Estate of Barilla, Matter of

• Decision Date: 07 December 1987
• Citation: 535 A.2d 125,369 Pa.Super. 213
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Anthony BARILLA, Deceased. Appeal of Teresa Young BARILLA, a/k/a Theresa Young Barilla, Widow of the Decedent.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 125

535 A.2d 125

369 Pa.Super. 213

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Anthony BARILLA, Deceased Appeal of Teresa Young BARILLA, a/k/a Theresa Young Barilla Widow of the Decedent.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted July 27, 1987.

Filed Dec. 7, 1987.

Joseph V. Agresti, Erie, for appellant.

Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and HOFFMAN and HESTER, JJ.

HOFFMAN, Judge:

This is an appeal from the lower court's order determining the parties' respective rights as established by an antenuptial agreement and the laws of intestacy. Appellant, the decedent's widow, contends that the lower court erred in concluding that (1) the antenuptial agreement provided for her to receive a one-fourth share of decedent's estate; (2) appellees, decedent's children, did not breach the antenuptial agreement; (3) appellant is only entitled to a life estate in the marital domain and not the net rental income from that property; (4) appellant is not entitled to share in the income from the assets of decedent's estate; and (5) she is not entitled to receive the accrued interest on her share of the estate. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the order of the court below.

Prior to their marriage on June 19, 1959, decedent and appellant entered into an antenuptial agreement which was drafted by decedent's attorney. Decedent died intestate on December 7, 1971 and was survived by appellant and his three children by a prior marriage. On January 19, 1972, appellee Dominic Barilla, one of decedent's children, filed a petition to have letters of administration issued to him in an effort to be appointed administrator of decedent's estate. Appellant contested the appointment and requested that she be appointed administratrix. The parties subsequently agreed to allow decedent's bank to act as administrator. After several attempts at settlement negotiations, the bank declined to proceed as administrator because the parties failed to fully cooperate. On March 1, 1984, Barilla, again, filed a petition to have letters of administration issued to him. Following a hearing, the court appointed the respective attorneys for the parties as co-administrators of the estate. Thereafter, when the co-administrators could not agree on the values of the assets of the estate, appellant's attorney filed a petition for an accounting and filing of inventory. Following a hearing, the lower court held that the antenuptial agreement was valid and that appellant was a creditor of the estate entitled to a one-fourth share of the estate. The parties filed post-trial motions and this appeal followed. ¹

Appellant first contends that the lower court erred in not determining that the intent of decedent was to provide her with a one-third share of the estate in accordance with the laws of intestacy rather than a one-fourth share as stated in the antenuptial agreement. ² We disagree.

One of the chief purposes of an antenuptial agreement is to alter the statutory provisions that the Pennsylvania legislature has enacted for the benefit of the surviving spouse. Emery Estate, 362 Pa. 142, 147, 66 A.2d 262, 265 (1949); In re Estate of Geyer, 338 Pa.Superior Ct. 157, 165, 487 A.2d 901, 905 (1985). It is an instrument of contract which entails the private undertakings between a husband and wife. Accordingly, such an agreement is governed by the law of contracts. Hollman v. Hollman, 347 Pa.Superior Ct. 289, 300, 500 A.2d 837, 843 (1985). A court's review of a contract is confined to its interpretation of the agreement. Steuart v. McChesney, 498 Pa. 45, 51, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (1982).

In interpreting a contract, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the complete writing and each and every part of it must be taken into consideration and given effect if reasonably possible.

Laub v. Laub, 351 Pa.Superior Ct. 110, 116, 505 A.2d 290, 293 (1986); see International Org. Masters, Mates and Pilots of America, Local No. 2, v. International Org. Masters, Mates and Pilots of America, Inc., 497 Pa. 102, 108-09, 439 A.2d 621, 624 (1981).

Here, the antenuptial agreement provides that:

WHEREAS the intended husband desires to marry the intended wife but desires to limit her interest in his estate and

WHEREAS the intended wife desires to release all her inchoate interest and any other rights granted to her by the laws of Pennsylvania; and ...

