Estate of Anderson

• Decision Date: 09 December 1983
• Citation: 468 A.2d 612
• Parties: ESTATE OF George E. ANDERSON.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 612

468 A.2d 612

ESTATE OF George E. ANDERSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Nov. 9, 1983.

Decided Dec. 9, 1983.

Grant & Linthicum, Carrie L. Linthicum (orally), Presque Isle, for plaintiff.

Solman, Page & Hunter, P.A., Robert Page (orally), Richard D. Solman, Caribou, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.

WATHEN, Justice.

Petitioner B. Christine Ryan is the personal representative of the estate of her brother, the late George E. Anderson of Stockholm, Maine. She appeals solely in her representative capacity from an order of the Probate Court (Aroostook County) construing the terms of decedent's will. She sought instructions of the court with regard to her duties, principally in determining whether respondent Martin A. Anderson could qualify as prime beneficiary under the terms of the will. She argues on appeal that the Probate Court abused its discretion by failing to answer specifically the questions raised in her petition and further that the order is internally inconsistent and ambiguous. We find that the Probate Court did provide sufficient instructions to permit petitioner to discharge her duties as personal representative and that she lacks standing to challenge the claimed deficiencies in the order which do not relate to the performance of those duties. We dismiss the appeal.

In his last will and testament, the decedent bequeathed "all the rest, residue and remainder of [his] estate real, personal and mixed to [the respondent] Martin A. Anderson, his heirs and assigns forever, provided, however, that he shall make his home on the premises and live and reside there." (Emphasis added). Should respondent not "so desire to live and reside there," the will directed that the estate be sold and the proceeds distributed in equal shares to nine named beneficiaries including both petitioner and respondent. After George Anderson's death in June of 1981, members of the family agreed to allow respondent a reasonable period of time in which to decide whether he wanted to move from his home in Massachusetts to decedent's residence in Stockholm, Maine. In the interim, petitioner agreed to reside in the house as a caretaker. A contest concerning the validity of the will and the choice of a personal representative delayed admission of the will to probate until July of 1982. Although respondent did not change his residence, during the intervening months he apparently attempted to secure employment in northern Maine. He indicated in a letter to his attorney on October 7, 1982 that "some positive answers" were expected "shortly" and that he would soon be engaging a moving company as the "final hurdle of the journey." In November of 1982 when respondent still had not moved to Stockholm, the personal representative filed a petition in Probate Court to construe the will. She requested the court's ruling whether respondent was disqualified as prime beneficiary because of his failure to move to Maine and whether she was authorized to sell the property and distribute the proceeds according to the alternate provisions of the will. In the event that it was still possible for respondent to qualify, she posed the following questions:

Can Martin A. Anderson satisfy the conditions of the will by simply moving to Stockholm, or must he actually reside "on the premises"?

How long must he reside "on the premises"? In other words, can he move to Stockholm and then immediately list the property for sale, liquidate it, and then return to Massachusetts? And if he does, can he retain the sale proceeds, or must he share them with the other persons named in Article First? May he move to Stockholm and then sell substantially all of the assets, retaining only the buildings and a small surrounding parcel of land, pocket the sales proceeds, and still be in compliance with the conditions in Article First?

After a testimonial hearing the Probate Court issued an order on February 15, 1983, construing the disputed provision of decedent's will. The court determined that respondent had "indicated a genuine desire and intent to move to 'the premises' and reside there," and that because of the logistical problems involved, he should be given until June 1, 1983 to accomplish the move. The order continued as follows:

If by June 1, 1983, Martin A....