Estate of Koplin
| Decision Date | 14 June 1977 |
| Citation | 139 Cal.Rptr. 129,70 Cal.App.3d 686 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Estate of Dorothy B. KOPLIN, Deceased. Kenneth CORY, as State Controller, et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. Brenda KOPLIN, Objector and Appellant. Civ. 49253. |
Page 129
v.
Brenda KOPLIN, Objector and Appellant.
[70 Cal.App.3d 689]
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Volk, Newman, Marsh, Gralla & Karp, Los Angeles, for objector and appellant.Myron Siedorf, Margaret F. Groscup and Phyllis K. Fairbanks, Los Angeles, for respondents.
STEPHENS, Associate Justice.
This is an appeal from an order overruling appellant's objections to the report of the inheritance tax referee and fixing inheritance tax based on a special power of appointment which the objector-appellant had disclaimed in writing prior to the filing of said report. The order was based on the court's finding that appellant's disclaimer had not been filed 'within a reasonable time after the disclaimant acquired knowledge of the interest.' Appellant (Brenda Koplin, a.k.a. Brenda Resos) is the daughter of decedent Dorothy B. Koplin. The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in its determination that appellant's disclaimer of the power of appointment granted to her in her parents' Declaration of Trust was untimely.
The Facts
The relevant facts found by the court are as follows:
'I. On September 13, 1967, Dorothy B. Koplin, decedent herein, and Harry Koplin, her surviving spouse, executed and entered into Wills and a revocable inter vivos trust entitled the 'Harry and Dorothy B. Koplin Family Trust,' the assets of which were community property.'
'IV. Decedent died on February 11, 1974.
'V. Said Trust was still in existence at the date of decedent's death.
'VI. On the date of decedent's death (appellant) was aware that she was granted a beneficial interest under decedent's Will and said Trust, but had not seen either document nor did she have knowledge of the specific beneficial interest granted. She had no knowledge that she was granted a power of appointment under the trust until April 1975.
'VII. On or about February 26, 1975, Paul Adcock, State Inheritance Tax Referee, forwarded to the attention of Peter Greenfield, 1 a Notice and Determination of Inheritance Tax taxing a life estate and power of appointment, having a new value of $411,032.06, to said (appellant), which amount when combined with the value of $34,121.72 ascribed to an insurance policy, resulted in a tax to her in the amount of $40,921.53.
'VIII. On or about April 9, 1975, a superseding Notice and Determination of Inheritance Tax was forwarded to Peter Greenfield providing for the same values and taxes due.
'IX. Thereafter, during April 1975, said (appellant) was informed and became aware for the first time that she received a power of appointment under the terms of said Trust and was informed of the tax consequences thereof.
'X. On April 22, 1975, said (appellant) served upon the Trustees and upon Paul Adcock, as Inheritance Tax Referee, her declaration disclaiming the power of appointment as granted in said Declaration of Trust.' 2
[70 Cal.App.3d 691] From the foregoing findings, the court concluded: 'I. Said disclaimer was not filed within a reasonable time after the
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disclaimant acquired knowledge of the interest. II. The Objections to Report of Inheritance Tax Referee are hereby overruled. III. The Report of the Inheritance Tax Referee is true and correct.'Contentions
Appellant contends:
'(1) The judgment fixing the report of the inheritance referee cannot be sustained as a matter of law by reason of appellant's disclaimer of the [70 Cal.App.3d 692] special power of appointment having been timely filed in accordance with Probate Code section 190.3. 3
Appellant urges that her interest in the special power of appointment was not 'indefeasibly
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fixed' under the proper construction of Probate Code section 190.3(a)(3) so as to support a finding by the trial court that her disclaimer was untimely as a matter of law. 4 Section 190.3(a)(3) provides in pertinent part: '(3) In case of interest created by inter vivos trusts, (a disclaimer is conclusively presumed timely if made) within nine months after the interest becomes Indefeasibly fixed.' (Emphasis added.) She contends that an interest which is 'indefeasibly fixed' is an interest which is 'indefeasibly vested'--that is, a vested interest which is not subject to any kind of divestiture of quality [70 Cal.App.3d 693] or quantity. Appellant reasons that since her interest in the special power of appointment is subject to divestiture, the nine month period provided for under section 190.3(a)(3) could not begin to run against her until the preceding life estate held by her father had come to an end. She concludes that since this has not yet occurred her disclaimer must be conclusively presumed to have been filed within a reasonable time as a matter of law. Respondent, of course,...To continue reading
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Bennett v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Bennett)
... ... 71] Kansas Statutes Annotated section 592292 (1983 & Supp.1990): a disclaimer can be filed within 9 months of the time the interest became indefeasibly fixed both in quality and quantity. The Kansas Supreme Court adopted the comments of the California Court of Appeals in Estate of Koplin, 70 Cal.App.3d 686, 694, 139 Cal.Rptr. 129 (1977), in construing that State's disclaimer statute: * * * public policy is best served by allowing a beneficiary to make a disclaimer of his interest at that point in time where the beneficiary is best able to weigh the alternative possibilities of ... ...
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Griffin's Estate, Matter of
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Kaplan v. Kirkland (In re Estate of Kirkland)
... ... Hence, we have before us a judgment roll appeal. (Prob. Code, 1050.) An appellant in a judgment roll appeal may not attack the sufficiency of the evidence, and we presume there was sufficient evidence to support the probate court's findings of fact. (Estate of Koplin (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 686, 693; Ducray v. Ducray (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 480, 483.) "[A] record is inadequate, and appellant defaults, if the appellant predicates error only on the part of the record he provides the trial court, but ignores or does not present to the appellate court portions of the ... ...
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In re Powell, Case No. 14-43428
... ... Court on March 12, 2015, on a Motion to Declare Notice of Disclaimer Void (Motion) filed by the Chapter 7 Trustee (Trustee) for the bankruptcy estate of Steven Craig Powell (Debtor). Objections were filed by Terrica Powell, in her status as a beneficiary of the estate of Michael Powell, and by the ... In this example, it is uniformly accepted that the interest "indefeasibly vests" upon the death of the life interest. See, e.g. , Estate of Koplin , 70 Cal. App.3d 686, 696 (1977). This interpretation is also supported by a review of the Washington State disclaimer statute (RCW 11.86.010-.090) ... ...