If the intended husband dies first the intended wife shall inherit and receive an undivided one-fourth ( 1/4) part of the estate of said intended husband absolutely, it being the true intent and meaning hereof that she, the said intended wife, shall, in such event, receive the same share or portion of the estate of the said intended husband as would be received by each of the children of intended husband in the event of his death intestate, he at this time having three children. The intended wife does hereby forever remise release and quit claim all right, title and interest which she might or otherwise could have in and to the personal or real estate of said intended husband as his widow under the intestate laws of Pennsylvania, and does hereby agree to accept and receive the share of said estate hereinabove mentioned to wit, the undivided one-fourth ( 1/4) part thereof, in full settlement of all such claims and demands as she might or otherwise could have as widow of the said intended husband in the event of his death in the manner hereinafter set forth.

Antenuptial Agreement at 1-2 (emphasis added). This language indicates that decedent's purpose in executing the agreement was to limit appellant's statutory rights upon his death and to prevent her from claiming her share as either a testate or intestate beneficiary.

Appellant maintains that the decedent's true intention is reflected in the language of the antenuptial agreement where it states that appellant "shall ... receive the same share or portion of the estate ... as would be received by each of the children of [decedent] in the event of his death intestate ..." Antenuptial Agreement at 1-2 (emphasis added).

To determine whether the parties intended for appellant to receive a one-fourth share, the court must consider the complete writing. See Laub v. Laub, supra. The agreement when read as a whole shows that decedent intended to limit appellant's share of his estate and to preclude her from taking her intestate share upon his death. The specific language that appellant refers to is not sufficient to overwhelm decedent's intention that his spouse and children share equally in his estate. After considering the intention of the parties and reviewing the language in the agreement, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that appellant was not entitled to a one-third share under the agreement.

Appellant next contends that the lower court erred in not finding that the appellees breached the antenuptial agreement by failing to comply with its terms, thus rendering the agreement unenforceable. The antenuptial agreement granted appellant a life estate in the marital residence and designated appellees as the remaindermen. Appellant claims that appellees padlocked the entrance to the property and have, in effect, deprived her of her life estate. She maintains that appellees' action constituted a breach of the antenuptial agreement.

It is a well established principle of law that a contract cannot legally bind persons not party thereto. Cumberland-Perry Area Vo-Tech School v. Bogar & Bink, 261 Pa.Superior Ct. 350, 357, 396 A.2d 433, 435 (1978); Chambers Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Allegheny County, 81 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 622, 626, 474 A.2d 728, 731 (1984). Generally, under Pennsylvania law, a person not a party to a contract cannot be held liable for breach. Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Off'ls., 546 F.2d 1077, 1082 n. 4 (3d Cir.1976).

Here, appellant alleges that appellees have breached the antenuptial agreement by their actions, which prevented her performance of the contract. Appellees, however, are not parties to the antenuptial agreement nor are they intended third party beneficiaries. Moreover, appellant has failed to allege that appellees have a contractual duty under the antenuptial agreement. The general principles of contract law dictate that appellant cannot seek to legally bind persons who are not parties to the antenuptial agreement. Cumberland-Perry Vo-Tech School v. Bogar & Bink, supra; Chambers Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Allegheny County, supra. Therefore, because appellees are not parties to the antenuptial agreement and have no duties under the agreement, we conclude that appellant cannot maintain a cause of action for breach of contract against appellees. ³

Appellant next contends that, because the antenuptial agreement granted her a life estate in the marital residence, the lower court erred in determining that she is not entitled to the net rental income from the residence during the period when she was absent from the property. The antenuptial agreement provides:

In consideration of the premises, the intended husband does hereby grant unto the intended wife the right to live in the first floor apartment on premises known as 902 West 17th Street, Erie, Pennsylvania, for and during her natural life, provided, however, during such occupancy she shall pay one-half of the costs of the maintenance and repair of the premises and one-half of all taxes and assessments that might be levied against said property. Her right to live in said apartment shall begin at the time of the death of the intended husband. This right to live on said premises shall be extinguished upon her failure to occupy the premises immediately after said death or upon her removal therefrom any time there after.

Antenuptial Agreement at 2. Based upon this provision, the lower court concluded that appellant was entitled to a life estate in the marital residence but was not entitled to rental income because appellant was a creditor of the estate and...