Estate of Legeas, In re
| Decision Date | 10 March 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. A036182,A036182 |
| Citation | 208 Cal.App.3d 1516,256 Cal.Rptr. 117 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Previously published at 208 Cal.App.3d 1516 208 Cal.App.3d 1516 In re ESTATE OF Margaret T. LEGEAS, Deceased. Margaret P. McINERNEY et al., Appellants, v. Jane CONNOLLY et al., Respondents. |
Clyde W. Stitt, San Francisco, for appellants.
Nelson H. Wild, Robert A. Belluomini, San Francisco, for respondents.
Foremost among the questions presented by these appeals is whether California will recognize a tort cause of action for the fraudulent destruction of testamentary instruments. We align California with other states which allow recovery in tort for the intentional deprivation of an expected inheritance.
The decedent, Margaret T. Legeas, executed numerous wills and codicils in her old age. The heart of this dispute centered around which of two of those wills would be admitted to probate.
The first will was executed by Mrs. Legeas in September of 1970. Enumerated therein were 27 specific bequests, including $10,000 to sister Jane Connolly; $2,000 to cousin Father Jarlath Heneghan; $20,000 to niece Margaret McInerney; and $20,000 to "my beloved friend, attorney and advisor, Timothy J. McInerney." Mr. McInerney was nominated as executor and given the power to distribute the residue of the estate "to each of my legatees named or otherwise referred to hereinbefore, and in such amounts as my Executor ... shall in his sole discretion determine, and to such charities as he shall, in his sole discretion, select."
The second will was executed in May of 1979. Among the 17 specific bequests were $3,000 to Father Heneghan and $11,000 to Ms. Connolly. The residue of the estate was bequeathed to Ms. Connolly. Father Heneghan was nominated by Mrs. Legeas as the executor of her estate. There is no mention of either Mr. or Mrs. McInerney.
Between 1970 and 1983, the close friendship between Mrs. Legeas and the McInerneys cooled. Mrs. Legeas felt that Mr. McInerney had unduly profited from a joint business venture and from his handling of the estate of Mrs. Legeas' husband. Mrs. Legeas was annoyed by "lovey-dovey" telephone calls from Mr. McInerney, whom she found intimidating and with whom she wished to avoid personal contact. Her feelings were the same with respect to Mrs. McInerney, although less intensity of emotion was involved. 1 Mrs. Legeas' antagonism towards Mr. McInerney progressed from distrust to fear and outright hatred. Up to 1983 Mrs. Legeas concealed from the McInerneys knowledge that she had executed the 1979 will.
By May of 1983 Mrs. Legeas' physical condition had deteriorated to the point that Father Heneghan had her placed in a nursing home. In August of that year Mrs. McInerney initiated conservatorship proceedings and was appointed temporary conservator of the person and estate of Mrs. Legeas. Later that month, Mrs. McInerney collected certain assets of the estate such as passbooks, certificates of deposit, and stock certificates, most of which she left with her attorneys. In one of Mrs. Legeas' safety deposit boxes Mrs. McInerney discovered the original of the 1979 will. Surprised at its provisions, Mrs. McInerney put it into her purse and did not turn it over to attorneys representing her in her capacity as Mrs. Legeas' conservator. According to the McInerneys, they gave the will to Mrs. Legeas, who subsequently told them she had torn it up.
Mrs. McInerney's petition to be appointed permanent conservator was successfully opposed by Father Heneghan as well as three of Mrs. McInerney's brothers and sisters on the grounds of (1) Mrs. Legeas' expressed desire that the McInerneys not "have anything to do with my person or my estate" and (2) fears that Mr. McInerney would dominate his wife and thus gain control of Mrs. Legeas' estate. The probate court appointed a bank as permanent conservator of Mrs. Legeas' estate and a charitable organization as permanent conservator of her person.
Mrs. Legeas died in July of 1984 at age 83, leaving an estate valued at approximately $500,000. The following month Mr. McInerney filed a petition asking for admission of the 1970 will to probate, and for his appointment as executor of the estate. Several weeks later Father Heneghan filed a petition for admission to probate of the 1979 will 2 (the original of which was alleged to have been "lost or fraudulently destroyed or [is] being concealed"), as well as his appointment as executor of the estate. The two petitions were consolidated.
