Estate of Castiglioni

• Decision Date: 16 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. D022217,D022217
• Citation: 40 Cal.App.4th 367,47 Cal.Rptr.2d 288
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8781, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,210 ESTATE OF Guiseppe CASTIGLIONI, Deceased. Annie CASTIGLIONI, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Elizabeth DEL POZO, as Special Administrator, etc., Objector and Appellant.

Page 288

47 Cal.Rptr.2d 288

40 Cal.App.4th 367, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8781,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 15,210

ESTATE OF Guiseppe CASTIGLIONI, Deceased.

Annie CASTIGLIONI, Petitioner and Respondent, v. Elizabeth DEL POZO, as Special Administrator, etc., Objector and Appellant.

No. D022217.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Nov. 16, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1995.

Review Denied Feb. 15, 1996.

[40 Cal.App.4th 369] Garry J. Bowman, Chula Vista, for Appellant.

Atherton, Allen & Geerdes and Franklin Geerdes, Chula Vista, for Petitioner and Respondent.

NARES, Associate Justice.

We here deal with the disposition of property that was joint tenancy property after there has been a felonious, intentional killing of one joint tenant spouse by the other, a factual pattern subject to PROBATE CODE SECTION 251¹. As a matter of first impression we give effect to relatively new developments in California law concerning tracing contributions to jointly held property in order to determine entitlement to the property after the killing. ²

Section 251 provides in part:

"A joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the Under circumstances where one spouse, here the wife, feloniously and intentionally kills the other spouse who placed his separate property, both real and personal, in joint tenancy with the surviving spouse long before the killing, what is "the share of the decedent" passing as the decedent's property under section 251? Does the decedent's share consist of an undivided one-half of the former joint tenancy property? Or, may the personal representative of the estate apply a tracing or other legal or equitable principle to establish a greater share of the decedent to pass in the estate? These are the issues in this appeal.

decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent's property and the killer has no rights by survivorship...."

Elizabeth Del Pozo (Administrator), special administrator of the estate of Guiseppe Castiglioni (Decedent), appeals an order of the probate court granting the petition of Annie J. Castiglioni (Spouse) requiring the Administrator to release one-half of joint tenancy bank accounts and joint tenancy rents to Spouse. Spouse stands convicted of the first degree murder of Decedent with a true finding the murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain. (Pen.Code, §§ 187, subd. (a); 190.2, subd. (a)(1).) ³ She is sentenced to prison for life without possibility of parole on the first degree murder count. ⁴

Administrator argues that although section 251 and case law determine the disposition of joint tenancy property where one joint tenant kills the other as in this case, it was error to award one-half to Spouse in light of the fact the accounts were Decedent's separate property before marriage.

Considering developments in California statutory law with respect to tracing and in the context of existing decisional law, we conclude the court erred in awarding one-half of the joint tenancy accounts and rents to the surviving Spouse who feloniously and intentionally killed the Decedent.

With respect to accounts subject to statutes dealing with tracing, we hold the share of the decedent under section 251 must be determined with reference to the tracing statutes. Similarly, section 251 expressly applies to real property and we determine adherence to the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme requires applying an identical result to this form of property. Since the matter was decided in the trial court without consideration of recent laws relating to tracing, we remand the case for further consideration in light of the tracing statutes. ⁵

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ⁶

Spouse killed Decedent on June 5, 1994. At the time, she was 51 and he was 85 years of age. They were married about five years and had lived together approximately five years before the marriage.

Before the couple married, Decedent owned three parcels of real property as his separate property: one commercial in National City, and one residential rental and one personal residential in Chula Vista. Decedent In February 1989, about one month after the marriage, joint tenancy deeds prepared by Decedent's attorneys were recorded placing title of the parcels of real property in the name of "Guiseppe Castiglioni and Annie J. Castiglioni, husband and wife as joint tenants." After the marriage Decedent also placed at least two savings accounts in his and Spouse's names as joint tenants.

similarly owned savings accounts before the couple married.

