Estate of Broadhurst
| Decision Date | 29 September 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 14836,14836 |
| Citation | 737 S.W.2d 504 |
| Parties | In the ESTATE OF Wall BROADHURST, Deceased. Tommy BROADHURST, Personal Representative, Appellant, v. Louella Love BROADHURST, Claimant-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Robert W. Evenson, Pineville, for appellant.
John R. Sims, Ruyle & Sims, Neosho, for respondent.
In this proceeding the Personal Representative of the Estate of Wall Broadhurst, deceased, contests the widow's election to take against the will under §§ 474.160 to 474.230, and her applications for exempt property, § 474.250, for support, § 474.260 and for a homestead allowance, § 474.290. In the trial court and in this court, that opposition is based upon the contention those rights are barred by a prenuptial agreement. §§ 474.120 and 474.220. The personal representative also asserts as a bar a release agreement signed by the widow after her husband's death. Following a hearing, the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of McDonald County found the agreements unenforceable, the widow's election to be effective and granted the allowances. The personal representative has appealed.
Only a brief, preliminary statement of facts is necessary. In contemplation of marriage, the decedent Wall Broadhurst and the widow, then Louella Love, on June 21, 1979, executed a prenuptial agreement. In general, that agreement provided "that in the event said marriage is consummated as now planned," neither party would make any claim to the property then owned by the other party. The parties were married on September 1, 1979. They were divorced on August 18, 1981. Approximately two months later they remarried. They did not re-execute the previous prenuptial agreement or execute a new prenuptial agreement.
Wall Broadhurst died on August 2, 1985, survived by his widow and by seven children from a prior marriage. His will had been executed on November 28, 1978. By that will he devised his entire estate to his seven children. That will was admitted to probate on August 7, 1985. On that date, his son, Tommy V. Broadhurst, was appointed personal representative of the estate.
On August 7, 1985, at the request of the personal representative, the attorney for the estate prepared a release agreement between the estate and the widow. In general, that agreement provided the widow would receive from the estate a 1979 pickup, .22 caliber pistol, washer, dryer, stereo, three calves and one sow. In turn, the widow agreed to abide by the terms of the prenuptial agreement previously entered into. She specifically agreed not to make any statutory claim against the estate "whether for widow's allowance, widow's share, statutory share, support for one year, homestead allowance, exempt property, or any other claim, which shall be relinquished in exchange for the delivery of the property itemized above."
Circumstances concerning the property she was to receive from the estate caused the widow to be unwilling to abide by the release agreement. On January 10, 1986, she filed in the Probate Division her election to take against the will. She also filed her applications for exempt property, support, and for a homestead allowance. No responsive pleading was filed.
A hearing was held on May 5, 1986. The announced and agreed purpose of the hearing was to determine the effectiveness of the election to take against the will and the applications for exempt property, support and a homestead allowance. Appearances at the hearing were made by the widow and the personal representative. The issue litigated was whether or not the widow's election and applications were barred by the prenuptial agreement or by the subsequent release agreement. The Probate Division of the Circuit Court made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. As stated, it found the agreements ineffective and determined the election was valid and granted the applications.
At the outset, this court must consider the widow's contention the appeal must be dismissed because the personal representative has no right of appeal from the judgments in question. A similar issue was considered in Matter of Estate of Savage, 650 S.W.2d 346 (Mo.App.1983).
The widow's contention must be determined under the applicable statutes construed in the light of well established principles. "The right of appeal is statutory and does not exist unless so authorized." Rone's Estate v. Rone, 218 S.W.2d 138, 144 (Mo.App.1949). The pertinent portion of § 472.160.1 provides: "Any interested person aggrieved thereby may appeal to the appropriate appellate court from the order, judgment or decree of the probate division of the circuit court in any of the following cases:" Section 512.020 grants the right of appeal to "[a]ny party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause...." The relationship between the two statutes has not been developed and it is not necessary in this instance to do so. Prior to recent amendments resulting from judicial reorganization, it had been held "[t]he right to appeal and whether an appellant is a party aggrieved within the meaning of Sections 472.160 and 512.020, V.A.M.S., are jurisdictional questions which may be raised at any time and by the court itself,...." In re Fusz' Estate, 397 S.W.2d 595, 595 (Mo.1966), 16 A.L.R.3d 1271, 1272-1273 (1967). Under both statutes the right of appeal is conditioned upon the appellant being aggrieved.
Generally, "a party is aggrieved when the judgment operates prejudicially and directly upon his personal or property rights or interests...." Hertz Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 528 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Mo. banc 1975). To appeal as such, a personal representative must be adversely affected in his representative capacity as distinguished from his personal capacity. In re Franz' Estate, 372 S.W.2d 885 (Mo.1963); In re Estate of Hill, 435 S.W.2d 722 (Mo.App.1968). The record must show the personal representative is an aggrieved party in his representative capacity and in the absence of such evidence, his appeal should be dismissed. Crigler v. Frame, 632 S.W.2d 94 (Mo.App.1982); In re Estate of Hill, supra.
"The great weight of authority is to the effect that an executor or administrator as such is not aggrieved or prejudiced by a decree determining the rights of the beneficiaries, and hence may not appeal." In re Fusz' Estate, supra, 397 S.W.2d at 595, 16 A.L.R.3d at 1273. It has been said:
The underlying rationale for the general rule denying a right to appeal appears to be that the executor or administrator is a mere stakeholder with a duty to deliver the residue of the estate to those persons designated by the court, and not bound to litigate their conflicting claims at the expense of the estate when the conflicting parties may do so at their own expense if it is their desire.
Annot., Executors--Distribution Orders--Appeal, 16 A.L.R.3d 1274, 1277 (1967). For example, it is held a personal representative may not appeal from a determination of apportionment in an order of distribution, In re Whitsett's Estate, 237 Mo.App. 1295, 172 S.W.2d 965 (1943), or from a determination a claimant was the adopted daughter of the decedent. Love v. White, 348 Mo. 640, 154 S.W.2d 759 (1941). Where all other distributees were parties, and the record did not establish the existence of creditors, it has been held a personal representative may not appeal from an order granting an allowance for the support of a widow. In re Clark's Estate, 213 S.W.2d 645 (Mo.App.1948). Additional authorities are collected in Matter of Estate of Savage, supra.
However, in the past, in certain circumstances, personal representatives have been permitted to appeal on the basis that all heirs and devisees and other interested persons have not been parties to the proceeding in the Circuit Court. It was so held in permitting an executrix to appeal from an order determining a claimant had been married to the decedent and granting her an allowance for support. Rone's Estate v. Rone, supra. In so...
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