Estate of Leefers

Decision Date27 September 1954
Citation127 Cal.App.2d 550,274 P.2d 239
PartiesIn the Matter of the ESTATE of Richard LEEFERS, Deceased. A. E. GALLAGHER, Public Administrator, Petitioner, v. Henry LEEFERS, Jr., Objector and Respondent, Herbert Brownell, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, Appellant. Civ. 4860.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Dallas S. Townsend, Asst. U. S. Atty. Gen., Director, Office of Alien Property, Laughlin E. Waters, U. S. Atty. for Southern Dist. of California, Los Angeles, Valentine C. Hammack, Sp. Asst. to the U. S. Atty. Gen., James D. Hill, George B. Searls, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., and Max Wilfand, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Boston, Mass., for appellant.

Clarence Harden, San Diego, for respondent.

GRIFFIN, Acting Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal by the Attorney General of the United States, as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, Executive Order No. 9788, 11 Federal Register 11981, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 6 note, from a decree establishing interests in the decedent's estate under section 259 of the Probate Code.

Richard Leefers, a naturalized citizen and resident of the United States, died intestate in San Diego County, California, on January 15, 1944, leaving an estate consisting entirely of personal property, valued at approximately $11,000. He was never married. He left surviving him certain described heirs then living in, and citizens of Germany, and Henry Leefers, Jr. (described as American claimant) who, at all times here concerned, was and is a citizen of the United States and residing therein.

A petition to probate the estate by the public administrator was filed in San Diego County on January 17, 1944. On March 13, 1947, the American claimant, objector and respondent herein, filed his petition for an order to determine interests in the estate. Objection was made to distribution of any portion of the assets to the foreign heirs because, at the time of decedent's death, there did not exist any reciprocal right on the part of citizens of the United States to take personal property and money in Germany by succession on testamentary disposition upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of Germany, and the American claimant asked that distribution of the entire estate be made to him under the provisions of sections 259, 259.1 and 259.2 of the Probate Code of California. The Attorney General, appearing as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, denied generally these allegations and alleged that such reciprocal rights defined by these code sections did then exist, and asked that distribution be made to him as such custodian. (On September 15, 1945, the Alien Property Custodian issued Vesting Order No. 4130, purporting to vest all right, title and interest of the named foreign heirs described therein for the use and benefit of the United States.)

After several weeks of trial the learned trial judge rendered a 59-page written opinion setting forth these facts and fully discussed the evidence produced by the Government in aid of its contentions and the facts in evidence produced by the respondent which he claims support his claim to the estate.

The question here presented on this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the trial court and whether the ultimate conclusion and judgment that on January 15, 1944, the date of the death of the deceased, there existed no reciprocal right on the part of citizens of the United States to take personal property upon the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens of Germany, and whether the Government had, on behalf of the foreign heirs, met the burden of proof cast upon it, Sec. 259.1, Probate Code, to show that such reciprocity existed.

Voluminous evidence was introduced through expert witnesses as to the German law relating to inheritance rights in effect at the time of decedent's death. It consisted of the text of German statutes and decrees, commentaries by German authorities upon such laws, expert testimony upon the meaning of the laws, and evidence as to the practical construction and application of the laws by German courts. Without setting it forth in detail, the issues before the trial court required a consideration not only of the existence of the foreign statutes but a finding as to their effect based upon the interpretation of them and their practical application by the German courts. The parties did not agree as to the correct interpretation of the statutes and each stressed uncertainties and ambiguities which require explanation. Moreover, it was shown that the right to inherit in foreign countries depended upon certain policies of the Nazi regime. Upon all these subjects both parties presented considerable testimony by experts. The Government's testimony compared favorably with the evidence produced by it in Re Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.App.2d 1, at pages 4, 5, 6 and 7, 230 P.2d 667. The Government experts concluded as their opinion that with respect to the pertinent sections of the German Civil Code as to the right to inherit and succeed, that no distinction was made between Nationals of Germany and foreigners, including American citizens; that under the German law of inheritance any foreigner may succeed to an estate in Germany the same as a National in that country; that this right of inheritance remained intact throughout the Nazi regime; and that no laws were enacted which in any way abrogated it.

