Esslinger v. Astrue, Case No. 3:09-cv-05760-KLS
| Decision Date | 04 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:09-cv-05760-KLS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | RANDALL L. ESSLINGER, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Plaintiff has brought this matter for judicial review of defendant's denial of his applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits. This matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule MJR 4(a)(4) and as authorized by Mathews, Secretary of H.E.W. v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). After reviewing the parties' briefs and the remaining record, the Court hereby finds that for the reasons set forth below, defendant's decision to deny benefits is affirmed.
On December 29, 1999, plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance and SSI benefits, alleging disability as of December 7, 1999, due to back problems, lung disease, chronic dermatitis, alcoholism, drug addiction, Hepatitis C, hearing loss, frost bite in his feet, problems with his hands and knees, being manic, and breathing difficulties. See Tr. 66-68, 96, 113, 620. Both applications were denied on initial review. See Tr. 20, 39, 620. A hearing was held beforean administrative law judge ("ALJ") on May 24, 2002, at which plaintiff, choosing to proceed without legal counsel, appeared and testified. See Tr. 542-93.
On January 28, 2004, the ALJ issued a decision in which plaintiff was determined to be not disabled. See Tr. 20-32. Plaintiffs request for review of the ALJ's decision was denied by the Appeals Council on October 15, 2004, making the ALJ's decision defendant's final decision. See Tr. 7; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.981, § 416.1481. Plaintiff appealed defendant's decision to this Court, which upon the stipulation of both parties, remanded the matter to defendant on July 21, 2005, to conduct further administrative proceedings. See Tr. 682-83. Pursuant to the Court's order, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ's decision, remanding the matter to a different ALJ to conduct the additional administrative proceedings. See Tr. 693.
A second hearing was held before the new ALJ on February 13, 2007, at which plaintiff, this time represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did a medical expert and a vocational expert. See Tr. 829-99. On May 16, 2007, that ALJ also determined plaintiff to be not disabled. See Tr. 620-37. On November 18, 2009, the Appeals Council again denied plaintiffs request for review of the ALJ's decision, making it defendant's final decision. See Tr. 594; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.981, § 416.1481.
On December 8, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the second ALJ's decision. See (ECF #1-#3). The administrative record was filed with the Court on February 23, 2010. See (ECF #11). The parties have completed their briefing, and thus this matter is now ripe for judicial review and a decision by the Court.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ's decision should be reversed and remanded to defendant for an award of benefits or, in the alternative, for further administrative proceedings, because the ALJ erred in: (1) failing to employ the proper technique for evaluating his mental impairments; (2)improperly assessing the effects of his substance abuse on his alleged disability; (3) evaluating the medical evidence in the record; (4) assessing his credibility and residual functional capacity; and (5) finding him to be capable of performing other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. For the reasons set forth below, the Court does not agree that the ALJ erred in determining plaintiff to be not disabled, and therefore hereby finds that the ALJ's decision be affirmed. Although plaintiff requests oral argument in this matter, the Court finds such argument to be unnecessary here.
This Court must uphold defendant's determination that plaintiff is not disabled if the proper legal standards were applied and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the determination. See Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Fife v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir. 1985). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975); Carr v. Sullivan, 772 F. Supp. 522, 524-25 (E.D. Wash. 1991). If the evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation, the Court must uphold defendant's decision. See Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).
At step two of the sequential disability evaluation process, the ALJ must determine if an impairment is "severe."1 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, § 416.920. An impairment is "not severe" if itdoes not "significantly limit" a claimant's mental or physical abilities to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (c), § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (c); see also Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-3p, 1996 WL 374181 *1. Basic work activities are those "abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b), § 416.921(b); SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 *3.
An impairment is not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has "no more than a minimal effect on an individual[']s ability to work." See SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856 *3; see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996); Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir.1988). Plaintiff has the burden of proving that his "impairments or their symptoms affect [his] ability to perform basic work activities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2001); Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998). The step two inquiry described above, however, is a de minimis screening device used to dispose of groundless claims. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290.
In this case, the ALJ found plaintiff had severe impairments consisting of Hepatitis C, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, Raynaud's syndrome, hearing loss, a bipolar disorder, and a substance abuse disorder. See Tr. 623. In addition, the ALJ found none of the following alleged impairments to be severe: carpal tunnel syndrome, a left shoulder injury, an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, a personality disorder, a posttraumatic stress disorder, and paranoid schizophrenia. See Tr. 623-25. Plaintiff argues, however, that in so finding the ALJ failed to employ the required proper technique in determining the severity of his alleged mental impairments. The Court disagrees.
To evaluate the severity of a claimant's mental impairments, defendant must "follow a special technique at each level in the administrative review process." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a) § 416.920a(a). Under this technique, defendant first determines whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)(1), § 416.920a(b)(1). If the claimant has such an impairment, defendant rates the "degree of functional limitation" resulting from that impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)(2), § 416.920a(b)(2).
Rating the degree of functional limitation involves consideration of four functional areas: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence or pace; and episodes of decompensation. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c), § 416.920a(c). If a claimant's degree of limitation in the first three areas is rated "none" or "mild" and "none" in the fourth area, then the claimant's mental impairment generally is considered not severe, unless evidence in the record otherwise indicates there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1), § 404.1520a(d)(1). Next, if the impairment is found to be severe, defendant determines if it meets or equals the criteria of any of those listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. See § 404.1520a(d)(2), § 416.920a(d)(2). If it does not, defendant then assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(3), § 416.920a(d)(3).
At the initial and reconsideration levels of the administrative review process, "a standard document" is completed to record how the above technique was applied. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e), § 416.920a(e). At the ALJ hearing level, though, documentation of the technique is done in the decision itself. Id. Plaintiff asserts that in this case the ALJ did not incorporate in his assessment of plaintiffs limitations or in the hypothetical question he posed to the vocational expert at the second hearing, any information as to the degree of mental functional limitation as required by the above special technique. However, plaintiff fundamentally misapprehends the nature of that technique.
First, this special technique is, as just discussed, applied for the purpose of determining the severity of a claimant's mental impairments. This, the ALJ did not fail to do, as he expressly found plaintiff had a mild limitation in his activities of daily living, mild difficulties in his social functioning, moderate difficulties in his concentration, persistence or pace, and no episodes of decompensation, and used that finding to make not only his severity determination at step two, but his determination at step three that none of his impairments met or medically equaled the criteria of a listed impairment.2 See Tr. 625. Second, as discussed in further detail below, the ALJ went on to address more specifically the mental functional limitations he found the evidence in the record supported in terms of plaintiffs residual functional capacity prior to steps four and five. Accordingly, no error in applying the above...
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