Esquinance v. Polk County Education Ass'n

Decision Date29 July 2005
Citation195 S.W.3d 35
PartiesDewey ESQUINANCE v. POLK COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Tennessee Education Association/NEA.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Larry L. Crain of Brentwood, Tennessee; Bruce N. Cameron of Springfield, Virginia for Appellant, Dewey Esquinance.

Richard L. Colbert and J. Christopher Anderson of Nashville, Tennessee for Appellees, Polk County Education Association and Tennessee Education Association.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Kevin Steiling, Deputy Attorney General for Intervenor/Appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS, J. and DAVID R. FARMER, J., joined.

In this appeal, plaintiff, a teacher in the county school system, appeals the trial court's decision dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the educational association, as the collective bargaining agent, violated his rights to free speech, free assembly and petition, and freedom of religion set out in Tenn. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 19 and 23, and violated his due process rights under Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8. In addition, plaintiff alleged that the State of Tennessee granted the education association a monopoly in violation of Tenn. Const. art I, § 22. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

On April 24, 2003, Plaintiff, Dewey Esquinance (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Esquinance"), filed a complaint against Defendants, Polk County Education Association, Tennessee Education Association/NEA (hereinafter "Defendants" or "PCEA and TEA" respectively) seeking monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, alleging various violations of the Tennessee Constitution on the part of the Defendants. The complaint alleges that PCEA violated Plaintiff's rights to free speech, free assembly and petition, and freedom of religion under Tenn. Const. art. I, §§ 3, 19 and 23, and that PCEA violated Plaintiff's due process rights under Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8 by forcing Plaintiff to choose between "a voice and a vote" in its governmental workplace condition by having his money used to promote abortion and homosexual rights. The complaint also alleged that the State of Tennessee granted PCEA an unconstitutional monopoly in violation of Tenn. Const. art. I, § 22.

Defendants filed an answer and motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(1) and 12.02(6), and the Attorney General of Tennessee was notified pursuant to Tenn.R.Civ.P. 24.04 of the constitutional challenge to the Educational Professional Negotiations Act (hereinafter "EPNA").

After hearing arguments on December 5, 2003, the trial court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss the first of four counts of the complaint, and the Attorney General was allowed 30 days to respond to Plaintiff's notice of the constitutional claim. On March 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion to convert the Defendants' pending motion to dismiss Count V to a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion to convert Defendants' motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment was denied, and the court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Count V, thereby disposing of all Plaintiff's claims and thus constituting a final order from which Plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff presents two issues for review:

1. Whether Mr. Esquinance has a constitutional right under the Tenn. Const., art. I, §§ 3, 8, 19, and 23, to be free from having his union dues used for purposes which conflict with his political and religious beliefs.

2. Whether representation under the collective bargaining agreement of PCEA violates the constitutional prohibition on monopolies in Tenn. Const., art. I, § 22.

We perceive the first issue to be whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as to Counts I through IV for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. It admits the truth of all relevant and material allegations but asserts that such allegations do not constitute a cause of action as a matter of law. See Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn.1997). Obviously, when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we are limited to the examination of the complaint alone. See Wolcotts Fin. Serv., Inc. v. McReynolds, 807 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990). The basis for the motion is that the allegations in the complaint considered alone and taken as true are insufficient to state a claim as a matter of law. See Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn.1975). In considering such a motion, the court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, taking all the allegations of fact therein as true. See Cook Uithoven v. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 934 (Tenn.1994).

Plaintiff's complaint states:

This is an action under the Constitution of the State of Tennessee seeking restitution and declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-14-102; § 20-2-202; and § 16-10-101.

PARTIES

1. Dewey Esquinance is a professional employee within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-602(11) of the Education Professional Negotiations Act ("Negotiations Act"). He is employed as a teacher by the Polk County Board of Education ("Board").

2. The Polk County Education Association/TEA/NEA ("Union") is a professional employees organization within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-5-602(12) of the Negotiations Act. The Union is the exclusive bargaining "representative" within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-602(13) and § 49-5-606 of the Negotiations Act for Mr. Esquinance and the other non-management professional employees in the employ of the Board. The Union's principal place of business is Polk County.

3. The Tennessee Education Association ("TEA") is also a professional employees' organization within the meaning of Tenn.Code Ann. § 49-5-602(12) of the Negotiations Act. The Union is the local affiliate of the TEA. The national affiliate of the TEA is the National Education Association.

