Estabrook v. Eastern Commercial Travelers Acc. Ass'n
| Decision Date | 26 February 1941 |
| Citation | 308 Mass. 439,32 N.E.2d 250 |
| Parties | ALICE M. ESTABROOK v. EASTERN COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS ACCIDENT ASSOCIATION. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
February 6, 1941.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., LUMMUS, QUA COX, & RONAN, JJ.
Insurance Accident. Words, "Gas," "Either."
Under a certificate of fraternal benefit accident insurance, which provided that no indemnity should be paid for death resulting from any injury caused wholly or in part, directly or indirectly "by . . . gas," there could be no recovery for death resulting from accidental inhalation of illuminating gas.
CONTRACT. Writ in the Superior Court dated March 10, 1938. The case was heard by Leary, J., and in this court was submitted on briefs.
G. T. Dewey, Jr. & L.
E. Stockwell, for the plaintiff.
R. Walsworth, for the defendant.
This is an action of contract brought by the plaintiff as beneficiary under a certificate of membership insurance issued to her deceased husband by the defendant, a fraternal benefit society. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 176. The case was tried by a judge of the Superior Court, sitting without jury, who made findings of fact, denied certain requests for rulings of the plaintiff, ruled that under the terms of the certificate the plaintiff could not recover, and found for the defendant. It is agreed that there was evidence to support his findings of fact, that, among other things, the deceased came to his death accidentally because of poisoning from illuminating gas which escaped from an open jet in the room where the body was found. There is no suggestion of suicide, and no question raised as to the sufficiency of notice and proof of death. The important question is whether there can be recovery for death caused by gas poisoning in the circumstances disclosed.
The certificate provides for the payment of indemnity for certain accidental disabilities, and for death, the covenants and agreements relating to which are upon express conditions:
The plaintiff contends that the word "gas" as used in the certificate is intended to apply only to the intentional inhalation of gas, and does not apply to an accidental inhalation such as, it was found, caused the death in the case at bar. There are reported cases which would seem to be authorities for this contention, but we are of opinion that it cannot be sustained, and that the construction placed upon the terms of the certificate by the trial judge was correct. The conditions, hereinbefore referred to, also except, among others, injuries caused wholly or in part, directly or indirectly, by hernia, fits, vertigo, somnambulism, insanity or disease in any form, or poison in any form, contact with poisonous substances, surgical operations, medical treatment, duelling, fighting, boxing or wrestling, war, riot, lifting or overexertion, suicide, sunstroke, freezing, riding or driving in races, or voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger.
It may be well to have in mind that this is a contract of insurance against accidents, and death resulting therefrom, that is, against risks and dangers that in general are unintentionally, involuntarily and unexpectedly incurred. See Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co. 262 Mass. 522 , where, at page 525, the following is quoted from United States
Mutual Accident Association v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100, 121: "`. . . if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means; but that if, in the act which precedes the injury, something unforeseen unexpected, unusual occurs which produces the injury, then the injury has resulted through accidental means.'" The object of an exception in the contract is to exclude that which otherwise would be included within it, and since the injuries and death against which the association covenants to indemnify by this certificate are those accidentally incurred, the natural and logical function of that part of the exception under consideration is to exclude such injuries and death, rather than those voluntarily and consciously encountered. McGlother v. Provident Mutual Accident Co. 89 F. 685, 687. By way of testing the contention of the plaintiff, it may be asked whether no death...
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