Essex Ventures, LLP v. Samuel
| Decision Date | 15 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | CV 14-252-M-DLC |
| Citation | 154 F.Supp.3d 1080 |
| Parties | Essex Ventures, LLP, David A. Tripp, The Weeks at Alaska Community Property Trust, KTM, LLC, Floyd C. Bossard, Margaret J. Bossard, J&MC, L.L.P., William Bouchee, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Grace M. Brooks, and the Richard C. Bossard and Margaret B. Bossard Revocable Trust, Plaintiffs, v. Robert C. Samuel, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
Brian J. Smith, Robert C. Lukes, Kevin A. Twidwell, Tessa A. Keller, Garlington Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiffs.
Quentin M. Rhoades, Nicole L. Siefert, Rhoades & Siefert, P.L.L.C., Missoula, MT, for Defendant.
Dana L. Christensen
Before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion and denies Defendant's motion.
This case arises from a single property owner offering two separate but abutting portions of her real property as security for two separate loans. The material facts surrounding these transactions are not in dispute. Plaintiffs are the current owners of the so-called “Riverside Lot,” a triangular piece of real property situated along the Clark Fork River west of Missoula, Montana. The Riverside Lot is landlocked to the extent it lacks legal access to a public road—apart from its boundary with the Clark Fork River, the Riverside Lot borders private property, including Defendant Robert C. Samuel's (“Samuel”) so-called “Exhibit C Properties,” in all directions.
The Riverside Lot and Exhibit C Properties were once under single ownership. Bonnie G. Snavely (“Snavely”), whose family historically owned much of the land in this immediate part of Missoula County, mortgaged the Exhibit C Properties, among others, to secure a loan from American West Bank in 2003. In 2005, American West assigned its mortgage interest to Samuel. Both the Snavely mortgage and the assignment were properly recorded. In 2006, Snavely mortgaged the Riverside Lot to secure a loan from Plaintiffs. This mortgage was also properly recorded.
Snavely ultimately defaulted on both loans—first Samuel's, then Plaintiffs'. Samuel obtained a judgment and decree of foreclosure on the Exhibit C Properties on December 14, 2006 and, following a sheriffs sale on November 18, 2008 and expiration of the one year redemption period, procured a sheriffs deed to the Exhibit C Properties on November 20, 2009. Likewise, Plaintiffs obtained a judgment and decree of foreclosure on the Riverside Lot on September 28, 2010 and, following a sheriff's sale on November 18, 2010 and expiration of the redemption period, procured a sheriff's deed to the Riverside Lot on January 3, 2014. To date, the Riverside Lot remains landlocked without legal access to a public road.
Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action in the Montana Fourth Judicial District Court in September 2014. They seek to establish legal access by implication, and urge the Court to declare both their entitlement to, and the form of, such access.
Plaintiffs further seek attorney's fees and costs. Samuel removed the case, citing this Court's diversity jurisdiction, in October 2014. The Court held a scheduling conference in February 2015. Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for summary judgment in July 2015, and Samuel filed his cross-motion for summary judgment in August 2015. This matter is set to be tried to a jury on January 11, 2016.
A party is entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
. Summary judgment is warranted where the documentary evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit will preclude entry of summary judgment; factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary to the outcome are not considered. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing part.” Tolan v. Cotton, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ). “[T]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 1863 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the forum state to state law claims. Mason & Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Int'l LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir.2011)
. Thus, the Court decides these motions for summary judgment pursuant to well-developed Montana law on easements.
Plaintiffs move for summary judgment as to the their entitlement to an implied easement by necessity across Samuel's land, and claim that the facts as described above satisfy the two elements of such an easement. Samuel counters that: (1) the law disfavors implied easements; (2) Plaintiffs ignore the third element of establishing an implied easement by necessity—lack of contrary intent; and (3) Plaintiffs have offered no evidence going to the scope of the easement sought. Because the undisputed facts establish Plaintiffs' right to the easement, and because none of Samuel's arguments are supported by Montana law, the Court will grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, reserving for trial the scope of the easement.
“Montana law recognizes the existence of easements by necessity as a species of implied easements.” Frame v. Huber, 355 Mont. 515, 231 P.3d 589, 591 (2010)
. “Easements by necessity arise from a legal fiction that the owner of a tract of land would not sell parts of the land so as to isolate and landlock a remaining portion of it without having intended to reserve a way of access to the parcel over the lands being severed.” Id. (citing Wolf v. Owens, 340 Mont. 74, 172 P.3d 124, 128 (2007) ). “The law implies intent by the landowner to provide an easement by necessity in favor of the landlocked parcel across the landowner's other lands when necessary to reach a public road.” Id. “In easement terms, the landlocked parcel is the dominant estate, and the landowner's other sold property that must be crossed to reach the landlocked parcel is the servient estate.” Id. (citations omitted).
“An easement by necessity can arise only within the context of land held in common ownership at the time a severance creates a landlocked parcel, and cannot exist over the land of a third person whose land was not part of the common ownership.” Id.
(citing Big Sky Hidden Village Owners Assoc, v. Hidden Village, Inc., 276 Mont. 268, 915 P.2d 845, 850 (1996) ). “Implied easements by necessity have never been intended to provide access across the land of others to benefit any and all landlocked property.” Id. at 592.
The party seeking an implied easement by necessity must prove “two essential elements” by clear and convincing evidence: (1) unity of ownership, and (2) strict necessity. Frame, 231 P.3d at 592
. “If the easement is established, the servient property owner then suffers permanent loss of some of his property rights without any compensation.” Id. “Therefore ... easements by necessity are ‘considered with extreme caution’ because they deprive the servient tenement owner of property rights ‘through mere implication.”’ Id. (citing Graham v. Mack, 216 Mont. 165, 699 P.2d 590, 596 (1985) ).
The unity of ownership element is met “where the owner of a tract of land severs part of the tract so as to create a landlocked parcel without expressly providing an outlet to a public road.” Id.
(citations omitted). “A single owner must at one time have owned both the landlocked tract to be benefited by the easement (the dominant tenement) and the tract across which the easement would pass (the servient tenement).” Id. (citations omitted). This element also requires that “the dominant and servient parcels were owned by one person or entity immediately prior to the severance that gives rise to necessity.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
“The element of strict necessity requires that there be no practical access to a public road from the landlocked parcel except across lands that were formerly in common ownership.” Id.
(citations omitted). “Strict necessity must exist at the time the tracts are severed from the original ownership and at the time the easement is exercised.” Frame, 231 P.3d at 592. “A developed way of access to the landlocked parcel need not actually exist at the time of severance, and an easement by necessity is distinguished from other implied easements on the simple ground that a developed way need not be in existence at the time of conveyance.” Id. (citing Schmid v. McDowell, 199 Mont. 233, 649 P.2d 431, 433 (1982) ). “The requisite necessity is the necessity to cross land formerly in common ownership for access to a public road.” Id. (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs meet both elements of an implied easement by necessity. First, Snavely owned, subject to the parties' respective mortgages, both the Riverside Lot and the Exhibit C Properties “immediately prior to the severance that [gave] rise to necessity.” Frame, 231 P.3d at 592
. In this case, the severance of the Exhibit C Properties from Snavely's larger holdings took place at the time Samuel obtained a sheriff's deed to the parcels on November 20, 2009. See James W. Ely, Jr. & Jon W. Bruce, The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land § 4:8 (2015) ( ...
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