In direct contradiction to this evidence there were certain qualifying laws and enactments or decrees received in evidence, extracts from certain text books and commentaries, as well as expert opinions to the effect that these decrees or laws offered by respondent herein made testamentary dispositions to certain classes or certain individuals invalid, particularly if they were contrary to what was termed by the National Socialist Regime, the 'Healthy National Sentiment', and that the German Civil Code was to be disregarded if the distribution of the estate was against 'Healthy National Sentiment'.

In support of the judgment the trial court found that as to certain extracts from German laws offered in evidence by the Government, there was no conflict with the California law in reference to succession, and particularly enumerated those laws, including the Weimer Constitution of the German Reich, effective August 11, 1919, providing in part as follows:

'Article 154

'(1) The right to inherit is guaranteed in accordance with Civil Law.

'(2) The share of the estate in inheritance is determined by the laws * * *.'

However, the court found that subsequent to these laws certain Nazi amendments were decreed, including one dated March 24, 1933, wherein the Reichstag enacted a law concerning the 'Removal of the Distress of Nation and Reich', which provided generally that the laws of the Reich may deviate from the Reich Constitution to the extent to which 'they do not have the institution of the Reichstag and the Reich Council as their object', and that the 'rights of the Reich President remain untouched'. These laws were made effective upon publication.

On July 31, 1938, under the Nazi regime, a law was enacted amending the provisions of the German Civil Code as follows: Sec. 48, Par. (1)

'A disposition for the event of death is void insofar as it is contrary to mandatory provisions of law.

'(2)--Any disposition for the event of death is void insofar as it is contrary--because of being grossly opposed to sound sentiment of the people--to consideration which a decedent, who is conscious of his duties, must have towards his family and the community of the people.'

On July 14, 1933, a law was passed by the Reichstag, translated as:

'Sec. 2. Reich nationals who are abroad, may be declared deprived of their German nationality if they have damaged German interests by a behavior which is contrary to their duty of loyalty against the Reich and Nationa. The same applies to Reich nationals who do not obey an order to return which has been directed to them by the Reich Minister of the Interior under reference to this rule.

* * *

* * *

'The Reich Minister of the Interior, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, decrees in each particular case the extent to which the loss of German nationality applies to spouses, to legitimate or legitimated children, and in the case of women, to illegitimate children.'

Another enactment dated May 21, 1935, provides in Article 18 thereof as follows:

'A German in the sense of this law is every Reich national although he possesses also a foreign nationality.'

On November 5, 1937, the Reichstag enacted a law providing:

'Sec. 1. Exclusion of de-naturalized persons from taking by succession, inheritance, and gift.

'(1) A person who has been deprived of his German nationality by virtue of sec. 2 of the Law of July 14, 1933 (RGBI I p. 480), cannot take by succession or inheritance from a German national.

'(2) The same applies to the spouse and the children of the persons referred to in par. 1, to whom the loss of nationality extends according to Sec. 2, par. 4 of the law of July 14, 1933.

'(3) Gifts by German nationals to persons referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) are prohibited. Anyone who makes or promises a gift contrary to this prohibition, is punishable with imprisonment up to two years and with a fine or with one or the other of these punishments.'

There was issued on October 11, 1939, a decree deemed to have the effect of law, which is translated as follows: 'Absentee Administration Decree', consisting of nine sections, the general purport of which was to require courts having probate jurisdiction to appoint administrators, under such directions and regulations as should be given and made by the Reich Minister of Justice, to take charge of the property of absent persons generally, but specifically upon 'order from the higher...

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  • Gogabashvele's Estate, In re
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 12 Septiembre 1961
    ...is no 'reciprocal right' within the meaning of the code section. Estate of Miller, 104 Cal.App.2d 1, 12, 230 P.2d 667; Estate of Leefers, 127 Cal.App.2d 550, 274 P.2d 239. This statute is constitutional. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 67 S.Ct. 1431, 91 L.Ed. Thus, where the right of a citize......

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