At the time of Decedent's death the three parcels of real property were estimated to be worth $380,000, with the rental properties generating about $10,000 annual income. The two accounts in joint tenancy had balances totaling approximately $64,000 at the date of death.

Decedent died intestate, leaving as his sole heir (other than Spouse) an adult married daughter. ⁷ The record suggests Spouse has no issue.

As the matter came before the probate court the facts (other than the stipulation the court was to assume a felonious and intentional killing) were established by declarations alone, with the Spouse's declaration giving rise to the conclusion that Decedent's separate property was the source of the joint tenancies in the real property and accounts. ⁸ In ruling the Administrator was required to release to Spouse sums equal to one-half of all joint tenancy bank accounts (forthwith) and one-half of all rents received from joint tenancy real property (at specified intervals), the trial court stated:

"The reason I think that Probate Code 251 is unambiguous in its application here is first that it is a fallacy to say that the widow is benefiting by the death of Guiseppe Castiglioni. What the death accomplished was a severance, which she herself might have accomplished by a voluntary deed any time after the joint tenancy was created in 1989. Either of the joint tenants would have had the power to sever the joint tenancy and to enjoy an unrestricted right to their half interest. So the fact is that the widow here didn't acquire a half interest at the death of the decedent, she acquired that half interest in 1989 when the deed of gift was given to her.

"I think it's farfetched to think that at that time she would have contemplated the tragedy that resulted four years later. And I think the Legislature had exactly this kind of scenario in mind when it adopted Probate Code 251 to make it clear that the severance itself at the death of--excuse me--it made it clear that, by creating a severance by operation of law upon the death of the one joint tenant who died by homicide, it was varying the historical principle that the survivor would have owned 100 percent instead of only 50 percent.

"... [T]he picture might be different if some affirmative defense were before the court suggesting some equitable theory other than merely the concept of profiting by one's own wrong raised to defeat the widow's ownership, something like--something that would justify a rescission in effect on the original joint tenancy deed. But there is no contention of that kind made. So for those reasons then there are no factual disputes really before the court...."

In opposing Spouse's petition for the order requiring release of one-half of the joint tenancy bank accounts and joint tenancy rents, Administrator relied on both section 251 and cases which predate enactment of the section. Administrator also pointed out that had the marriage been terminated by a dissolution proceeding, rather than by a murder, Spouse would not have received any of the property since Decedent would have been reimbursed for his contributions under Family

Code section 2640, subdivision (b), ⁹ by the process of tracing. Administrator argued that to permit Spouse to acquire one-half of the joint tenancy property when she contributed nothing to it allows her to gain something by her wrongful act of murder that she could not have gained by a dissolution of the marriage. Thus, Administrator asked that equitable principles such as Civil Code sections 2224 and 3517, imposing a constructive trust on wrongfully gained property and proscribing taking advantage of one's own wrong, respectively, be applied to prevent Spouse from receiving one-half of the joint tenancy bank accounts and rents.

DISCUSSION

I LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Initially, we point out that succession to property is purely a matter of statute; if words of a statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose not apparent on the face of the statute or from its legislative purpose, and the court should not construe a statute so as to work a forfeiture in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intent. (Estate of Kramme (1978) 20 Cal.3d 567, 572, 143 Cal.Rptr. 542, 573 P.2d 1369.) Since at least 1905, the law of this state has been that there are no inheritance rights for a person who intentionally caused the death of the decedent. (Id. at pp. 572-575, 143 Cal.Rptr. 542, 573 P.2d 1369.) In construing and applying former section 258, ¹⁰ Kramme at pp. 576-577, 143 Cal.Rptr. 542, 573 P.2d 1369) refuses to apply the equitable principles embodied in Civil Code sections 2224 and 3517 which read:

"One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it." (Civ.Code, § 2224.)

"No one can take advantage of his own wrong." (Civ.Code, § 3517.)

Kramme explains its exclusive use of section 258 and refusal to apply the Civil Code sections as "consistent with the principle that if a specific statute is enacted covering a particular subject, the specific statute controls and takes priority over a general statute...