Estate of Hendren, Matter of
| Decision Date | 14 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-783A238,3-783A238 |
| Citation | 459 N.E.2d 437 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Rhea W. HENDREN, Deceased. Don CONNELL and Candace L. Emig, Co-Executors, Respondents-Appellants, v. A.B. b/n/f Faye Land, Petitioner-Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
William H. Tobin, Saul I. Ruman & Associates, Hammond, for respondents-appellants.
James A. Harris, Sachs & Hess, P.C., Hammond, for petitioner-appellee.
This is an appeal from the award of a family allowance under the probate code, IC 29-1-4-1. 1
On November 5, 1981 Faye Land initiated a paternity action in the juvenile division of the Lake Superior Court. The putative father of Land's as yet unborn child was Rhea W. Hendren, a fifty-five year old widowed truck driver for Inland Steel Company. Land sought a declaration of paternity and an award of support. On December 21, 1981 she amended her petition indicating she had given birth to a son, A.B., on December 11, 1981.
Blood tests performed by agreement of the parties indicated a probability of 96.13% that Hendren was A.B.'s biological father. After some discussion the parties reached an agreement, and an order embodying that agreement was prepared. On September 10, 1982 the order was submitted to the juvenile court referee for his approval. The order provided, among other things, that Hendren was the father of Land's child and that Hendren would provide support for the child.
On October 1, 1982 Hendren's counsel received the proposed order back from the juvenile court referee marked "denied." The referee advised Land's counsel he had denied the order because he felt only the court could approve a provision in the order providing for a reduction in support payments upon Hendren's succession to his Social Security benefits. The attorneys for the parties inserted a remedial provision and resubmitted the order on October 6, 1982. It was returned approved as of October 7, 1982.
However, unknown to counsel for both parties, Hendren had died of cancer on October 4, 1982. Hendren's will was filed for probate on October 8, 1982, and letters testamentary were issued. On November 19, 1982 Land filed a petition requesting a family allowance be awarded to her son. The parties agreed to a stipulation of facts and submitted the legal issue of A.B.'s right to such an allowance to the court. On March 15, 1983 the court granted the allowance in the following ruling:
"The Court having had the matter of the Petitioner [sic] for Statutory Allowance of [A.B.], a minor, under advisement, and having heard the evidence and examined the briefs filed herein, now approves the petition and orders that the minor's allowance authorized pursuant to I.C. 29-1-4-1 be paid from the personal property of this Estate, and if there are insufficient personal property assets to pay the same, the difference therein shall be made up from the real estate in this Estate, and shall be a lien thereon."
The executors of Hendren's estate appeal this ruling raising one issue:
Was it error to grant A.B. an IC 29-1-4-1 allowance when there had been no judicial declaration of paternity during Rhea Hendren's lifetime as required by IC 29-1-2-7(b)? That statute provides in pertinent part:
The executors maintain that filiation by the procedures prescribed in IC 29-1-2-7(b) is an absolute prerequisite for an award under IC 29-1-4-1. IC 29-1-2-7(b) provides an illegitimate child will be treated as a legitimate child for intestate inheritance and the award of family allowance if: (1) the child's paternity is established by law during the father's lifetime; or (2) the putative father marries the mother and acknowledges the child as his own. 2 The executors acknowledge that filiation via the former procedure was in process at Hendren's death. However, they argue that because the order recognizing Hendren's paternity was not approved until three days after Hendren's death, A.B.'s paternity was not established by law during Hendren's lifetime. The executors contend this failure prohibits A.B.'s receiving an IC 29-1-4-1 allowance as a "child" of the deceased Hendren.
The executors ask us to determine whether an IC 29-1-4-1 allowance can be awarded to an illegitimate in the absence of a legal determination of paternity during the father's lifetime. Logically, this issue can arise in either of two situations: (1) The paternity determination was not initiated during the putative's father's lifetime; or (2) The paternity determination was not completed during the putative father's lifetime. The present case is an instance of the second situation. Before we can determine what, if any, legal significance that fact has, we must review the law in this area. We begin with case law, and the Supreme Court's views on the rights of illegitimates.
