Espinoza v. Target Corp.
| Decision Date | 19 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-12485,20-12485 |
| Parties | MARIA ESPINOZA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TARGET CORPORATION, JANE GREER, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
Non-Argument Calendar
D.C. Docket No. 9:19-cv-81108-RLR
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Maria Espinoza slipped and fell on a puddle of milk in a store owned by Target Corporation ("Target") and suffered serious injury. Espinoza sued Target for negligence and argued that the puddle existed for long enough that Target should have known about the dangerous condition. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment to Target. The central question in this appeal is whether the evidence supports an inference that Target had constructive notice of the puddle. Espinoza cannot meet her burden to show that Target had such notice because she relies on a series of inferences that are supported only by speculation and conjecture. Accordingly, we affirm.
Espinoza was shopping at a Target store ("the store") in Boynton Beach, Florida. She slipped on a puddle of milk in the stationery aisle, fell, struck her head on a shelf, and began bleeding from her head.
Several Target employees—including Roshel Baker, Debbie Bock, Diasmine Dameus, and Yoliswa Mbanyana—responded to the scene. They found Espinoza lying on the ground in a puddle of white liquid. Baker estimated that the puddle was approximately "two feet, three feet, maybe" in size. Dameus described the puddle as "a pretty decent size spill." They also saw blood on the floor. Espinoza was conscious, moving, and talking.
Espinoza believed that the white liquid came from a "1-gallon container of milk" due to the size of the puddle. After falling, she described her clothes as being "all wet" and the milk as being "warm" to the touch. As Bock, Dameus, and Mbanyana cleaned up the aisle, they also came to believe that the liquid was milk.
When they arrived at the scene, Baker and Bock did not see any footprints or cart tracks in the milk. Other customers began to "hover[] over" Espinoza. Paramedics arrived, and soon "everybody was everywhere" around the scene. After Espinoza was removed by paramedics, Dameus took photographs of the scene. From those photographs, Bock later identified at least one footprint in the puddle.1 Those photographs also documented a collection of bloody towels, paper towels, Elmer's glue, a box of gloves, and an envelope.
Upon hire, and on a yearly basis, Target trains its employees to keep a store clean and to ensure that nothing remains on the floor. Employees are trained to keep an eye out for anything on the floor as they move about the store, and they are instructed to pick up items on the floor.2 When they see a liquid substance on the floor, Target employees are trained to remain in the area and page anotheremployee to clean up the spill.3 Target also assigns employees to monitor specific areas of a store, including the stationery aisle.
Nobody knows when the spill occurred in this case. And nobody knows when the last Target employee walked down the stationery aisle prior to Espinoza's fall.4 However, Bock walked through the stationery department approximately 30-45 minutes before Espinoza fell and did not see any liquid on the floor at that time.
Espinoza sued Target, alleging negligence for failing to correct a dangerous condition in its store.5 After discovery, Target moved for summary judgment. It argued that Espinoza could not show that Target had actual or constructive knowledge of the milk puddle that caused Espinoza's fall. Espinoza opposed the motion and argued that Target had constructive notice of the puddle. In her view, there was a genuine dispute of material fact because a jury could infer from Target's lack of an inspection policy, the temperature of the milk, the size of the puddle, and a footprint in the puddle that the puddle existed for a sufficient length of time to put Target on constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
The district court granted summary judgment to Target. First, the district court dismissed Espinoza's claim that Target had no inspection policy as a "mischaracterization of the evidence." It relied on Florida caselaw to find that the fact that no inspection occurred in a given period of time cannot establish that the condition existed for a sufficient period of time to put Target on constructive notice of the condition. Second, the district court determined that the footprint in the milk did not support an inference that Target had constructive notice of the puddle because the photograph containing the footprint was taken after other customers and paramedics had swarmed the area. Third, the district court observed that Espinoza did not explain how the size of the puddle was probative of how long the puddle had been on the floor. And fourth, the district court determined that the temperature of the milk did not show that the puddle had been on the floor long enough to put Target on constructive notice. It reasoned that Espinoza: (1) provided no evidence concerning where the milk came from and how it came to be on the floor, and (2) failed to substantiate how "warm" the milk was or how long it would take refrigerated milk to reach a vague "warm" temperature. Thus, the district court concluded that there was no reasonable inference to support a finding of constructive knowledge based on the temperature of the milk because that inference would be "purely conjectural and speculative."
The district court granted final judgment to Target, and this appeal followed.
Espinoza's appeal boils down to two central arguments. First, she contends that the district court erred when it failed to draw reasonable inferences in her favor that would raise a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Target had constructive notice of the dangerous condition. Second, she argues that the district court erred by requiring her to shoulder the evidentiary burden of proving Target's constructive knowledge when Target is unable to identify the last employee to walk the stationery isle and whether that employee adhered to Target's inspection policy.
"We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo[.]" Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 787 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2015). We "view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). "Summary judgment is appropriate when 'there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact' and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Carlson, 787 F.3d at 1317 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
If the party moving for summary judgment shows the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden "shifts to the non-moving party to rebut that showing by producing affidavits or other relevant and admissible evidence beyondthe pleadings." Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). A self-serving and uncorroborated affidavit can create a genuine dispute of material fact. United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 858 (11th Cir. 2018). However, "[c]onclusory allegations and speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact." Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2018).
Under Florida law, a plaintiff alleging negligence must show four elements: "(1) a duty by defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach by defendant of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach and injury to plaintiff; and (4) loss or damage to plaintiff." Encarnacion v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 211 So. 3d 275, 277-78 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (quotation omitted). Business owners owe invitees a duty: "(1) to take ordinary and reasonable care to keep its premises reasonably safe for invitees[,] and (2) to warn of perils that were known or should have been known to the owner and of which the invitee could not discover." Norman v. DCI Biologicals Dunedin, LLC, 301 So. 3d 425, 428 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (quotation omitted).
"If a person slips and falls on a transitory foreign substance in a business establishment, the injured person must prove that the business establishment had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and should have taken action to remedy it." Fla. Stat. § 768.0755(1). Espinoza does not contend thatTarget had actual knowledge of the puddle, so our analysis focuses on the issue of constructive knowledge. Relevant here, an injured person may prove constructive knowledge by presenting circumstantial evidence showing that the "dangerous condition existed for such a length of time that, in the exercise of ordinary care, the business establishment should have known of the condition."6 Id. § 768.0755(1)(a). The mere presence of a liquid on the floor is insufficient to establish constructive knowledge. Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087, 1090 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011). If a plaintiff does not identify evidence to suggest the length of time that a liquid was on the floor, there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and a defendant is entitled to summary judgment. See, e.g., Oliver v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 291 So. 3d 126, 129-30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (); Lago v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 233 So. 3d 1248, 1252 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (); Encarnacion v. Lifemark Hosps. of Fla., 211 So. 3d 275, 278 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (...
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