Estate of Hardy

Decision Date25 June 1992
Citation609 A.2d 1162
PartiesESTATE OF Herbert F. HARDY.
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Joel Dearborn, Ferris, Dearborn & Willey, Brewer, for appellant.

Roger G. Innes, Hale & Hamlin, Ellsworth, for appellee.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD and COLLINS, JJ.

GLASSMAN, Justice.

Herbert F. Hardy died testate in Maine in 1979. After providing for the payment of his funeral expenses and administrative costs, Hardy's will left his widow a life estate in all of his remaining assets. 1 The will also provided for specific bequests and devises to be made upon termination of the life estate. 2 Irene (Geri) Butler, as the personal representative of the estate, filed a petition for instructions in the Hancock County Probate Court (Ellsworth, Patterson, J.) to determine whether the third article of Hardy's will disposed of the furniture as well as the real property located at Great Pond. After a hearing, the court determined that the provision only disposed of the real property, and Butler appeals. We hold that the Probate Court erred as a matter of law and vacate the order.

The existence and the meaning of ambiguous language in a will are both questions of law for the trial court when no extrinsic evidence is presented as to the intent of the testator. See Estate of Wilson, 542 A.2d 838, 839 (Me.1988); Estate of Cushman, 501 A.2d 811, 813 (Me.1985). We review questions of law de novo and may substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See Bliss v. Bliss, 583 A.2d 208, 210 (Me.1990).

Here, the evidence before the trial court was limited to the language within the four corners of Hardy's will. We concur in the court's determination that because the word "property" is expressly qualified to include both realty and personalty in the other articles of the will, its meaning is ambiguous in the context of the will's third article. We disagree with the trial court, however, as to the intent of the testator manifested by the word "property" in article three of the will.

As we have previously stated, "The intention of the testator, collected from the language of the whole instrument interpreted in light of the manifest object of the testator, guides construction of [a] will." Estate of Sweet, 519 A.2d 1260, 1264 (Me.1987). In the second article, the meaning of the word "property" must be determined without reference to the words "all the rest, residue and remainder" because they are words of limitation only and do not describe the kind of assets that are in view. The distinction is illustrated by contrast with the fifth article where the word "property," similarly limited, is described as "real, personal and mixed, tangible and intangible, of whatsoever nature and wheresoever situated." The term "property" in the second article must be construed as encompassing both personalty and realty despite the omission of descriptive qualifiers; otherwise, the testamentary provision for the...

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10 cases
  • Glidden v. Belden
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 4 novembre 1996
    ...The court's determination that the Rangeway was a public way was a legal finding, and thus we review it de novo. Estate of Hardy, 609 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Me.1992) (legal determinations subject to de novo review). Our review of the case law disclosed only two cases that discuss the rangeways: H......
  • Langille v. Norton
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 20 juillet 1993
    ...questions of law that we review de novo when no extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent is presented to the court. Estate of Hardy, 609 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Me.1992). No such extrinsic evidence was presented here. Although the various provisions in a will should be reconciled if possible, T......
  • State v. O'Connor
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 22 août 1996
    ...755 (Me.1996) (citing United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 842 (7th Cir.1992)). We review questions of law de novo. Estate of Hardy, 609 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Me.1992). The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state 3 and federal 4 constitutions are coextensive, State v. Wilson, 671 A.2d 958, 960 (......
  • Snyder v. Haagen
    • United States
    • Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)
    • 14 juin 1996
    ...determination of the meaning of the word "parallel" was a legal determination), and is subject to de novo review. Estate of Hardy, 609 A.2d 1162, 1163 (Me.1992). There is no Maine case in which the phrase "right angles" has been interpreted. A search of the leading treatises did not disclos......
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