Estate of Allen v. City of Rockford

• Citation: 349 F.3d 1015
• Decision Date: 20 November 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-1873.,02-1873.
• Parties: ESTATE OF Darlene ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Illinois, Cheryl Taylor and Bruce Scott, individually and in their official capacities as police officers for the City of Rockford, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

349 F.3d 1015

ESTATE OF Darlene ALLEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF ROCKFORD, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Illinois, Cheryl Taylor and Bruce Scott, individually and in their official capacities as police officers for the City of Rockford, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-1873.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued January 24, 2003.

Decided November 20, 2003.

Christopher J. Taylor (argued), Rockford, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kerry F. Partridge (argued), City of Rockford, Law Department, Rockford, IL, for City of Rockford, Cheryl Taylor, and Bruce Scott.

Eugene G. Doherty (argued), Holmstrom & Kennedy, Rockford, IL, for Rockford Health Systems, Inc. and Arthur Proust.

Before RIPPLE, EVANS, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

After she was placed under arrest for driving under the influence of drugs, Darlene Allen was driven to Rockford Memorial Hospital by a police officer for the purpose of obtaining a urine sample. Allen refused to provide a urine sample and to consent to a drug screening test requested by the emergency room doctor. After deeming Allen not competent, the doctor, without the assistance of the arresting officer, forcibly extracted blood and urine samples from Allen. Allen sued the City of Rockford and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged due process violations stemming from the unwanted medical treatment, and also filed various state law claims against the City, the officers, and numerous hospital personnel. The district court granted summary judgment to the City and police officers on Allen's § 1983 claims, denied Allen's cross-motions for partial summary judgment, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Allen appeals both the grant of summary judgment in the officers' favor and the denial of partial summary judgment in her favor. Because Allen has not established that the officers either breached a duty of care or placed her in a dangerous situation by not preventing her forced treatment, we affirm the district court's ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 6, 1999, Rockford police officer Kevin Nordberg received information that a car matching the description of Darlene Allen's had been traveling on the wrong side of the road. Nordberg pulled over Allen in a parking lot for a local tavern. He observed that Allen was shaking violently, and had slurred speech and glassy eyes. Allen attributed her behavior to prescription medication. After eliciting statements from Allen about the condition of her car (the front passenger's side was damaged and the front bumper was missing) and confirming those statements, Nordberg believed that Allen had fled the scene of a property damage accident,¹ and placed her under arrest. He also suspected that Allen was driving under the influence, and called D.U.I. Task Force Officer Cheryl Taylor to the scene to help assess Allen's condition. Taylor observed the same abnormal behavior that concerned Nordberg and also noticed that Allen had difficulty walking unassisted. Allen admitted taking a drug called Soma, which had been prescribed to her sister, and was arrested for driving under the influence of drugs.

Taylor drove Allen to Rockford Memorial Hospital, where Allen refused to provide a urine sample in connection with her alleged D.U.I. violation. Taylor told Dr. Arthur F. Proust, the board-certified emergency room doctor, that Allen had been driving northbound in a southbound lane and had been in an accident. She also told him that Allen had passed a Breathalyzer test. Dr. Proust observed that Allen's speech was slurred, that she was intermittently sleepy and alert, and that she had borderline low blood pressure. He also noticed that there were only seven pills remaining in the bottle of Soma. (Dr. Proust claims that if the Soma had been taken at the prescribed dosage, there should have been sixteen pills left.) Allen was disoriented with respect to the time of year, stating that it was January instead of July. According to Dr. Proust, he became concerned that Allen may have overdosed on the Soma, with potentially fatal consequences, and may have ingested other drugs as well that would have exacerbated the effects of the Soma. Allen refused to consent to a drug screen. Upon determining that Allen's altered state rendered her incompetent to make decisions about her medical treatment, Dr. Proust told Taylor that he planned to extract blood and urine samples from Allen to determine the type and amount of drugs she had ingested.² Additionally,hospital staff told Taylor that they were concerned about potential liability if they allowed Allen to leave the hospital and she overdosed.

Taylor told Dr. Proust that Allen had refused to consent to any testing relating to her alleged D.U.I. violation. Taylor then apprised her supervisor, Sergeant Bruce Scott, of the situation. Neither Taylor nor Scott have any medical training beyond CPR and basic first aid. Scott told Taylor that the hospital was acting of its own accord, and that it was up to the doctor to act as he thought necessary to prevent Allen from having a potentially life-threatening drug overdose. Taylor then informed the hospital that she would have no role in Allen's medical treatment. With the assistance of hospital staff, Dr. Proust then forcibly extracted the blood and urine samples from Allen.³ There were no police officers in the room at that time. Tests revealed that Allen had taken other drugs in addition to Soma, such as benzodiazepines, marijuana, and opiates. (Allen acknowledged in her deposition that she was taking Soma, Vicodin, Prozac, and Activan as of July 5, 1999, the day before her arrest.) Allen was given counteracting agents designed to prevent drug overdoses⁴ and was released back into police custody.

Allen filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the City of Rockford, Taylor, and Scott⁵ alleging Fourteenth Amendment due process violations stemming from Taylor and Scott's failure to prevent the hospital staff from extracting the samples. Allen also filed various state law claims, including battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and malicious prosecution, against Rockford Health Systems, Inc. d/b/a Rockford Memorial Hospital, Dr. Proust, other hospital personnel, the City, and the officers. The defendants sought summary judgment on all claims, while Allen filed various cross-motions for partial summary judgment.

In a well-reasoned opinion, the district court granted summary judgment to the City and the police officers on Allen's § 1983 claims, denied Allen's partial summary judgment motion on those claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and denied as moot all parties' summary judgment motions on the state law claims. Allen appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the police officers in their individual capacities, but does not appear to challenge the grant of summary judgment to the City. She also contests the denial of her motion for partial summary judgment.⁶

II. ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). We review grants of summary judgment de novo, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Rizzo v. Sheahan, 266 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir.2001). However, our analysis is complicated by the fact that Taylor and Scott have raised the defense of qualified immunity. Allen bears the burden of defeating this defense. See Sparing v. Vill. of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir.2001). Thus, we assess whether, viewing all of the facts in Allen's favor, the officers violated one of Allen's constitutional rights. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Even if this requirement is satisfied, in order to prevail Allen must also show that the constitutional right was clearly established such that a reasonable officer would have understood that she was violating that right. Id. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

A. The § 1983 Claim

The Supreme Court made clear in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not impose a general, affirmative obligation upon the state to protect its citizens against the deprivation of life, liberty, and property by private actors. Id. at 195, 109 S.Ct. 998. However, the courts have acknowledged that this rule is subject to two narrow exceptions.

Specifically, "when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon [the State] a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for [the person's] safety and general well-being," in light of the special relationship between the state and that individual. Id. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998; see also Kitzman-Kelley v. Warner, 203 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir.2000) (explaining that the special relationship arises "from the limitations that the state has imposed upon [an individual] through a restraint on his personal liberty"); Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 987 (7th Cir.1998) (stating that "[w]hen a state actor ... deprives a person of his ability to care for himself by incarcerating him, detaining him, or involuntarily committing him, it assumes an obligation to provide some minimum level of well-being and safety"). The state's failure to meet this duty of care constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998. Additionally, the state may be held liable for due process violations if it places an individual in a position of danger that she would not otherwise have faced. See Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 516...