In November of that year the McInerneys filed a complaint by which they elected to contest the 1979 will on the grounds that (1) it had been executed at a time when Mrs. Legeas was "mentally incompetent" and acting under the undue influence of the attorney who drafted it, 3 and (2) "in 1983, decedent tore up and destroyed the purported 1979 will ..., with intent to revoke the same, and with the express intent to revive and make effective, as her last will and testament, the ... 1970 will."
Ms. Connolly responded with a cross-complaint to the McInerneys' probate petition, and with a separate complaint which The causes were tried in probate court by a jury which returned two verdicts. The first was a special verdict finding that the 1970 will had been revoked by Mrs. Legeas and that the 1979 will had been fraudulently destroyed. A judgment ordering admission of the 1979 will to probate was entered in due course. The jury also returned a general verdict in the fraud action finding Mr. and Mrs. McInerney liable for compensatory damages of $182,616.60 (which represented the attorneys' fees incurred by Ms. Connolly in connection with all three actions), and further finding Mr. McInerney liable for punitive damages of $150,000. A separate judgment reflecting this verdict was also entered.
was given a separate civil action number. 4 In each of these pleadings (as subsequently amended) Ms. Connolly alleged causes of action against the McInerneys for (1) their fraudulent destruction of the 1979 will (2) their "use of fraud[,] undue influence[,] and duress" in procuring the destruction of the 1979 will by Mrs. Legeas (3) their interference with the prospective economic advantage Ms. Connolly would have received under the 1979 will (4) a constructive trust covering the estate assets to which Ms. Connolly would be entitled under the 1979 will should the McInerneys prevail in having the 1970 will admitted to probate (5) the McInerneys' failure to produce the 1979 will as required by Probate Code section 320, and (6) the intentional spoliation of evidence. The new action was ordered "consolidated for purposes of discovery, motions, and trial" with the probate proceedings
Following denial of their motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdicts, the McInerneys filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgments. Mr. McInerney also appeals from a pretrial order of instruction to the special administrator of Mrs. Legeas estate, and from an order denying his motion for reconsideration.
We were more than a little surprised upon reading the parties' briefs by their agreement that California has never taken a position regarding the question whether the fraudulent destruction of a will is an actionable wrong for which tort recovery may be had. Our independent research confirmed that the parties were indeed correct.
The area of transfers from a decedent's estate has proven to be a fertile breeding ground for fraud. Courts have condemned fraud in a constellation of contexts. Its reported manifestations have been organized by commentators into these categories: (1) in inducing or preventing an inter vivos conveyance; (2) in the procuring of the execution of a will; (3) in the prevention of the execution of a will; (4) in causing the revocation or alteration of a will; (5) in the prevention of the revocation or alteration of a will; and (6) in the destruction, concealment, or spoliation of a will. (See Evans, Torts to Expectancies in Decedents' Estates (1944) 93 U.Pa.L.Rev. 187; Annot., Liability in Damages For Interference with Expected Inheritance or Gift (1983) 22 A.L.R.4th 1229; 2 Page on Wills (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960) §§ 24.1, 24.3-24.5; Rest., Restitution, § 184, com. a.) Our concern is with the last grouping.
Judicial aversion to testamentary-related fraud is not a recent phenomenon. The common law of Britain permitted equitable relief to recover a bequest which had been frustrated by the destruction or concealment of a will. (See e.g., Barnesly v. Powel (Ch. 1749) 1 Ves.Sen. 284 ; Tucker v. Phipps (Ch. 1746) 3 Atk. 359 ; Hampden v. Hampden (H.L.1709) 3 Bro.P.C. 550 .) The impulse to refuse judicial sanction to fraudulent interference with testamentary transfers continued after the formation of the United States. Traditional equitable remedies such as the imposition of a constructive trust were, however, deemed inadequate for complete redress. Beginning in 1834, the courts of eight states have explicitly recognized an independent tort action for damages caused in the intentional destruction, concealment, or spoliation of a will. Courts in at least nine other states have given indications that such a cause of action would probably find a favorable reception. (...
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