FACTS

4. The Board and the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("Agreement") as authorized by Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-612 of the Negotiations Act. This agreement grants to members of the Union several special rights and privileges which include, but are not limited to:

a. All grievances must be submitted to the Union for approval before they can be filed and before they can be sent to arbitration;

b. Union members are protected from discrimination based on Union activity, but non-members are not protected from discrimination based on a decision to refrain from union activity;

c. Union officers and agents get up to 20 days to attend union conducted meetings to "improve the instruction of the school system." Nonmembers do not get similar time off work;

d. The teachers who sit on the Board's Steering Committee which sets the criteria for teacher evaluations are chosen by the Union; and,

e. The committee that controls the Board's sick bank has five members, two of whom are chosen by the Union and three by the Board. Three votes are necessary to get sick bank donations approved. Nonmembers have no voice in sick bank decisions.

5. Only Union members have a right to vote on the agreement and to sit on the employee negotiating team which presents the employee point of view in forming the Agreement.

6. Dewey Esquinance joined the Union on or about September 5, 2002, because of [sic] he wanted to have a meaningful voice and a vote in his working conditions and to avoid the discrimination contained in the Agreement against those employees who decided not to join the Union. He signed the original membership application with "moral and political objections."

7. Union dues include amounts sent to the TEA and the National Education Association. The majority of the dues amount collected by the Union is forwarded to the TEA and the National Education Association.

8. On or about January 12, 2003, Mr. Esquinance notified the Union that he objected to his Union dues being used to pay for any activities other than local negotiations, and he specifically objected to supporting the TEA and the National Education Association.

9. On or about January 22, 2003, both the Union and the TEA separately responded in writing to Mr. Esquinance. Neither the Union nor the TEA agreed to allow Mr. Esquinance to pay only for negotiations. Both stated that they could not determine this amount.

10. At approximately the same time, Mr. Esquinance requested the Board to stop deducting dues for the TEA and the National Education Association from his paycheck, and only deduct the dues for the local Union. On or about January 30, 2003, the Board notified the Union and Mr. Esquinance that it would honor Mr. Esquinance's request to limit the amount of his payroll deduction of dues.

11. On or about February 4, 2003, the Union informed Mr. Esquinance that because of his notice to stop deducting that portion of his dues that were transmitted to the TEA and the National Education Association, his Union membership was terminated.

12. Thereafter, sometime between February 4 and February 25, 2003, Mr. Esquinance sent a letter misdated January 12, 2003, which agreed to pay "under protest" the full amount of Union dues, including the amounts for the TEA and the National Education Association, so that he could retain his membership in the Union.

13. In response, the Union wrote to Mr. Esquinance on or about February 25, 2003 stating that there was "nothing to protest and no appeal process for the amount of dues paid." The Union also encouraged Mr. Esquinance to continue his Union membership so that he...

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  • Morrison v. Allen
    • United States
    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • March 10, 2011
    ... ... Cf. Polk v. Torrence, 218 Tenn. 680, 405 S.W.2d 575, 576 (1966) ... begin putting money aside for their son's college education and for their retirement. They eventually decided to obtain ... filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against Messrs. Roberts and Allen, American General, and ... ...
  • Anderson v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.
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    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
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    ...to rational basis review. See Dial-A-Page, Inc. v. Bissell, 823 S.W.2d 202, 206-07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991); Esquinance v. Polk Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 195 S.W.3d 35, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 9. This recitation accompanied the original STRP ordinances and the new ordinance, Substitute Ordinance No......
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    • Tennessee Supreme Court
    • February 16, 2011
    ... ... Appeals, Middle Section Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 05-1489-1 Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor After the death ... Cf. Polk v. Torrence , 405 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tenn. 1966) (finding the ... ...
1 books & journal articles
  • Tennessee. Practice Text
    • United States
    • ABA Antitrust Library State Antitrust Practice and Statutes (FIFTH). Volume III
    • December 9, 2014
    ...health and morals of the public”); see McCanless v. Klein, 188 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tenn. 1945). 178. Esquinance v. Polk County Educ. Ass’n, 195 S.W.3d 35, 47-48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding statute and municipal action that resulted in the creation of an exclusive teachers’ union to be const......

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