Estate of Katleman
| Decision Date | 09 February 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. B062451,B062451 |
| Citation | 13 Cal.App.4th 51,16 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Beldon KATLEMAN, Deceased. Carole KATLEMAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur J. CROWLEY, Defendant and Appellant. |
Crowley & Cuneo, and Sarah J. Hoover, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.
Hufstedler, Kaus & Ettinger, Warren L. Ettinger, Dan Marmalefsky and Mark R. McDonald, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and respondent.
Arthur Crowley ("Arthur"), the major beneficiary under the will of Beldon Katleman ("Beldon"), deceased, appeals from the order of the Superior Court that Carole Katleman ("Carole") is entitled to share in the estate as a pretermitted spouse pursuant to Probate Code section 6560. 1 Arthur's major contention is that, pursuant to section 6561, subdivision (a) (which denies a pretermission claim by a spouse if it appears from the will that the testator intentionally failed to provide for the spouse) 2 and section 21303 (), 3 Carole may not share in the estate We will conclude that a pretermission claim prosecuted by an omitted surviving spouse, even though subsequent to an unsuccessful will contest, is not defeated by the will's no contest clause unless such clause clearly establishes that, at the time the will was executed, the testator: (1) contemplated the possibility of a later marriage and (2) intended to disinherit the later acquired spouse. As the no contest clause before us fails to satisfy either of these requirements, and because the prosecution of a will contest cannot defeat established pretermission rights, we will affirm the trial court's order.
as an omitted spouse because she initially contested Beldon's will, rather than immediately asserting a pretermission claim under section 6560. Arthur relies upon the "no contest" clause in Beldon's will which expressly disinherited "any devisee, legatee or beneficiary under this Will, or any legal heir of mine or person claiming under any of them," if such person contested the will.
Beldon and Carole were first married in 1973 but they divorced in 1975. Arthur was Beldon's best friend and his next door neighbor during these years and until Beldon's death.
On January 2, 1976, Beldon executed a will, in which he bequeathed $10,000 to Gomelia Baker, a servant of his mother's, and left the balance of his estate, valued in excess of $10 million at the time of his death, 4 in trust for his mother for the remainder of her life, then to Arthur, who was also the named trustee. Beldon specifically disinherited Diane Harriet De Shong, his adult daughter from a previous marriage, and her two sons. Paragraph TENTH of the will read as follows:
In 1980, Beldon and Carole remarried. Beldon's mother died in 1982. By 1988, Beldon and Carole were again discussing divorce, although Carole did not consider these discussions to be serious. Beldon died on September 28, 1988, without having revoked his 1976 will.
Beldon's 1976 will was submitted for probate on October 4, 1988. On October 28, 1988, Carole filed a contest of the will, in which Beldon's daughter later joined, contending probate should be denied on the grounds, among others, that Beldon had been unduly influenced and defrauded by Arthur in the execution of the will. Carole filed her statement of interest in the estate as an omitted spouse under section 6560 on November 30, 1988, in response to a petition for determination of entitlement to estate distribution, which was filed by one Keith Desser, who alleged he was Beldon's illegitimate son.
The will contest was litigated at length and was ultimately unsuccessful. On August 3, 1990, after a 14-day trial, the 1976 will was admitted to probate.
Trial was held on Carole's statement of interest on July 29, 1991. In a tentative statement of decision, issued on August 12, 1991, the court found Carole entitled to her share of Beldon's estate as an omitted spouse under section 6560. The court reasoned that (1) under Estate of Duke (1953) The court made findings of fact that Beldon was not thinking of Carole or contemplating remarriage to her when he executed the 1976 will, was not aware "of the possible and problematical entry of Carole into the classes of persons towards whom the no contest clause was directed," and in the end forgot about the 1976 will. For this reason, the court found the language in paragraph TENTH of the will did not refer to Carole with sufficient clarity to establish she was among the category of persons whom Beldon intended to disinherit absolutely, or to disinherit if they contested his will.
41 Cal.2d 509, 261 P.2d 235; Estate of Axcelrod (1944) 23 Cal.2d 761, 147 P.2d 1, and Estate of Shannon (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1148, 274 Cal.Rptr. 338, words such as "heirs" and "heirs at law" in a disinheritance clause are not sufficient to defeat the claims of a pretermitted spouse under section 6560, and (2) no reason appeared why a different standard should apply where a no contest clause is at issue. The court concluded that under Estate of Duke, supra, and Estate of Axcelrod, supra, the minimum threshold for sufficient specificity required the presence of terms establishing the testator contemplated a future marriage and intentionally disinherited the future spouse.
The trial court agreed that Carole's will contest appeared to have been vindictive, but concluded that Arthur's remedy was a malicious prosecution action, not enforcement of the will's no contest clause. The court reasoned that in a malicious prosecution action, a jury could determine the appropriate penalty. The court stated it was unwilling to impose a multimillion dollar penalty without hearing all the evidence on the issue of Carole's vindictiveness.
Arthur moved to reopen the cause to present additional evidence that Beldon at no time forgot about his 1976 will and that Carole's will contest was motivated by vindictiveness. That motion was denied, 5 and on November 13, 1991, the court granted Carole's petition to share in the estate under section 6560. This timely appeal followed.
Arthur contends that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to give effect to Beldon's intent, clearly expressed in the will, to disinherit persons who contested the will; (2) Carole was equitably estopped from claiming a share in Beldon's estate as a pretermitted spouse after vindictively contesting his will; and (3) the court abused its discretion when it declined to reopen the proceedings to hear additional evidence.
The interpretation of a will is an issue of law, which this court independently determines. (Estate of Dodge (1971) 6 Cal.3d 311, 318, 98 Cal.Rptr. 801, 491 P.2d 385; Poag v. Winston (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1173, 241 Cal.Rptr. 330.) Here, it was stipulated between the parties that Carole remarried Beldon after the execution of his 1976 will and was his surviving spouse. This stipulation established that Carole had a statutory right under section 6560 to share in Beldon's estate unless, as provided in section 6561: (1) Beldon intentionally failed to provide for her and this intention appeared from the will; (2) he provided for her by a transfer outside the will; or (3) Carole made a valid agreement waiving her right to share in Beldon's estate.
However, the stipulation of the parties disposed of the last two of these possibilities. The parties agreed that (1) Carole had not validly waived her right to share in Beldon's estate and (2) Beldon did not provide
for Carole outside of his will. Thus, the threshold issue for determination is whether it "appears from the will" (§ 6561, subd. (a)) that Beldon intentionally failed to provide for Carole. If not, then we must determine, in view of Carole's unsuccessful will contest, whether the no contest clause can nonetheless operate to defeat her pretermission rights.
Arthur contends that an intent not to provide for Carole appears in paragraph TENTH of the will. Under well established authority, the disinheritance clause in paragraph TENTH of the will plainly does not refer to Carole with adequate specificity so as to overcome her rights as an omitted spouse. The clause does not demonstrate that Beldon contemplated a future marriage or that he intended to disinherit an after acquired spouse.
In order for a testator to disinherit an heir who might otherwise assert a pretermission claim (i.e., a surviving after acquired spouse or afterborn child) the intent to disinherit such heir must appear "in strong and convincing language" on the face of the will. ...
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