Estate of Keeven, Matter of
| Citation | 110 Idaho 452,716 P.2d 1224 |
| Decision Date | 20 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 15615,15615 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Barbara Louise Hurst KEEVEN, Deceased. Sylvester H. KEEVEN, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant, Appellant, v. Lila WAKLEY, Personal Representative, Defendant-Counterclaimant, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
John B. Kugler, Pocatello, for plaintiff-counterdefendant, appellant.
DaLon Esplin, Pocatello, for defendant-counterclaimant, respondent.
This is an appeal from an order of the magistrate court that (1) the appellant, Sylvester Keeven, was not an omitted spouse in his deceased wife's will within the meaning of I.C. § 15-2-301 and (2) the decedent's real property was her separate property. The district court dismissed Keeven's appeal stating that it was not provided for by statute and that the magistrate's order was not a final judgment. We reverse the district court's dismissal of Keeven's appeal and affirm the magistrate court's order.
The facts of the case are as follows. Barbara VanLeuven was a widow when she and Sylvester Keeven began living together around 1976. In March of 1979, Barbara executed a will, leaving her personal property in equal shares to her five children, and her real property in six equal shares to her five children and her "dear friend Sylvester Keeven." The residue of Barbara's estate was left in equal shares to her children. Barbara's sister, Lila Wakley, was nominated as personal representative.
In February of 1980, Barbara married Sylvester Keeven. On September 19, 1982, Barbara died. The will of March 1979 had not been redrafted, amended or revoked.
Lila Wakley made an informal application for probate of the will on October 13, 1982. She was appointed personal representative and gave notice to Keeven. Keeven petitioned for homestead, exempt property and family allowances provided under I.C. § 15-2-401. On December 13, 1982, the parties stipulated that Keeven was entitled to the allowances and that he was entitled to live in the house for a maximum of one year after the decedent's death.
An inventory listing was filed on March 17, 1983, and a second inventory was filed on May 5, 1983, characterizing and valuing the property of the decedent as separate or community.
On April 27, 1983, the personal representative moved for partial summary judgment approving the characterization of decedent's real property, a house in Lava Hot Springs, as her separate property. In response, Keeven filed an affidavit alleging that he personally performed a majority of the construction of the house and contributed his own money and resources to its construction. He also alleged that he and his deceased wife had always intended and agreed to consider the house as belonging to each of them. The personal representative's motion was granted. In its Memorandum Decision and Order, dated June 30, 1983, the magistrate court refused to consider Keeven's affidavit of the oral agreement between himself and the decedent since such testimony would violate I.C. § 9-202(3) (Idaho's Deadman Statute). The magistrate stated that since there existed no written agreement as to the transmutation of the separate real property to community property, there was no genuine issue of material fact to preclude declaring the real property as separate.
Both Keeven and the personal representative then filed motions for partial summary judgment to determine if Keeven was an omitted spouse pursuant to I.C. § 15-2-301 and therefore entitled to an intestate share of decedent's estate. After a hearing, the magistrate court granted the personal representative's motion. The court found that Keeven was provided for in the will.
The personal representative had also filed a motion for partial summary judgment to settle the characterization and valuation of all property in the second inventory based on Keeven's failure to respond to her Requests for Admissions. On February 6, 1984, the court denied this motion holding that the facts contained in the second inventory were still in dispute. The magistrate also ordered Keeven to turn over possession of the house to the personal representative.
Keeven filed an appeal of the magistrate court's order to the district court. The personal representative filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and, in the alternative, filed a cross-appeal on the magistrate's denial of partial summary judgment settling the characterization and valuation of the property in the second inventory. Initially, the district court dismissed Keeven's appeal but suggested it would again entertain the appeal if the magistrate court certified that its order constituted a final judgment under Rule 54(b).
On May 3, 1984, the magistrate court did certify its order, and the district court again took jurisdiction and scheduled briefing and hearing dates on the appeal.
After a hearing, the district court issued an order striking its previous order scheduling the case for appellate briefs and hearing. It also modified its previous decision by eliminating that portion suggesting it would entertain an appeal if a Rule 54(b) certificate was filed by the magistrate court. The district court remanded the case to the magistrate court for completion of the probate and stated it would not entertain any more appeals until the probate was completed, unless the appeal was specifically provided for by the rules or statutes.
Keeven now appeals that dismissal to this Court.
Under I.A.R. 11(b), Keeven can appeal the magistrate's order to the Supreme Court in this probate proceeding as a matter of right only if the order would have been appealable from the magistrate to the district court. Whether the magistrate's order is appealable to the district court is governed by I.R.C.P. 83(a). In this case, I.R.C.P. 83(a)(3) provides the avenue for Keeven's appeal. That part of the rule provides for an appeal "[f]rom any order, judgment or decree by a magistrate in a special proceeding in which an appeal is provided by statute."
Keeven argues that the questions raised in his appeal of the magistrate's order deal with issues encompassed in subsections 3, 4 and 7 of this statute. The district court disagreed, noting that "the only exception which vaguely matches any of the issues decided by the magistrate is exception No. 7, which speaks of the 'distribution or partition of an estate, or any part thereof, or the payment of a debt, claim, legacy or distributive share.' " However, the court said, since the personal representative's "administration" of the estate does not constitute a "distribution" of the estate, subsection 7 is inapplicable.
We agree with the district court that subsection 7 is inapplicable, and based on the plain language of subsection 4, it too appears inapplicable. Only subsection 3 provides a colorable basis on which Keeven can appeal.
In Estate of Pierce, 95 Idaho 625, 515 P.2d 1017 (1973), this Court noted that
"By the enactment of I.C. § 17-201, the legislature intended that certain actions taken by the courts handling the settlement of decedent's estate were of such material consequence that it was essential the decisions reached by the courts in those areas should be subject to review by a higher court regardless of whether such decisions were 'final judgments' as provided by I.C. § 13-201." Id. at 626, 515 P.2d at 1018.
In Pierce, the Court held that an order of intestacy and appointment of an administrator was appealable under I.C. § 17-201(1) even though not a final judgment. See also, Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 318, 678 P.2d 108, 110 (Ct.App.1984), (a more literal approach to subsection 6 of I.C. § 17-201 was followed).
The Omitted Spouse
I.C. § 15-2-301 provides:
Hence, a determination that someone is an omitted spouse is a determination "against the validity of the will" (I.C. § 17-201(3) ) as to the omitted spouse, but not as to the other devisees. Upon such a determination, those other devisees' share is abated but not reevaluated based on intestacy. The will remains partially valid. I.C. § 17-201(3) should not be read to mean the order...
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