Estate of Chappelle v. Sanders

• Decision Date: 17 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-161.,81-161.
• Citation: 442 A.2d 157
• Parties: ESTATE OF Nan CHAPPELLE (Carolyn B. Simpson, Administratrix), Appellant, v. Retta SANDERS, et al., Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

Page 157

442 A.2d 157

ESTATE OF Nan CHAPPELLE (Carolyn B. Simpson, Administratrix), Appellant, v. Retta SANDERS, et al., Appellees.

No. 81-161.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted December 3, 1981.

Decided February 17, 1982.

Benjamin L. Evans, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for appellant.

John F. Kelly, Langley Park, Md., was on the brief for appellees.

Before KERN, MACK and BELSON, Associate Judges.

MACK, Associate Judge:

Appellant, administratrix of the estate of decedent Nan Chappelle, appeals from an order of the trial court granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that appellees' concealment of their identities should have tolled the running of limitations periods. We disagree and affirm the order of the trial court.

Appellant's complaint alleged that on or about June 17, 1976 appellee Theophilus Sanders, Jr., while driving Retta Sanders' car, collided with a vehicle in which the decedent rode as a passenger, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Appellant contends that Theophilus Sanders gave decedent a false name, address and telephone number, left the scene of the accident before police arrived, and failed to file an accident report.¹ Appellant concedes, however that the driver of the decedent's car noted the license plate number of Sanders' car and traced ownership to Retta Sanders.² The complaint further alleged that appellee Retta Sanders denied that her car had been involved in this collision when questioned.

Appellant filed wrongful death and survival claims on behalf of the decedent's estate on July 5, 1979, over three years after the date of the accident. The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds following a hearing at which appellant argued that appellees' fraudulent concealment of their identities should have tolled the running of the limitations periods.

D.C.Code 1973, § 16-2702 requires that wrongful death claims be filed within one year of a decedent's death. While the survival act, id. § 12-101 imposes no specific limitation, § 12-301(8) imposes a three-year limitation period on personal injury claims. Appellant's survival action accrued on the date of her injury, see Shehyn v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 392 A.2d 1008, 1013 (1978), and the one-year wrongful death limitation period began to run on August 17, 1976, the date of her death. As appellant acknowledges, both claims are therefore barred by these time limitations in the absence of a condition that tolled the running of these periods.

It is well established that affirmative acts employed by a party to fraudulently conceal either the existence of a claim or facts forming the basis of a cause of action toll the running of limitations periods. William J. Davis, Inc. v. Young, D.C.App., 412 A.2d 1187, 1191 (1980). Accord, Weisberg v. Williams, Connolly & Califano, D.C.App., 390 A.2d 992 (1978); Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary and Casualty Hospital, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 50, 396 F.2d 931 (1967). However, "`[o]ne well established defense to a claim of fraudulent concealment is that the plaintiff knew, or by the exercise of due diligence could have known, that he may have had a cause of action.'" Weisberg, supra at 996, quoting Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. City of Burlington, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 65, 67, 351 F.2d 762, 764 (1965). "[A] mere doubt in the mind of a party in connection with his legal rights, or his right to recover in a lawsuit, will not suspend the running of the statute of limitations." 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 146 (1970) (footnote omitted).

Appellant, however, does not allege that appellees concealed the existence of a cause of action but rather, that they concealed their identities. While the effect of such a concealment on the statute of limitations is a question of first impression in this jurisdiction, other jurisdictions have generally refused to toll the running of limitations periods under similar circumstances. "Concealment of the identity of parties liable, or concealment of the parties, has been held not to constitute concealment of the cause of action and not to be available to avoid the running of the statute of limitations." Id., § 148 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., Lim v. Superior Court, 126 Ariz. 481, 616 P.2d 941 (1980); Guebard v. Jabaay, 65 Ill.App.3d 255, 21 Ill.Dec. 620, 381 N.E.2d 1164 (1978); Staples v. Zoph, 9 Cal.App.2d 369, 49 P.2d 1131 (1935).

Appellant argues that appellees' failure to file an accident report in violation of D.C.Code 1973, § 40-426 should have tolled the running of the limitations periods, citing St. Clair v. Bardstown Transfer Line, Inc., 310 Ky. 776, 221 S.W.2d 679 (1949) (holding that tortfeasor's failure to comply with statute requiring accident report to be filed tolled the limitation period). Appellant's reliance on this authority is misplaced for, even if we assume that the purpose of this statute is "to provide the means whereby one injured or otherwise damaged by an automobile collision . . . may be given the opportunity to seek compensation . . .," id. at 779, 221 S.W.2d at 680-81, appellant can hardly claim, as did the plaintiff in St. Clair, that "[s]he...