The rights of illegitimate children is an issue which the Supreme Court has addressed with some frequency. Pickett v. Brown (1983), --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76 L.Ed.2d 372; Mills v. Habluetzel (1982), 456 U.S. 91, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 71 L.Ed.2d 770; Lalli v. Lalli (1978), 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503; Trimble v. Gordon (1977), 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31; Gomez v. Perez (1973), 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56; Levy v. Louisiana (1968), 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436. In Gomez v. Perez, supra, the Court held that a state may not make "illogical and unjust" distinctions between the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. Gomez v. Perez (1973), 409 U.S. 535, 538, 93 S.Ct. 872, 875, 35 L.Ed.2d 56, quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1972), 406 U.S. 164, 175, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 1406, 31 L.Ed.2d 768. However, the Court also recognized the existence of certain practical problems regarding the rights of illegitimates:
409 U.S. at 538, 93 S.Ct. at 875. Although the Court has never been called upon to address the precise issue confronting us, in Lalli v. Lalli (1978), 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 it was confronted with an equal protection challenge to a similar statute. Although the Court's equal protection analysis is not relevant here, its discussion of the reasons for requiring a determination of paternity during the reputed father's lifetime is instructive.
In Lalli, Robert Lalli claimed to be the illegitimate son of Mario Lalli and entitled to inherit from his estate. A New York statute allowed illegitimates to inherit provided that they had obtained a court order declaring paternity during the father's lifetime. Robert Lalli had not obtained such an order prior to Mario Lalli's death. He challenged the New York statute as illegally discriminating against illegitimates in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed. In doing so, it discussed the reasons for requiring such a determination be made during the putative father's lifetime.
The Court began by noting its observation in an earlier decision that "the often difficult problem of proving the paternity of illegitimate children and the related danger of spurious claims against intestate estates ... 'might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required ... for legitimate children generally.' " 439 U.S. at 265, 99 S.Ct. at 523, quoting Trimble v. Gordon (1977), 430 U.S. 762, 770, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 1465, 52 L.Ed.2d 31. After indicating the statute's requirement was an evidentiary requirement, the Court proceeded to consider in detail "the peculiar problems of proof" involved in establishing paternity. 439 U.S. at 268-69, 99 S.Ct. at 524-25. The Court observed that childbirth in the absence of "a formal family unit" brings with it difficult problems of ascertaining and assigning paternal responsibility. Because of these problems, "spurious claims may be difficult to expose." Id. at 271, 99 S.Ct. at 526. The Court noted the New York statute was an attempt to deal with these problems rationally. It was the result of a lengthy study undertaken by a legislative commission. The commission determined "[a]ccuracy is enhanced by placing paternity disputes in a judicial forum during the lifetime of the father."
The commission concluded that adjudication of paternity during the father's lifetime increased " 'the reliability of the fact-finding process' " and permitted the designated father to defend himself against " 'unjust accusations.' " 439 U.S. at 271, 99 S.Ct. at 526. The Court accepted these conclusions and found the statute's requirement of a paternity determination during the father's lifetime was substantially related to these two important state interests, as well as to the accurate and efficient disposition of a decedent's estate. It was for this reason the Court found the requirement did not offend equal protection. The Court noted, however, its decision was not intended to restrict the states' freedom to employ other procedures for insuring the authenticity of asserted filial relationships.
The Supreme Court has again considered the problems of proof in paternity actions recently in Pickett v. Brown (1983), --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 76...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Estate of Edwards, Matter of
...to promote accuracy and fairness by insuring the determination took place in an adversarial context. In the Matter of the Estate of Hendren (1984), Ind.App., 459 N.E.2d 437, 442, trans. With a view toward these purposes, this court decided in Hendren that a family allowance could be awarded......