Estate of Lang
Decision Date | 19 February 1980 |
Docket Number | 76-1543,Nos. 76-1353,s. 76-1353 |
Citation | 613 F.2d 770 |
Parties | 80-1 USTC P 13,340 The ESTATE of Grace E. LANG, Deceased. Richard E. LANG, Executor, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
George W. Steers, Jones, Grey & Bayley, Seattle, Wash., for Lang Estate.
Appeal from a Decision of the United States Tax Court.
Before WRIGHT and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges, and MURRAY, Senior District Judge. *
The Tax Court held that (1) family loans on which the statute of limitations had run were gifts subject to gift taxes; (2) a penalty should be assessed for the lender's failure to file gift tax returns; and (3) state gift taxes were deductible from the gross estate as a "claim against the estate." The taxpayer appealed the gift tax and penalty rulings, while the Commissioner appealed the estate tax ruling.
We hold that the Tax Court erred on the penalty issue but correctly decided the other issues. Our jurisdiction to review Tax Court decisions derives from 26 U.S.C. § 7482 (1976). 1
All facts were stipulated. Mrs. Grace Lang, a Seattle resident, died testate in June 1968. Her estate tax return was filed in September 1969. In 1972 the Commissioner made two additional claims against her estate ("taxpayer").
The first claim was for gift taxes owing. Mrs. Lang had made two interest-free loans to her son Howard in 1962 and 1963. He failed to repay them, and the state statute of limitations ran on them in 1965 and 1966. The Commissioner claimed that, by allowing the statute to run, Mrs. Lang effectively gave the amount of the loans to her son and his wife. Mrs. Lang had not filed federal gift tax returns in either 1965 or 1966. As a result, the Commissioner assessed not only a gift tax deficiency but a penalty against the estate.
The Commissioner's second claim was for estate taxes owing. Two weeks before her death, Mrs. Lang created an irrevocable trust for the benefit of her children. Federal and state gift taxes on the gift were not paid until after her death. Under Washington law, the state gift taxes could be credited against state inheritance taxes.
On its federal estate tax return, the taxpayer claimed a credit for the state inheritance taxes and two unpaid-debt deductions for the federal and state gift taxes. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction for the state gift taxes. He contended that, because they were credited against state inheritance taxes, they actually were inheritance taxes. Under I.R.C. § 2053(c)(1)(B), state death taxes cannot be deducted as unpaid claims against the estate.
On the gift tax issue, the Tax Court ruled that the loans were gifts and that taxes and penalties were owing. On the estate tax issue, the Tax Court held that the state gift taxes did not become state inheritance taxes and therefore were deductible as an unpaid debt.
Estate of Meyer v. Commissioner, 503 F.2d 556, 557 (9th Cir. 1974), quoting Factor v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 100, 109 (9th Cir. 1960), Cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933, 81 S.Ct. 380, 5 L.Ed.2d 365 (1961). "Factual inferences from undisputed facts" also will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Paxton v. Commissioner, 520 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016, 96 S.Ct. 450, 46 L.Ed.2d 389 (1975).
I.R.C. § 2501 provides for a tax on the transfer of property by gift. I.R.C. § 2511(a) states that "the tax imposed by section 2501 shall apply whether . . . the gift is direct or indirect." 2
Treas.Reg. § 25.2511-1 (1958) explains the gift tax in greater detail. Subsection (a) of that Regulation says that "a taxable transfer may be effected by . . . the forgiving of a debt," and subsection (c) provides that "all transactions whereby property or property rights or interests are gratuitously passed or conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device employed, constitute gifts subject to tax."
Subsection (g)(1) further defines a gift for gift tax purposes:
Donative intent on the part of the transferor is not an essential element in the application of the gift tax to the transfer. The application of the tax is based on the objective facts of the transfer and the circumstances under which it is made, rather than on the subjective motives of the donor . . . . The gift tax is not applicable to a transfer for a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth, or to ordinary business transactions (defined in Treas.Reg. § 25.2512-8 as transactions which are bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent).
In Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306, 65 S.Ct. 652, 654, 89 L.Ed. 958 (1945), the Supreme Court reiterated that donative intent is not an essential element of a taxable gift.
The taxpayer contends that the loans could not be gifts under those definitions because the running of the statute of limitations is a "nonevent" and not the equivalent of a "transfer of property," or even the forgiveness of a debt. It asserts that the running of the statute does not extinguish a debt but merely creates an affirmative defense in a collection suit. If the debtor does not assert the defense, the creditor can still collect the debt.
The running of the statute of limitations, however, accomplishes much more than the taxpayer suggests. It serves to transfer control of a debt to the debtor at the end of the statutory period. Thereafter, it is the debtor rather than the creditor who decides whether and under what terms loaned funds will be repaid. 3 Cf. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181, 63 S.Ct. 545, 547, 87 L.Ed. 690 (1943) () That control is transferred by a statutory mechanism rather than an overt donative gesture is not significant. "Indirect" gifts are as subject to the gift tax as are "direct" gifts. I.R.C. § 2511(a); Treas.Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
The taxpayer also argues that the Tax Court erred in its assessment of the facts and circumstances of the transfer. The Tax Court presumed that, because the loan was to a family member, Mrs. Lang knowingly allowed the statute of limitations to run. It cited Heringer v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927, 77 S.Ct. 225, 1 L.Ed.2d 162 (1956), as authority for the presumption. In that case, parents transferred their property to a corporation and issued 60% Of the corporate stock to their children. This court said that "(t)he family context of the transactions created a presumption of gift," Id. at 151, and held that gift taxes were due.
A number of other factors support the presumption of a gift in this case. First, although Howard borrowed substantial sums from his mother on five occasions between 1962 and 1967, he repaid none of the loans. Second, prior to her death, Mrs. Lang expressly forgave portions of two of the loans. Then, in her will, she forgave all of Howard's remaining debts. Finally, these loans were not typical business loans, for they bore no interest.
In light of the above, the Tax Court did not err in inferring that Mrs. Lang allowed the statute of limitations to run and thereby implicitly forgave the debts. 4 Paxton v. Commissioner, supra. Further, we note that this finding of donative intent on the part of Mrs. Lang was not essential to the Tax Court's ultimate finding of a taxable gift. Commissioner v. Wemyss, supra.
Finally, the taxpayer contends that the Tax Court erred in not relying on Securities Co. v. United States, 85 F.Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.1948), and Schweppe v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1224 (1947), Aff'd, 168 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1948). Both cases held that the running of the statute of limitations did not transform a loan into a gift. These cases are not controlling here because they pertain to income tax rather than gift tax. A gift is defined differently for purposes of income tax than for purposes of gift tax. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 284, 80 S.Ct. 1190, 1196, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 (1960); Hamberg v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1968).
We conclude that the Tax Court did not err in finding that, under I.R.C. § 2511, these loans became gifts subject to gift taxation when the statute of limitations ran on them.
I.R.C. § 6651(a) provides for a penalty of up to 25% Of the tax due for failure to file a required return, unless that failure is "due to reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect." "Reasonable cause" is "the exercise of ordinary business care and prudence." Treas.Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (1971). The taxpayer bears the burden of proof as to reasonable cause. Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 1957).
The Tax Court upheld the penalty because the taxpayer failed to introduce evidence that the failure to file was due to reasonable cause. The taxpayer asserts on appeal that the circumstances of the case "speak for themselves."
We agree. In 1965 and 1966, income tax law indicated that loans on which the statute of limitations had run did not become gifts. Securities Co. v. United States, supra ; Schweppe v. Commissioner, supra. In the absence of any gift tax cases on point it was not unreasonable for Mrs. Lang to believe that her loans did not become gifts and that therefore she owed no gift tax on their transfer. Cf. Matter of I. J. Knight Realty Corp., 431 F.Supp. 946, 958 (E.D.Pa.1977) ( ).
The Tax Court's finding that the penalties under § 6651(a) were...
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