Estate of Mcferren v. Infinity Transport

• Decision Date: 30 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. W2004-02278-SC-WCM-CV.,W2004-02278-SC-WCM-CV.
• Citation: 197 S.W.3d 743
• Parties: ESTATE of Dennis McFERREN v. INFINITY TRANSPORT, LLC
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

197 S.W.3d 743

ESTATE of Dennis McFERREN v. INFINITY TRANSPORT, LLC

No. W2004-02278-SC-WCM-CV.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel.

June 28, 2005 Session.

May 30, 2006.

Keith M. Alexander, Southhaven, Mississippi, for the Plaintiff-Appellant, Estate of Dennis McFerren.

Lori Dale Parish, Memphis, Tennessee, for the Defendant-Appellee, Infinity Transport, LLC.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CLAYBURN PEEPLES, Sp.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JANICE M. HOLDER, J., and RON E. HARMON, Sp.J., joined.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to and heard by the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We find that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant in the first lawsuit due to insufficient service of process pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.03. The doctrine of prior suit pending does not apply, and the second lawsuit was not barred. The trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment against the defendant and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for reinstatement of the default judgment against the defendant.

At issue is whether or not a second suit filed against employer for workers' compensation benefits in one division of the Chancery Court for Shelby County is barred by the doctrine of prior suit pending when the sheriff's office lost proof of service of process in first suit with identical issues and parties. Proof showed that forty-nine days after putative service in the first suit the sheriff's department issued a "Lost Letter" verifying service of process but was unable to identify the person upon whom process served or to describe the manner of service. Two months after filing first suit plaintiff filed a second suit with identical issues and parties in a different division of the Shelby County Chancery Court and later moved for a default judgment in the second suit, which was granted by the trial court.

Upon motion to rehear, however, the trial court set aside the previously issued default judgment and dismissed the complaint, relying upon the doctrine of prior suit pending. Plaintiff argues that the prior suit was not pending due to the fact that insufficient service under Rule 4.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure prevented the first court from obtaining in personnum jurisdiction over the defendant and that therefore, the doctrine of prior suit pending could not apply. We agree.

The facts are essentially uncontested. The original plaintiff, Dennis McFerren, filed a complaint for workers' compensation benefits against the defendant, Infinity Transport, LLC, an Arkansas corporation, on October 23, 2003, in the Chancery Court for Shelby County. At the time of filing the complaint was given a docket number of CH-03-2044 and was assigned to Part One of the Chancery Court for Shelby County. It alleged that on January 19, 2003, while working for defendant, Infinity Transport, plaintiff, McFerren, sustained a work-related injury to his lower back and bilateral extremities.

Subsequent to filing first suit plaintiff issued process for service upon National Registered Agents, Inc., the registered agent for defendant, Infinity Transport, in Tennessee. The office of National Registered Agents, Inc. being in Nashville, Tennessee, process was sent to the sheriff of Davidson County, Tennessee, for service.

On December 11, 2003 the Warrant Division of the Davidson County, Tennessee Sheriff's Department sent a "Lost Letter" notification to the Clerk of Chancery Court for Shelby County, Tennessee indicating that on October 29, 2003 the Davidson County Sheriff's Office had received process relating to the first suit filed, that of October 23, 2003. The Sheriff's letter stated that the Sheriff's Office served the same process the following day, October 30, 2003. The "Lost Letter" notification further stated that the Sheriff's Department had misplaced the original of the process and thus was unable to identify either the person served or to describe the manner of service. Nor was such information forthcoming.

As of January 1, 2004, defendant, Infinity Transport, had filed no response to plaintiff's complaint, and the following day, January 2, 2004, plaintiff filed a second complaint against Infinity Transport alleging precisely the same work-related injuries as had been alleged in the first complaint of October 23, 2003. This complaint, that of January 2, 2004, was given a docket number of CH-04-005 and was assigned to Part Two of the Shelby County Chancery Court. A private process server served process in this second suit upon the chief agent of defendant Infinity Transport's Shelby County, Tennessee office on January 6, 2004.

On February 11, 2004, having received no response from defendant Infinity regarding either complaint, plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment in Cause # CH-04-005, that being the second complaint, that filed on January 2, 2004.

On February 20, 2004, the trial court entered a default judgment against defendant and set a Writ of Inquiry, which was mailed by plaintiff's attorney to defendant's place of business. On March 22, 2004, the court granted plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $42,257.26 plus costs for medical and disability benefits.

Plaintiff subsequently filed that judgment with the State of Arkansas, and on June 2, 2004, defendant, Infinity Transport, filed a petition with the trial court asking that the earlier default judgment be set aside. Prior to this, on May 24, 2004, the original plaintiff, Dennis McFerren, was killed in an automobile accident, but his estate responded to defendant's petition for setting aside the default judgment on June 21, 2004.

On July 6, 2004, the trial court, relying on the doctrine of prior suit pending, entered an order setting aside the default judgment previously entered, dismissed the complaint and taxed the costs to defendant. The trial court opined that it had not been given notice at the original hearing for default judgment that the prior suit had been filed and that plaintiff should have taken a non-suit in the first suit before proceeding with his motion for default judgment in the second. The trial court then remanded further proceedings to Part One of the Chancery Court for Shelby County.

Also on that day, July 6, 2004, defendant Infinity Transport filed an answer to plaintiff's original complaint of October 23, 2003, the first response defendant had made thereto.

On September 7, 2004, the trial court entered a subsequent order on defendant's petition to set aside the default judgment, that order essentially identical to its earlier order, that of July 6, 2004 except that the subsequent order did not remand the case to Part One of the Shelby County Chancery Court. It is from this order that plaintiff appeals.

There being no dispute as to the facts of the case, as they relate to this appeal, it is now left to us to determine, as a matter of law, whether the doctrine of prior suit pending applies to those facts.

There is also no dispute regarding Tennessee's recognition of the doctrine of prior suit pending. For well over a century our courts have consistently held that where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter, the first of those courts to acquire jurisdiction takes exclusive jurisdiction over it. Any subsequent actions must, therefore, be dismissed. In courts of concurrent jurisdiction, that court which first acquires jurisdiction thereby acquires exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, if there is another suit pending in a court of concurrent jurisdiction between the same parties, concerning the same subject matter, and for the same object, the defendant to the second suit may plead the pendency of the former suit as a defense to the second. Metro. Dev. & Housing Agency v. Brown Stove, 637 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1982) (hereinafter "MDHA").

The purpose of, and rationale behind, the doctrine of prior suit pending is nothing less than to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to preserve that unquestioned authority and rank that makes it possible. Id. at 882. A similar, but not identical, principle operates in the federal system, there termed the "first-filed" rule. This "first-filed" rule was developed in order to avoid the danger of inconsistent results and the duplication of judicial effort. Martin v. Townsend, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13955, No. 90-2616, 1990 WL 159923, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct.15, 1990).

The authority of that court first acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties continues until the matters in issue are disposed of, and no court of coordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its actions. Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins. Co. v. Patricia Lee Futrell Corley, Estate of Robert Leon Corley, and Cheryl Ann Jones Patterson, 2003 Tenn.App. LEXIS 940, No. W2002-02633-COA-R9-CV, at *9, 2003 WL 23099685, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec. 31, 2003).

Not only have Tennessee courts consistently recognized the doctrine of prior suit pending, they have been uniform in delineating the requirements prerequisite to its being applied. It has been clearly established, and held repeatedly, that in order for the doctrine of prior suit pending to apply, three conditions must be met; they are as follows:

(1) The two cases must involve identical subject matter, and

(2) The suits...