. g., Bosworth v. State, supra; Guster......
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Guster v. State
...of Article 26.13, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., mandatory, see Ex parte Chavez, 482 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), the court in Espinosa v. State, 493 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Mitchell v. State, 493 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), held that the court in a felony case no longer needed to inquir......