Estate of Cotton, In re

• Decision Date: 06 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94APF07-1109,94APF07-1109
• Parties: In re ESTATE OF COTTON.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 368

104 Ohio App.3d 368

662 N.E.2d 63

In re ESTATE OF COTTON.

No. 94APF07-1109.

Court of Appeals of Ohio Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided June 6, 1995.

Craig E. Evans, Columbus, for appellee.

Stephen E. Maher, Columbus, for appellant.

PEGGY L. BRYANT, Judge.

Defendant-appellant, Michael S. Morris, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, finding that defendant intentionally and feloniously caused the death of Joyce Ann Cotton Morris and is barred from benefitting from her death in any manner. Defendant's single assignment of error states:

"The court erred in applying common law to disqualify appellant from inheritance as surviving spouse, where O.R.C. 2105.19 (the civil disqualification statute) is the exclusive method by which to determine the beneficiary status of the appellant, who has been identified, adjudicated, and convicted of involuntary manslaughter, a non-purposeful homicide exempted from disqualification as beneficiary by the terms of O.R.C. 2105.19."

The facts of this case are undisputed. On April 6, 1992, defendant entered a guilty plea to the stipulated lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter, with a firearm specification, in violation of R.C. 2903.04, an aggravated felony of the first degree. The trial court found defendant guilty on the charge and sentenced him. The victim of the offense, Joyce Ann Cotton Morris, defendant's wife, left a last will and testament, which was admitted to probate on May 30, 1991.

Given the foregoing, plaintiff, Darryl D. Cotton, Administrator WWA of the Estate of Joyce Ann Cotton Morris, filed an action in the probate division of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, seeking direction regarding the rights of Michael Morris as surviving spouse to inherit from the decedent.

Following a pretrial, the parties submitted briefs addressing whether defendant could lose his right of inheritance through application of the common law, given that his conviction for involuntary manslaughter involves an offense not specified in R.C. 2105.19, which provides:

"[N]o person who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or is found not guilty by reason of insanity of a violation of or complicity in the violation of section 2903.01, 2903.02, or 2903.03 of the Revised Code * * * shall in any way benefit by the death. All property of the decedent, and all money, insurance proceeds, or other property or benefits payable or distributable in respect of the decedent's death, shall pass or be paid or distributed as if the person who caused the death of decedent had predeceased the decedent."

On the recommendation of the referee who initially considered the issue, the trial court concluded that R.C. 2105.19 does not provide the exclusive method for disqualifying defendant from exercising spousal rights or receiving estate assets. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Shrader v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 41, 20 OBR 343, 485 N.E.2d 1031, the court found that the beneficiaries of the estate could proceed under the common law in an attempt to prove that defendant had committed an offense which would prohibit him from benefitting from the estate of the decedent.

The parties subsequently submitted stipulated facts relevant to the ultimate issue, on which the trial court concluded that defendant intentionally and feloniously caused the death of the decedent and "therefore, by common law, is barred from benefitting from the death" in any manner. Contending that R.C. 2105.19 provides the exclusive means for prohibiting him from receiving under the decedent's will, defendant urges in his single assignment of error that the trial court erred in applying the common law to determine that he may not benefit from his actions in causing the death of decedent.

The Supreme Court in Shrader addressed similar circumstances. In that case, John Shrader had not been convicted of any criminal offense, including those set forth in R.C. 2105.19, and thus the Supreme Court found that the statute was inapplicable. As defendant urges here, Shrader argued that R.C. 2105.19 provided the exclusive means for disqualifying him from any benefits resulting from his wife's death. In rejecting his contention, the Supreme Court stated:

" * * * A familiar principle of statutory construction, however, is that a statute should not be construed to impair pre-existing law in the absence of an explicit legislative statement to the contrary. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson (1952), 343 U.S. 779, 783 [72 S.Ct. 1011, 1014, 96 L.Ed. 1294, 1299]; Frantz v. Maher (1957), 106 Ohio App. 465, 471-472 [7 O.O.2d 209, 212-213, 155 N.E.2d 471, 475-476]. All that R.C. 2105.19(A) does or purports to do is to eliminate the necessity to prove that the beneficiary of a policy of life insurance committed such an act, when the beneficiary has been...